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California State University, Los Angeles
Philosophy Faculty

Talia Bettcher (2000–), Chair, Ph.D. University of California, Los Angeles. History of Modern Philosophy, Philosophy of Self, Gender and Sexuality

Mohammed Abed (2008–), Ph.D. University of Wisconsin, Madison. Ethics, Social and Political Philosophy, Philosophies of Violence, Genocide and Terrorism

Bruce Atta (1996–), M.A. California State University, Los Angeles. Metaphysics, Epistemology, Ethics, Social and Political Philosophy

Mark Balaguer (1992–), Ph.D. City University of New York. Philosophy of Mathematics, Metaphysics, Meta-ethics, Philosophy of Language, Logic

Jay Conway (2005–), Ph.D. University of California, Riverside. 19th-20th Century Philosophy, Modern Philosophy, Aesthetics, Social and Political Philosophy

Richard Dean (2009–), Ph.D. University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. Ethics, Kant's Moral Philosophy, Applied Ethics

Foad Dizadji-Bahmani (2013–), Ph.D. London School of Economics, United Kingdom. Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Physics, Philosophy of Probability

Ronald Houts (1983–), Ph.D. University of California, Los Angeles. Metaphysics, Epistemology, Logic

Keith Kaiser (2001–), Ph.D. University of California, Los Angeles. Metaphysics, Philosophy of Mind

Steven R. Levy (2005–), Ph.D. University of California, Los Angeles. Epistemology, Metaphysics, Logic, Applied Ethics

Henry R. Mendell (1983–), Ph.D. Stanford University. Ancient Philosophy, History of Ancient Mathematics and Science, Philosophy of Science, Metaphysics

David Pitt (2003–), Ph.D. City University of New York. Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics

Joseph Prabhu (1978–), Ph.D. Boston University. Philosophy of Religion, 19th and 20th Century German Philosophy, Moral and Social Philosophy, Indian and Comparative Philosophy

Sheila Price (1964–), M.A. University of California, Los Angeles. Recent Philosophy, Comparative Religions, Medical Ethics, Environmental Ethics

Michael K. Shim (2007–), Ph.D. State University of New York, Stony Brook. 20th Century Continental Philosophy, Phenomenology, Husserl, Modern Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language

Kayley Vernallis (1993–), Ph.D. University of California, Berkeley. Moral Psychology, 19th and 20th Century Continental Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy, Ethics, Aesthetics, Gender and Sexuality

EMERITUS PROFESSORS

Thomas Annese (1961–1992), Epistemology, Modern Philosophy

Sharon Bishop (1967–2004), Ethics, Political Philosophy, Philosophical Psychology, Feminist Ethics

Donald Burrill (1962–1992), Ethics, Philosophy of Law, American Philosophy

Ann Garry (1969–2011), Feminist Philosophy, Philosophical Methodology, Epistemology, Applied Ethics, Wittgenstein, Philosophy of Law

Ricardo J. Gómez (1983–2011), Philosophy of Science and Technology, Philosophy of Mathematics, Kant, Latin American Philosophy

George Vick (1967–1997), Metaphysics, Phenomenology, Existentialism, Philosophy of Religion, Medieval Philosophy

Professor Spotlight: Bruce Atta

Bruce Atta has been continuously teaching philosophy at Cal State LA since 1997. Professor Ann Garry assigned him his first class, Critical Thinking, while he was finishing his MA. Since then he has regularly taught Critical Thinking, Metaphysics, Epistemology, Applied Ethics, Philosophy of Biology, and Themes of Adult Life. Bruce has several passions in life: music, philosophy, the novels of Murakami, Palahniuk and Lethem, watching movies; and, most importantly, spending time with his significant other, Margo, and their three dogs.

When Bruce was fifteen years old, his two brothers decided to form a hardcore punk band called Middle Class, which he joined as their drummer. Young Atta toured with the band across the US and Europe. Not only was Middle Class popular, it also became a seminal band of the early hardcore punk scene in Southern California. When he was twenty-one, he left the band but continued working as an independent musician.

When asked what motivated him to major in philosophy, his answer was that he somehow fell into it. He continued his career as a musician after getting his undergraduate degree in philosophy. In the ’90s, realizing how much he enjoyed philosophy, and

how inescapable he found it, he decided to return to his studies by pursuing an MA at Cal State LA. He attended classes taught by professors Ann Garry, Ricardo Gomez, Ron Houts, Jennifer Faust, and Mark Balaguer. He jokingly remarked that being a professor at the same university where he had once been a student makes him feel like "a barnacle that can't be scraped away." He enjoys being a professor in Cal State LA's philosophy department because the atmosphere is incredibly collegial and everybody appreciates one another.

In the classroom, Bruce has a mastery of his subject matter and captivates his students with the remarkable ability to make complicated ideas accessible to those who are just beginning to grapple with philosophy. Whether they are ethical concepts, such as utilitarianism or deontology, or metaphysical and epistemological ones—like subjective experience, teleology, dualism, and the mind-body problem—he introduces them with examples taken from everyday life and personal experiences. To illustrate how he explains the nature of subjective experience in response to behaviorism, he said: "The way that I experience my headache isn't the same as the way that you experience my headache." Inspired by his classes, many of his students have changed their minor or major to philosophy. One former student was so inspired by his teaching of Peter Singer's article, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality," that now, as a business owner, he gives a portion of his profit to charity organizations.

Bruce thinks that philosophy is important because it exposes one to different methods of thinking and opposing viewpoints, and compels one to critically evaluate earlier prejudices. Philosophy makes students less myopic about their academic careers, and provides them relief from the pressure of having to pursue a degree for merely mercenary ends. By helping students exercise their critical faculties, philosophy enables them to lead their lives more deliberately. According to Bruce, philosophy is a natural part of human life, to which everyone is exposed when confronting ethical dilemmas or once they recognize their own mortality. However, struggling with the issues of philosophy isn't some-

thing that can be easily achieved without a mentor to decode and make accessible the required tools. Bruce teaches philosophy with humor and humility. He engages the students and pushes them to tackle philosophical issues in an environment of laughter and joy. He says, borrowing from Nagel: "We don't have to be romantic by following Camus in his tragic or heroic approach to the absurdity of life. We can approach our life with humorous irony instead of despair."

When initially asked to be this year's spotlight, Bruce demurred on the grounds that other professors were more deserving. However, the pedagogical mastery of philosophy that he brings to the department is irreplaceable; and he is widely considered to be one of the best professors at Cal State LA. His commitment to philosophy and his students is inspiring.

