THE ONTOLOGY OF AGENCY IN THE LIGHT OF DETERMINISTIC CAUSATION: A FOLK-PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY
In this piece of work I have revisited the free will problem which is a problem about intentional agency under deterministic causation as is perceived in the folk mindscape. I have first tried to disentangle the concept of deterministic causation from some of its mistaken offshoots like fatalistic inevitability and have shown how holding and transmitting this misconception to the concept of agency can negatively manipulate the folk-psychological concept. In fact, a primary contention of this paper is to adduce evidence that folk concept about agency may not subliminally run counter to deterministic causation. It is only the particular libertarian belief of the experimenting philosopher that may interpret it as indeterministic. Citing some folk-psychological studies, I have tried to propose that folk-psychology may support event-causal account of agency, which is consistent with determinism.