— N.R. et al

Staff Spotlight: Donna Balderrama

"But the effect of her being on those around her was incalculably diffusive: for the growing good of the world is partly dependent on unhistoric acts; and that things are not so ill with you and me as they might have been, is half owing to the number who lived faithfully a hidden life, and rest in unvisited tombs." — George Eliot, *Middlemarch*

Over the millennia, philosophy has woven in and out of respectability and institutional support. Although it has moved between being viewed as dangerous to superfluous, the Philosophy Department at Cal State LA is uniquely situated toward the positive end of this spectrum. Donna Balderrama, the department's Office Manager, is one of the principle reasons that philosophy has found such a wonderful home here. People often discuss the nature of the campus community in a way that minimizes staff involvement. Colleges are viewed as relationships between ideas and books, students and professors. However, before any faculty member or student enters into the world of ideas they have to engage with Donna. And throughout their time here, Donna is a constant guide, resource, and friend. Philosophy couldn't ask for a better person to both welcome those new to it and nurture its practitioners.

Donna has been working at Cal State LA off-and-on for over thirty years. However, her life circled around the campus itself even before she started working. Donna grew up on a street where Parking Lot F and Student Housing are now located. Her very first job was at the Trident Shop bookstore (now the Barnes & Noble on campus). Her mom worked in Transcripts and Records for over thirty-five years. Oscar, her husband of thirty-eight years,

and many in her family are Cal State LA alums. She is truly in the family business.

Donna first started working at the campus bookstore when she was seventeen. She left for about ten years to raise her two children—Matthew and O.J., a project manager for app/web design and a television writer, respectively—whom she's immensely proud of. After briefly going back to work in the bookstore, Donna moved to Human Resources: "I loved hiring people. I loved giving people jobs." Eventually Donna was given the opportunity to work for the Philosophy Department. Recalling when she was first offered the job she said, "I thought I'd died and gone to heaven. Everyone was so nice." When asked if she thought this was because of the specific people in the department or if there's something intrinsic to philosophy that attracts nice people she replied, "Philosophy. These people are special people. You don't get that in all the departments. They're really good people. They have big hearts and they really want to see you succeed. And the students are the same." While most people fall in love with philosophy because of the texts, Donna fell in love with the people. And every philosopher that meets her reciprocates that love.

As the Office Manager, Donna's presence extends far beyond her job description. Many people refer to her as "motherly" or "matriarchal". Bureaucracy can infantilize and frustrate even the most stalwart of individuals. If Donna is perceived as motherly it is because of her ability to smooth out bureaucratic quagmires and enforce a sense of justice in an otherwise faceless engagement with paper work and computerized processing. "Although it sounds very, very trivial," said professor Ricardo Gomez, "it is nice to be welcomed all the time with a big smile." From birthdays to faculty farewells, guest lectures to department parties, Donna ensures that everyone is made to feel appreciated and cared for.

In a department where over half the students are taught by part-time faculty, Donna eliminates hierarchical boundaries and engenders an atmosphere of respectful sociability between graduate assistants, full-time faculty, and lecturers that is rare at most colleges. No matter what your status, Donna has your back and

compels everybody to respond in kind. Undoubtedly, this contributed to her being one of the recipients of the Distinguished Women Awards in 2007.

Everyone asked to comment on Donna's role in the department said some version of the same thing: she's the glue that keeps it all together. There are numerous positive aspects of the Philosophy Department at Cal State LA that one could point to. Donna is the nexus that colors and shapes those aspects into a cohesive whole. Students, faculty, and staff all acknowledge that it just wouldn't be the same without her. Philosophy is immensely grateful to have such a thoughtful steward and friend.

— M.H. et al

Contingentism and Correctness Conditions for Mathematical Fictionalism

Nefeli Ralli

Introduction

Fictionalism is an anti-realist view in the philosophy of mathematics that takes mathematical statements to be about abstract objects. However, fictionalists reject the existence of abstract objects like numbers. Thus, they consider ordinary mathematical sentences like "2 is even" to be false. Nevertheless, they must provide an account of fictional mathematical correctness in order to explain the importance of mathematics in our reasoning and its applicability in our everyday lives. For this reason, fictionalists have to explain why and under what conditions "2 + 2 = 4" is fictionally correct while "2 + 1 = 4" is fictionally incorrect, even though they take both of these statements to be strictly speaking false. There are different accounts of fictionalism that provide different explanations of what makes a mathematical sentence fictionally correct. However, we might wonder to what extent those correctness conditions can be objective if mathematics is merely a useful fiction—is mathematical correctness something independent of people?

Imagine a possible world in which no people exist. In this world, is the sentence "3 is prime" correct? Zoltan Szabó has argued that fictionalists about mathematics will have to answer the question in the negative, because fictionalism renders fictional mathematical correctness conditions contingent on the existence of sentence tokens and therefore people. However, common intuition suggests that "3 is prime" would be correct even in a world with no people. This conclusion can be secured by adopting a form

of contingent fictionalism that is different from the one Szabó has considered. In this paper, I will argue that there is a version of fictionalism in the literature, due to Mark Balaguer, that is capable of avoiding Szabó's objection by employing a different kind of contingentism that does not make fictional correctness dependent on the existence of linguistic communities; in virtue of this, this version of fictionalism maintains the objectivity of mathematics.

In Section I, I will briefly explain what mathematical fictionalism is. In Section II, I will explain why fictionalists need to rely upon a 'true-in-the-story-of-mathematics' predicate and the role that this predicate plays within fictionalism. I will then articulate two competing accounts of what truth-in-the-story-of-mathematics consists of. In Section III, I will summarize an objection to fictionalism that Szabó poses in the form of a dilemma: either fictionalism cannot escape commitment to abstracta, or it commits to an implausible version of contingentism. In Section IV, I will explain Mark Balaguer's counterfactual reading of 'true-in-the-story-of-mathematics', and explain how fictionalists can avoid Szabó's objection if they use Balaguer's reading of this operator. In Section V, I will compare the correctness conditions provided by each view and argue that the counterfactual account provides a greater degree of objectivity and is capable of avoiding certain theoretical problems inherent in the referential account. In Section VI, I will conclude with a summary of the features that make the counterfactual account plausible.

I. Fictionalism

Fictionalism in mathematics is a metaphysical view about our mathematical discourse that opposes Platonism. Platonists hold that our mathematical statements are about abstract objects, which are non-physical and non-mental. Moreover, these objects do not occur within space-time; call this the *Platonist semantic thesis*. Furthermore, Platonists maintain that abstract objects actually exist; call this the *Platonist ontological thesis*. The primary virtue of Mathematical Platonism is its ability to provide a simple, consis-

tent, and robust semantic analysis of our mathematical discourse. It allows us to explain the objectivity of mathematical correctness, and it allows us to account for the infinity of numbers; if, for instance, numbers were physical things, it would be an empirical question what the largest number was. Moreover, Platonist semantics does not impute implausible semantic intentions onto speakers; it does not suggest, as some anti-Platonist views have, that when a person says "2 is even" that she *means* "if there are numbers, then 2 is even". As such, it can plausibly be understood as providing a *face-value reading* of mathematical discourse. Fictionalists agree with Platonists that if there were numbers, they would be abstract objects. Thus, they are committed to the Platonist semantic thesis; they think that our mathematical sentences are supposed to be *about* abstracta. However, unlike Platonists, fictionalists do not think there are any abstract objects—they reject the Platonist ontological thesis. Fictionalists are a subset of nominalists—they only believe in the existence of concrete (non-abstract, physical or mental, spatiotemporal) objects.

Both fictionalists and Platonists (of the kind I am considering) assume that there is only one kind of existence. The result of this univocal quantificational analysis is that all existent things exist in the same sense of the word. The sentence "3 is prime" is of the logical form **Fa** and consequently entails a statement of the form (**∃x**) (**Fx**), which quantifies over numbers. Oranges, houses, and numbers are meant to exist in the same sense and there is no substantial difference in the kind of existence involved in those sentences that express existential claims (i.e., "There is a house" and "There are numbers"). Numbers, however, are not concrete objects; they are supposed to be abstract objects and according to fictionalists they do not exist since only concrete objects exist. As such, fictionalists believe that mathematical sentences are false and that the singular terms occurring in mathematical sentences are vacuous and fail to refer.[1] When fictionalists claim that terms fail to refer, they mean that those terms are supposed to be about some object(s), and those objects do not exist. Moreover, fictionalists are committed to the view that the truth-value of the sentences

in which these terms occur depends upon the existence of the objects in question. For instance, when somebody says: "That tree has green leaves", the truth of the statement depends upon the existence of the tree that the person is intending to refer to, there being leaves on that tree, and those leaves being green. Fictionalists take statements like "3 is prime" to function analogously, but they hold that 3 does not exist (because abstract objects do not exist), and so they think the statement is false.

II. Truth in the Story

While fictionalists believe that sentences like "3 is prime" are strictly speaking false, they think that there is nonetheless something importantly correct about such sentences; they believe that such sentences are *true-in-the-story-of-mathematics*. This true-in-the-story predicate plays a fundamental role in the fictionalist program; it enables fictionalists to recapture correctness conditions for mathematical statements, to begin explaining the important work that mathematical reasoning does in our everyday lives, and to vindicate our strong intuitions about arithmetic and other branches of mathematics. According to fictionalists, mathematical sentences are false analogous to the way that "Alice drank tea with the Mad Hatter" is false but nonetheless *true in the story of Alice in Wonderland*. The view is that while neither "1 + 1 = 2" nor "1 + 1 = 3" is true simpliciter, "1 + 1 = 2" is true-in-the-story-of-mathematics[2] while "1 + 1 = 3" is not (Balaguer 1998, pp. 12-13 and Field 1993, p. 289). Thus, while mathematical sentences are not true simpliciter, there is another truth predicate—true-in-the-story-of-mathematics—which applies to all the mathematical sentences that we typically think are true. Alternatively, if a statement is true-in-the-story-of-mathematics, it is *fictionally correct*. So the true-in-the-story predicate provides *fictional* correctness conditions for mathematical statements. However, we must keep in mind that the *literal* correctness conditions are different from the *fictional* correctness conditions. The former render all mathematical sentences false (or vacuously true), whereas the latter

provide another layer of correctness; namely, one that is relativized to the story of mathematics. In what follows, when I speak of correctness conditions, I mean *fictional correctness conditions*.

In providing correctness conditions for mathematical statements, the fictionalist *pragmatically* uses a fictional truth as a nearby truth. The word "*pragmatically*" is used to show that the sentence that carries the fictional truth is not intended to substitute the original sentence as a mere synonym—it is not a *semantic paraphrase* (Szabó 2003, pp. 20-24). The pragmatic paraphrase, which provides us with the result that its original counterpart is true-in-the-story-of-mathematics, diverges in truth-value from the original sentence, which is literally false. Fictionalists in general accept this distinction between semantic and pragmatic paraphrases, and hold that the correctness conditions for fictional truth are provided by pragmatic paraphrases; they disagree with one another about what the pragmatic paraphrases for mathematical sentences *are*. There are several accounts of *truth-in-the-story-of-mathematics*. I will examine two views: the first is a referential account; the second is a counterfactual account. The referential account holds that in talking about the story of mathematics, we refer to a *theory*, whereas the second holds that if the numbers that our mathematical theories purport to be about existed, then certain mathematical sentences would be true.

1. The Referential Account of Fictionalism (RAF): Szabó considers this view when he articulates a possible objection to this interpretation of fictionalistic correctness conditions (Szabó 2003, p. 23). This view takes the true-in-the-story predicate to be equivalent to an *according-to-T* operator. The idea is that, on this view, to say that S is true-in-the-story-T is just to say that according to T, S. On Szabó's construal, T occupies a referential position, so this view entails commitment to a referent, namely, a theory. So fictionalists of this sort hold that *"According to Peano Axioms, every number has a successor"* is true and stands in as the pragmatic paraphrase for the literally false sentence *"Every number has a successor"* to provide fictional correctness conditions.

2. The Counterfactual Account of Fictionalism (CAF): Mark

Balaguer's view as described in *Fictionalism, Theft and the Story of Mathematics* (Balaguer 2009) develops a different account of correctness conditions. On this view, we can account for the correctness conditions of mathematics if we give a counterfactual reading to the *true-in-the-story-of-mathematics* predicate. In particular, on this view, to say that some sentence S is true-in-the-story-of-mathematics is to say this: "*If there were abstract objects of the kind that our mathematical theories purport to be about, then S would be true*". For the purposes of this paper, I will use C: "*If there were abstract objects of the kind that our mathematical theories purport to be about, then 3 would be prime*" as an illustrative instance of the counterfactual that gives correctness conditions for the story of mathematics.[3]

On Balaguer's view, correctness is determined partially by our intentions, as it is a matter of *what our theories purport to be about:* we have certain pre-theoretic beliefs about what we are trying to capture by means of our mathematical theories, and these beliefs put certain constraints upon what can count as consistent with our full conception of numbers, sets, etc. The counterfactual correctness conditions are capable of capturing this fact, and of providing correctness conditions beyond what can be entailed by currently accepted axioms and theorems. The example Balaguer uses to illustrate this point concerns mathematicians who discover a correct answer to the question of whether the continuum hypothesis is true or false, something which is undecidable given currently accepted set theoretic axioms. Neither the continuum hypothesis nor its negation is a consequence of *currently* accepted axioms. However, mathematicians might be able to discover an axiom which they all take to be obvious, and which provides an answer to the continuum hypothesis question that is compatible with currently accepted set theory. If correctness conditions are given by our currently accepted theories, then in this situation, the continuum hypothesis would *become* true-in-the-story-of-mathematics as soon as it is incorporated into the theory. This intuitively seems wrong, as the axiom would express part of the conception of sets that mathematicians had been concerned with all along, and

the mathematicians would take this axiom to have been true and the continuum hypothesis to have been correct all along. So, the correctness conditions of mathematics cannot depend solely on currently accepted axioms and theorems but also on our conception of the branch of mathematics we are talking about (e.g., set theory).

III. Szabó's objection to fictionalism and an obscure account of contingentist fictionalism

According to Szabó, if we interpret *true-in-the-story-of-mathematics* as "*According to T*", this involves reference to a theory and thus fictionalism carries commitments to theories (Szabó 2003, p. 23). That generates an issue as fictionalists must settle on a particular view of what a *theory* is. A theory can either be an abstract object (composed of types) or a concrete object (composed of tokens). On one standard reading, a theory is a set of sentence types, or propositions. A proposition is an abstract object; it bears the meaning of a sentence, and it is what is purported to be held in common between sentences of various languages that are taken to *mean* the same thing. For example, "Snow is white" and "La neige est blanche" mean the same thing, and so express the same proposition. If this is the case though, it cannot help fictionalists, as they would be explaining why some mathematical sentences are correct in virtue of features of some other abstract objects. However, fictionalists reject all abstract objects. If the fictionalist claims that she does not believe that propositions exist either, but that talk of such things is merely a useful fiction (i.e., that it is false), then she would still owe an account of what makes one sentence about propositions correct and another incorrect, and insofar as she tries to provide this account in terms of other abstract objects, her account faces an infinite regress. As such, an account which attempts to provide correctness conditions for talk about abstract objects in terms of other abstract objects will simply conclude that no mathematical sentence is *fictionally* correct, i.e.,

true-in-the-story-of-mathematics. If the *correctness conditions* refer to abstracta (which, on the fictionalist supposition, do not exist), then *all the sentences* would end up false and there would not be any difference in correctness between the sentences "3 is prime" and "4 is prime".

Szabó points out that fictionalists can escape this problem by adopting the view that theories are concrete entities, e.g., linguistic tokens like strings of sounds, or piles of ink. But according to Szabó, this is problematic because, given the fact that linguistic tokens do not exist necessarily, the sentences will express merely contingent truths. However, mathematical truth is presumed to be necessary, so we face an issue that needs to be resolved. The particular form of contingentism that is entailed by this interpretation of the *true-in-the-story* predicate is not viable. Nevertheless, as I will argue in the next section, if we follow Balaguer's interpretation, then we can develop a sensible kind of contingentism, which is capable of maintaining the objectivity of mathematics while providing a plausible account as to why the non-existence of mathematical objects is contingent. The problem with the kind of contingentism that Szabó considers stems from the idea that sentence tokens determine mathematical correctness. If sentence tokens determine mathematical correctness, then the correctness conditions will depend on the existence of people. But it seems that mathematical correctness is not dependent on the existence of people.

To begin illustrating this problem, suppose that there is a world in which there are no people, and consequently no mathematical or linguistic communities, and thus no mathematical practice develops. The statement, "According to T, S" will be false in this world. That is because there are no concrete mathematical theories in this world, since there are no individuals to express theory-tokens. As such, the term T will fail to refer to anything. Given this, there will not be any mathematical statements that would count as true-in-the-story-of-mathematics; both "3 is prime" and "4 is prime" would be false, and neither would be *fictionally* correct. This view thus entails that fictional mathemat-

ical correctness is *contingent on the existence* of sentence tokens, and consequently this version of contingentism makes substantive correctness conditions (ones in which some statements are *fictionally* correct) depend on the existence of some mathematically competent linguistic community. This seems intuitively wrong; if it is possible that certain mathematical sentences are correct, then they should be correct at some worlds which do not contain mathematically competent thinkers. According to the contingentist fictionalism (RAF) considered by Szabó, there would be no fictionally correct statements in such worlds. This suggests that the RAF account makes correctness conditions depend on the wrong things.

This version of fictionalism thus commits itself to a dependence thesis that we have no reason to endorse; it says that the fictional correctness of the statement "3 is prime" depends on there being sentence tokens that assert that 3 is prime. A further disadvantage of the RAF account is that it deviates from a face value reading of mathematical sentences by claiming that there are certain inferences that are valid which are intuitively invalid. For instance, the statement "According to PA, 3 is prime" entails that people exist. This inference, however, is wildly implausible. That mathematical statement has not implied anything about people.

Thus, this contingentism that Szabo's objection entails is not viable. However, there is another kind of contingentism, that counterfactual fictionalists could make use of. This kind of contingentism holds that some things do not exist (or exist), however there is nothing which necessitates their non-existence (or existence). To begin illustrating this alternative conception of contingentism, take the following Contingentist Platonist account, developed by Gideon Rosen (2002): mathematical objects exist but not of necessity, and so occur within some worlds, and not within others (Φ & $\Diamond\sim\Phi$). In the worlds in which these objects exist, the correctness conditions for mathematical statements are determined by features of the mathematical objects. Given the plenitude of possibilities, there are worlds in which mathematical objects do not exist and yet the physical world is exactly as it

is in *the actual world*. Contingentism, in this sense, presupposes that the concrete and abstract realms exist independently of one another and that it is possible for one to exist without the other. The two classes of things (concreta and abstracta) are utterly distinct from one another and there is no fundamental dependency between the two. The fictionalism developed by Balaguer uses a counterfactual conception of truth-in-the-story-of-mathematics that can be paired with this kind of contingentism that is different from the RAF kind of contingentism.

IV. Balaguer's fictionalism and a viable version of contingentist fictionalism

The correctness conditions, on this view, are given by the counterfactual C: "*If the abstract objects that our theories purport to be about existed, then 3 would be prime*". Balaguer uses a counterfactual conditional and thus avoids the use of declarative sentences that carry ontological commitments to abstracta or concreta in interpreting correctness conditions. The claim is merely that if the world were some certain way—in particular, if it were such that mathematical objects existed—then there would be certain further claims that would be true of it, and this consequence follows necessarily. It is important to note that C can be used by either contingentist fictionalists or necessitarian fictionalists. Contingentist fictionalists will interpret C as a counterfactual, and take the existence of mathematical objects to be possible, albeit not actual, whereas necessitarian fictionalists will interpret C as a counterpossible—as they hold that abstract objects necessarily do not exist. This is equivalent to the statement that it is not possible for abstract objects to exist; as such, when necessitarians use C, they are assuming an antecedent they take to be impossible. If the antecedent is impossible, then assuming it entails a contradiction. As such, necessitarians will need to adopt some non-classical logic in order to explain how conditionals with impossible antecedents can be true without entailing that all such conditionals are true. This is because, in classical logic, a contradiction entails the

truth of all statements. I will consider only the contingentist view, suggesting later that this view is prima facie more plausible than the necessitarian alternative.

On the standard Lewisian analysis of counterfactuals, a counterfactual ($A \mathrel{\square\!\!\Rightarrow} B$) is true if and only if in the nearest possible worlds in which the antecedent obtains, the consequent also obtains (Lewis 1986). Fictionalists, however, presumably reject the ontology of possible worlds. In speaking of possible worlds, I do not intend to commit to their ontology; when I refer to them, I do so only in order to cash out features of our modal-talk. For present purposes, it suffices to point out that while there is no consensus on what the correct analysis of counterfactuals is, any plausible view grants that if A entails B ($A \models B$), then the counterfactual "if A had been true then B would have been true" ($A \mathrel{\square\!\!\Rightarrow} B$) is true. It turns out that this is all that is required for the counterfactual analysis to be true, because C is necessarily true due to the entailment relation between A and B. Our standard mathematical theories make reference to 3, and the antecedent assumes that our standard mathematical theories are true descriptions of reality, so the consequent simply makes explicit what is implicit in, or entailed by, the antecedent. It is necessary analogously to the way the counterfactual "If there were bachelors on the moon, then there would be unmarried men on the moon" is necessary. As such, the consequent obtains in every possible world in which the antecedent obtains. Balaguer's view holds that the correctness conditions of mathematical statements are contained in the counterfactual, and in this way it is capable of avoiding several of the objections that have been leveled against RAF. The correctness conditions for mathematical statements depend upon how mathematical objects *would have been* if they existed, rather than upon concrete sentence tokens that are about abstract objects.

Moreover, this kind of contingentism that could be paired with Balaguer's view is a totally different kind of contingentism from that which is supported by RAFs, and it is not a bad kind of contingentism. A contingentist of this type would say that a statement or proposition is contingent if it is actually true but it

could be false, or vice versa, that it is actually false but could be true [(~Φ & ◊Φ) or (Φ & ◊~Φ)]. The counterfactual contingentist fictionalist (CCF) holds that while abstract objects do not actually exist, they could, i.e., the non-existence of numbers is not necessary. According to CCFs, our mathematical theories are contingent because the existence of mathematical objects is contingent, whereas the correctness conditions for mathematical statements are necessary. In contrast, the contingentism in RAF holds that the correctness conditions for mathematics are dependent upon the existence of sentence tokens and people.

According to CCFs, abstract objects do not exist in the actual world, but it is not necessary that they do not exist. CCFs arrive at the plausibility of this claim by conducting a thought experiment. They consider the sentence Ω: "Abstract objects do not exist but it is possible that they exist." (~Φ & ◊Φ) to see if there is a contradiction that would render the sentence impossible.[4] This statement does not entail a semantic or logical contradiction, so there is no incoherence arising from the meaning of the terms. This leaves for consideration facts about physical-empirical reality that would render the contingentist thesis incoherent and absurd. The CCFs cannot grasp any such facts—there is nothing contradictory in the actual world being as it is, and Φ being possible (i.e., that numbers could exist)—so they cannot see any reason for believing that abstracta necessarily do not exist. According to CCFs, it is actually true that numbers do not exist, but it is not absurd to think of an alternative in which they could have existed.

V. Objectivity for Correctness Conditions Recovered

CCFs thus make a much less controversial claim than RAFs; they simply hold that mathematical objects do not exist, and that there is no necessity involved in this lack of existence. This version of fictionalism (CCF) is true just in case there is a possible world in which mathematical objects exist, but they do not exist in this world. RAF, in contrast, uses descriptive statements in order to

capture correctness conditions and thus involves commitment to written or uttered theory-tokens. RAFs claim that certain sentences are true-in-the-story-of-mathematics because those sentences are members of a theory or are entailed by the sentences that constitute that theory. As such, RAFs claim that mathematical correctness is determined not by how the world *could* be, but by how it is—and this is a weakness for the referential account. Referential fictionalists must defend the claim that which mathematical statements are correct depends on the existence of tokens in the physical world.

By making the correctness conditions depend on the way in which certain abstract objects would have been, fictionalists are capable of capturing a higher degree of objectivity concerning the nature of mathematics, and of escaping worries about arbitrariness that are incurred when claiming that correctness conditions are determined by sentence tokens. Given that the counterfactual is about abstract objects of the kind that **our mathematical theories purport to be about**, it may seem that this brings in some degree of relativity or cultural arbitrariness, as the correctness conditions are not simply determined by the nature of abstract objects alone but partially by facts about our semantic intentions as well—i.e., what we intend to pick out as our story of mathematics. However, this feature of the counterfactual does not make the correctness conditions arbitrary so much as it specifies the range of abstract objects that can count as being the ones that set the correctness conditions for *our* story of mathematics. There could be a series of natural numbers that is very different from the one that we commonly think of when we are doing mathematics—one that lacks any number over 52, or in which there are numbers that do not have finitely many predecessors. If mathematical objects of the aforementioned kind exist, they are not the ones with which we are standardly concerned, and so they are not the ones that determine the correctness conditions of our mathematical theories.

To illustrate how CCF obtains a higher degree of objectivity for mathematical correctness, we can consider the objection that if there are no people, then there are no correctness conditions

for the story of mathematics. Referential contingentist fictionalists must accept this conclusion. If there are no people, then there are no sentence-tokens, and as such, no mathematical statements will be fictionally correct. The counterfactual contingentist fictionalists say that the correctness conditions for a given branch of mathematics (e.g., set theory) are given by our conception of that branch of mathematics and its logical entailments. On their view, when we are trying to capture the correctness conditions for a particular story of mathematics, we assume the counterfactual supposition that objects of the *specified* kind exist, and this does not depend on there being semantic intentions—it holds that if abstract objects (of the intended type) existed, then certain mathematical sentences would be correct. This account is thus thoroughly conditional; it does not depend upon people existing for there to be truths about what counts as correct or incorrect within a sufficiently well-specified story. Thus, according to CCFs, there is a possible world w in which there are no people but which contains abstract objects of the kinds that our mathematical theories purport to be about and in which 3 is prime.

One further important feature of CCF is that fictionalists and Platonists will be in rough agreement about the correctness conditions of mathematical statements; all that they will disagree upon is the truth-value of the antecedent in C: "*If the abstract objects that our theories purport to be about existed, then 3 would be prime*". Fictionalists will say that the antecedent is false but nonetheless possible. Platonists will simply take the antecedent as a true description of the way the world is. Moreover, in both cases, C is necessary, thus preserving the objectivity of mathematical correctness. Mathematical correctness is belief-independent analogously to the way correctness about logical entailments is belief-independent. Once we have concerned ourselves with a particular conception of mathematical objects of a certain kind, e.g., natural numbers, the correctness of a mathematical claim does not depend on our beliefs. 3 is prime regardless of what a particular person says or thinks. Furthermore, even if mathematical objects do not exist, there are objectively correct statements of mathematics, and

our standard mathematical theories will have objective correctness conditions.

VI. Conclusion

Szabó has argued that fictional correctness conditions of mathematical statements must be given by concrete sentence tokens, and that fictionalism thus entails an implausible dependence thesis. I have shown that fictionalists can and should avoid this conclusion. If fictionalists hold that mathematical objects exist contingently, and that the fictional correctness conditions for mathematical statements are given by a counterfactual of the form C: "*If the abstract objects that our theories purport to be about existed, then 3 would be prime*", then they do not need to be committed to the existence of anything in order to claim that some statements are correct and others are incorrect. I have argued that the contingentism inherent in this view does not entail any deep theoretical problems and is relatively plausible. CCF holds that the non-existence of mathematical objects is contingent, but that mathematical correctness is nonetheless necessary and belief-independent, given a counterfactual supposition. This account of mathematical correctness conditions is thus non-metaphysical in the sense that fictional correctness does not depend on the existence of anything, e.g., people or numbers. In adopting this version of contingentism, fictionalists are capable of endorsing correctness conditions that are roughly analogous to the correctness conditions that Platonists will endorse, thus preserving the close semantic connection between fictionalism and Platonism.

Notes

1. The kind of mathematical fictionalism I will argue for endorses the view that mathematical singular terms do not refer and therefore mathematical statements are false. Others that endorse a different view of vacuity hold that mathematical statements lack truth value.
2. There is more than one mathematical "story" that deviates from our standard mathematics. I will use the truth predicate "*true-in-the-story-of-mathematics*" as meaning true in the story of what our mathematical theories purport to be about. For further reference see Balaguer 1998, p. 13.

3. If instead of a counterfactual, a material conditional was used, then many mathematical statements that we take to be intuitively false would end up vacuously true; for instance, "If there are numbers, 2 is odd" is vacuously true if the antecedent is false.
4. A similar argument can be found in Rosen 2002, p. 294.

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The Right to Immigrate and Freedom of Association

Austin Mitzel

Immigration has become an urgent global issue in recent years. It is deserving of philosophical attention, and it has become a central topic in political studies. It raises foundational issues with respect to state sovereignty and human rights. Some, like Joseph Carens and Sarah Fine, have argued that there is little justification for preventing immigration. Others, like Wellman and Miller, are more impressed with the sovereignty of the state and self-determination of its members. In this paper, I will attempt to defend some of Wellman's and Miller's claims against those who believe that very few or no state restrictions on immigration are justified, while making important concessions to those who advocate for fewer immigration restrictions. All legitimate states, acting on behalf of their citizens, enjoy a right to association, which allows them to restrict immigration. However, when the fundamental interests of potential immigrants are at stake, and where immigration would not threaten the fundamental interests of those states or their members, they have an obligation to receive those immigrants.

My paper will proceed as follows: First, I will characterize Wellman's argument for the state's right to restrict immigration and Fine's response to it. I will then attempt to refine Fine's argument by explicating her notion of harm in terms of fundamental interests. I will show that where potential immigrants have fundamental interests in immigrating, all well-situated states have an obligation to receive them. Finally, I will consider some practical examples of fundamental and non-fundamental interests and consider the bearing of each on immigration.

In "Immigration and Freedom of Association," Wellman claims that: "Each of us has a morally privileged position over

our self-regarding affairs" (Wellman 2008, p. 114). The extent of the impact of a choice on the lives of others is a measure of the self-regard of that choice. The choice to murder a person is not self-regarding, because it has an unavoidably detrimental effect on another person. But the sort of books or movies I choose to read or watch in my home has little impact on other people. Hence, that choice is more private. Wellman is claiming that we have a particularly strong claim to decide these kinds of private or self-regarding choices for ourselves. The right to association—the freedom to go about our daily activities and undergo our projects, whether with others or alone—is crucial to this formula since it is an intimate and self-regarding choice. Thus, the privileged status of our self-regarding personal choices extends naturally to how and whether we choose to associate with others. This principle forcefully suggests that we are free to engage, or not engage, with whomever we like. Since the right is held equally by all people, all legitimate social interactions are the result of the mutually free choice to associate.

While the general freedom of association is clearly a matter of personal moral privilege, the limits set by self-regard are unclear. We might say that an affair, action, or decision is self-regarding when the effects it has on other people are of little moral relevance to those affected. Unfortunately, this does little to solve the problem. It just moves it onto new ground—'morally relevant' is just as ambiguous as 'self-regarding'. Wellman explicates the notion of moral relevance in terms of harm. If certain actions performed by an agent can be shown to have sufficiently harmful effects on others, we have reason to override or restrict the agent's right to do what she likes. One controversial example of this is free speech: Certain kinds of speech, in light of the fact that they cause objective harm to some specific person or group of people, and/or incite others to violence, are categorized as 'hate speech' and therefore not protected by law. However, mere harm is not necessarily enough to establish sufficient moral relevance. Sometimes, the importance of a right outweighs the harm done to others. Perhaps A feels harmed when B tells him that God hates

him and that he is going to hell. Presumably, B is still within his rights in speaking in this way. Wellman concedes that rights can and should be curtailed where they permit actions which cause a sufficient degree of harm to others. His defense of the state's right to prevent all immigration must therefore show that the harm caused to potential immigrants whose applications are denied does not outweigh the right of the state to choose its associates (its citizens).

Difficulties in clearly delimiting our rights are compounded with ambiguous notions of harm, and the sorts of harm which ought to be prevented by law. It is just this kind of ambiguity which Fine explores in her critique of Wellman's article. One of her responses consists in showing that the costs of incorporating immigrants into society are outweighed by the significant harms that are done to immigrants when they are refused entry. For Fine, the right to freedom of association held by groups (on which Wellman rests the state's right to refuse immigrants) only outweighs the interests outsiders have in joining these associations when the associations are either sufficiently *intimate* or *expressive*. One example of an intimate association is marriage: nobody would suggest that the interest A has in marrying some particular person, or the harm caused if he/she refuses, outweighs his/her right to refuse A's proposal. Similar considerations guide her understanding of expressive associations, or associations formed primarily for the purpose of expressing some point of view. A religious organization is an expressive association: its integrity as an expressive body would be compromised were it not allowed control over its membership. Intimate and expressive associations have a particular claim to exercise dominion over membership. Fine also concedes that associations may have more control over membership when the harm incurred is relatively insignificant. So to the extent that an organization is non-intimate and non-expressive, and as the costs of exclusion are greater, the group's claim to free association is weaker. On Fine's view, since the state is neither intimate nor expressive, the harm done to immigrants refused entry outweighs the state's right to refuse them.

In order to evaluate this argument, we need to make sense of the notion of harm that we ought to employ when discussing rights. Fine and Wellman elaborate very little on the notion of harm which they invoke in their discussions. They do distinguish greater and lesser harm, however. Fine says:

> Again, though not every action with potentially harmful effects can or should be prohibited, sometimes the interests in question are so substantial, and thwarting them is so detrimental to the well-being of the excluded, that exclusion itself becomes a cause for concern. (Fine 2010, p. 347)

Fine's characterization of harm singles out "Substantial" interests, and significantly "Detrimental" effects. She does this to avoid any rubric which would make all harm equally significant. However, substantiality does not necessarily address a lingering ambiguity. The substantiality of harm could be a measure of either its extent, or its nature, or both. By the extent of harm I mean its forcefulness in experience. If A accidentally pricks the palm of his hand with a needle, he experiences pain. If instead A were to accidentally stab his palm totally through with a knife, the pain might be of the same *type*, but would certainly be much more forceful. On one understanding of 'substantial', the second scenario is substantially worse, more painful, or more harmful, than the first. However, for the purpose of evaluating the interests or rejected immigrants, this understanding of substantiality must be ruled out. The experiential force of pain or harm varies from individual to individual. To see why, consider that each person's sensitivity to physical pain and social slights varies. Some have a higher pain tolerance, others a lower one. Imagine that I insult two people in a way that is perfectly within my freedom to speak. I've acted rudely, but not illegally. Person A listens and shrugs it off. Person B, however, is deeply hurt. Perhaps I have profoundly altered (if temporarily) her view of herself, or highlighted some flaw about which she is deeply insecure. If it doesn't yet seem that I have hurt Person B substantially enough, imagine that the insult distracts her from her job to such an extent that she gets fired. As a consolation,

she takes up drinking. Her depression and insecurity, exacerbated by alcohol dependency and unemployment, leads her to commit suicide.

My insult was not the direct cause of this series of deplorable changes in her life, but it was clearly involved, and the pain is indisputably substantial. That is, it is certainly substantial to *her*, since only the experience of extraordinary pain could cause such a reaction. But this means that the same action—insulting someone—can cause different people to experience levels of pain that are substantially different from one another. How could we evaluate an action based upon the harm it does to others if the experienced pain differs from individual to individual?

This difficulty perhaps suggests conceptualizing *substantiality* differently. First, harm should not be measured merely in terms of people's idiosyncratic experience. Perhaps two people who prick their fingers with needles experience the same harm, even though it barely registers for one person, and causes a stifling, hardly-containable outburst of pain for the other. This means that the substantiality of the harm is not directly associated with the reaction or the experience of the sufferer. On this view, the notion of harm will have to be placed on an impersonal foundation. We can do this by thinking of substantiality in terms of fundamentality, where the extent of harm has to do with how central the interest that it thwarts is. The most fundamental interests are those that are closest to a person. In ever-widening circles, interests that are more distant are less fundamental, less integral to a person's existence as a whole. A broken foot causes me harm. Conversely, it thwarts my interests—presumably at least the interest I have in a properly-functioning foot, and probably my interest in walking as well (among other interests). I am harmed in a different way when I am systematically subjected to an unjust, capricious political system. Say I am sentenced to work in a labor camp for an indefinite amount of time for criticizing some aspect of the state under which I live. This certainly thwarts my interests, and it seems to do so in a much more severe way. I have an interest in having non-broken feet, but this interest pales in comparison to the inter-

ests that are violated by a totalitarian state. Intuitively, the interest I have in living under a just political system which protects my rights is more *fundamental*.

This means that, when evaluating the extent of a right, we should restrict its operation only in cases in which it violates the fundamental interests of others. This will ensure that legally-binding notions of interest and harm will be independent of the sensitivity of different people. Additionally, this will ensure that our notion of interest does not unwittingly inscribe specific, idiosyncratic moral codes in our law. To see why this might otherwise be a problem, consider the justification for adopting the framework of rights in the first place. Rights allow individuals to act within a limited sphere of their own choosing. My religious freedom enables me to tend to my spiritual needs in whatever way I believe I ought to. It gives everyone else the right to do the same. The point of religious freedom, therefore, is to allow individuals who have different ideas and felt needs to pursue what they think is best. To consider a further example, some people are vegetarians/vegans on the grounds of conscience. For them, eating meat/consuming animal products is wrong because it causes pain to animals in unacceptable ways. Many people don't share this view and happily eat meat. The framework of rights in which we live allows consumers to make this choice for themselves. It allows these two competing moral frameworks, and many others besides, to flourish side by side in a diverse society.

This shows that the framework of rights enshrined in law is supposed to be neutral with respect to a variety of different conceptions of the good life. One implication of this is that the framework of law which enshrines and protects the rights of individuals should not take account of non-fundamental interests. These interests will differ among individuals, depending upon their aptitudes, personal values, and moral frameworks. Hence, fundamental interests are unlike the great variety of ordinary interests many individuals may have: they must be interests that everyone has. Rawls' concept of primary goods is useful here: "Suppose that the basic structure of society distributes certain primary goods, that is,

things that every rational man is presumed to want. These goods normally have a use whatever a person's rational plan of life is." (Rawls 1999, p. 54) These primary goods are what Rawls calls 'Second-order' goods which enable individuals to pursue whatever sort of life they think is best (provided that it is consistent the right of others to do the same). This circumvents the issue of idiosyncratic interests for Rawls because the primary goods are merely the necessary background for the pursuit of people's particular interests. Thus, "Other things being equal, [people] prefer a wider to a narrower liberty and opportunity, a greater rather than a smaller share of wealth and income, and self-respect" (Rawls 1999, p. 348). We can begin to fill out this account by considering Rawls' Original Position. The deliberators in the Original Position are trying to come up with principles of justice based upon a fair distribution of the primary goods. The interests we have in the primary goods are fundamental. That is, our fundamental interests are the interests that we have irrespective of our specific life circumstances. Rawls places the deliberators in the Original Position behind a 'Veil of Ignorance' to ensure that the deliberators do not come up with principles that favor particular groups of people over others. The veil prevents knowledge of the particular interests of individuals and groups:

> The parties do not know certain kinds of particular facts. First of all, no one knows his place in society, his class, position or social status; nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like. Nor does anyone know his conception of the good, the particular of his rational plan of life, or even the special features of his psychology… the parties do not know the particular circumstances of their own society. (Rawls 1999, p. 118)

Knowledge of my particular love of Italian food is not available behind the veil of ignorance, but the general human need for sustenance is. This ensures that the interests considered from behind the veil of ignorance are only the fundamental interests

which every person (at least 'rational' people) has in common.

We are now in a better position to understand immigration. Some kind of harm is done to a potential immigrant when his application is denied, but is that harm a violation of some fundamental interest? That is, if the state refuses him entry, is it unduly restricting his right to do so? Wellman's response to this question is to analogize between immigration and the situation of a religious association or marriage. Religious associations and potential marriage partners have the right to refuse members, so why shouldn't the state? We have seen that Fine rejects this analogy because a marriage is an intimate association, and a religious group is an expressive one. There is a particular justification for groups such as these to have control over membership. But the state isn't intimate or expressive, so the harm done to rejected immigrants is much more considerable.

The state is not intimate or expressive, and this weakens its claim to the right of association. But this does not make its right of association groundless. We might compare the state to a golf club. Despite the fact that they are neither intimate nor expressive, golf clubs have a right to association (albeit a weak one). Fine thinks that golf clubs can exercise this right primarily because exclusion from a golf club does not seriously harm anyone. However, if we only consider interests protected by rights, we can see instantly why the golf club has the right of association: nobody has the right to be a member of any particular golf club. An analogy could be drawn here with the state. The state may have a relatively weak claim to the right of association. However, unless people have the right to immigrate, the state is perfectly within its right to exclude potential immigrants from membership.

People choose to immigrate for a variety of reasons. Sometimes they immigrate to flee oppressive governments, persecution, or anarchic social conditions. In these sorts of cases, their fundamental interests are at stake, and no states have the right to refuse such immigrants provided they are able to take them in. I believe that no general and universal right to immigrate exists, however, because fundamental interests are not always at stake in the desire

and attempt to immigrate. To substantiate this claim, I must argue for two points: first, that people who wish to immigrate in pursuit of non-fundamental interests can be turned away by any state in the name of its right to association, and secondly, that people who wish to immigrate in pursuit of their fundamental interests must be taken in by any state provided it is able to take them in.

To make the first claim more plausible, consider a case with certain structural analogies. One plausible concept of charity is that it consists in voluntary contributions to those in need. Typically, these needs are directly related to health and/or bodily integrity. Now, do people have a right to receive charity? I suspect that many would agree that everyone has a right to some kind of healthcare and bodily integrity. But no one has a right to charity, for the very simple reason that every right creates reciprocal obligations, and the obligation to provide charity is ambiguous. Although we all surely have an obligation to be charitable, we do not have an obligation to be charitable to any specific person. The right to receive charity generates what we can call an 'imperfect' obligation—one for which there is no specific recipient. Charity is an imperfect duty because the needs of a person can be fulfilled in more than one way, by more than one person. No particular person can be obligated to any other particular person. Put another way, no person standing in need of charity can demand that any particular person give charitably to him. This doesn't necessarily mean that the latter person does not have a duty to give charitably to the first person; it just means that the first person cannot demand it as a matter of right. Other structurally similar cases exist: I have the right to get married, but cannot demand that any particular person be my spouse. I have the right to eat at restaurants, but cannot demand to be able to eat at a particular restaurant if I cannot afford it. In the same way, I have the right to leave my country of origin in search of a home elsewhere, but cannot demand that any particular country accept my application.

The freedom to emigrate implies the freedom to attempt to immigrate but not the freedom to immigrate to any particular country when fundamental interests are not at stake. One possible

explanation for the cases which we noted above is that rights imply particular kinds of obligations on the part of others. Principally, they are negative: Person A's right to free speech implies an obligation on my part not to interfere with his right. Non-interference is an appropriate obligational model for most of the widely accepted rights protected in liberal democracies. However, many of the associational freedoms we have noted, if understood improperly, entail inappropriately positive obligations. Surely all individuals have the right to join golf clubs if they want to. If this is the case, everybody has a negative obligation to not interfere with individuals' pursuit of golf club membership. But if we further assert that individuals have the right to join a *particular* golf club A, we have thrust an entirely different and more burdensome obligation upon the golf club. For admitting new members is not just letting someone alone to pursue their own happiness; it is taking upon oneself (or one's association) the task of admitting, dealing with, and accepting the repercussions of new membership. This may not seem particularly troublesome in the case of a golf club. But we can agree that the positive obligations of being forced to take on a spouse against one's will would entail inappropriately positive obligations and undue burdens. States and marriages, though very different, are not completely disanalogous. Both are subjected to inappropriately positive obligations when they are required to take on members/spouses whom they would like to refuse. The best way to mediate between the competing claims of the applicant and the association is to leave the power over membership predominantly in the hands of particular associations and to guarantee individuals the right to seek membership, but not the right to join any particular association.

So far, I have argued that states are associations and that they do not have the obligation to receive immigrants whose fundamental interests aren't at stake. The case is different when their fundamental interests and rights are being violated. The state's comparatively weak claim to the right of association can be overturned in cases in which potential immigrants or refugees are attempting to flee oppressive circumstances. No particular state

has the obligation to take in an immigrant for just any reason whatsoever, but as we have seen, fundamental interests give us sufficient justification to curtail rights. When a person's fundamental interests are at stake, he has the right to flee. His right to immigrate is made meaningless unless states have an obligation to take him in. Hence, states have an obligation to accept immigrants leaving countries in which their rights and/or fundamental interests are not protected, provided they can take them in.

But why should the state work to protect the fundamental interests of outsiders at all? Doesn't the state exist to protect the fundamental interests of those within it? It does, and this is precisely why it has an obligation to accept immigrants when their fundamental interests are at stake. Prior to the formation of the state (to recall an old contractual myth), there is no legal difference between citizens and non-citizens. Those who choose to become citizens are united only in their desire for the protection the state provides and in their willingness to submit to the laws that the citizens form. The only legitimate reason to reject a person from the citizen association at the founding of the state is if he disrupts or threatens the integrity of the political system that the citizens are trying to form. Now, if this is the case at the founding of the state, why should it be any different after the creation of the state? The citizen association is being created with the founding of the state, whereas it already exists after the state exists, but the legitimacy of the reasons for exclusion is the same in both cases. When a person's fundamental interests are being harmed, it is reasonable for him to respond by seeking membership in a state association which will protect his interests, thereby fulfilling its function.

I indicated above that the only legitimate reason for rejecting someone's bid for membership in the state association is if he threatens the state or disrupts its ability to protect the interests of its members. This is a proviso which limits the state's obligation to take in people whose fundamental interests are at stake: the state to which an immigrant wishes to go must not have any fundamental interest in keeping him/her out. The state has a fundamental interest in its own preservation. This is because the

preservation of the fundamental interests of the state is a necessary condition for the protection of the fundamental interests of its members. If taking in new members will destabilize the state (perhaps by exhausting and overwhelming its infrastructure, or compromising its security), then the reason that motivated immigrants to go to that country—its ability to protect and provide for their fundamental interests—would be mitigated. Hence, a country has an obligation to take in immigrants only when the immigrants' fundamental interests are at stake, and only when the state's fundamental interests are not at stake.

I have tried to motivate the position that the state has the right to prevent immigration when its fundamental interests are at stake. However, I have not said much about what sort of interests are fundamental. I would like to say more both about the fundamental interests of immigrants and the fundamental interests of states, taking practical and imminent problems as my starting point.

Since the deliberators in the Original Position formulate their principles from behind the veil of ignorance, unaware of the particular interests of those that they represent, they give priority to a wide variety of rights, including religious freedom, freedom of speech and press, freedom from imprisonment without trial, freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, and the ability to pursue and keep gainful employment. We can say without controversy that prohibiting the free exercise of some religion and persecuting its members violates those people's fundamental interests. Similarly, a person's fundamental interest is violated if he is unreasonably imprisoned for criticizing the government, imprisoned without a fair trial, or searched without reasonable suspicion.

These cases are not controversial. More controversial are the cases that David Miller considers in his paper "Immigration: The Case for Limits". There, he considers immigrating for the purpose of having access to a greater number of cultural or religious options. For instance, let's say that A adores classical music and has the aptitude and desire to be a classical pianist. However, there is very little demand or appreciation for classical music in

his country. He cannot make a living as a classical pianist. Does A have a fundamental interest in being able to move to a country where he will be able to work as a classical pianist? He has an undeniably strong desire to be a classical pianist, but this is not enough to show that his fundamental interests are being violated. After all, he is not prevented by law from being a classical pianist. None of his rights are being violated and he is still able to find gainful employment. This is the case because, as I said earlier, the fundamentality of an interest may not reflect the importance of that interest to the individual himself.

Analogous reasoning applies to questions of religious culture and opportunity. Let's say B is a deeply religious person living in a predominantly atheistic society. B does not find his society agreeable and tries to immigrate. His religious expression is somewhat limited by the atheistic society in which he lives, but his right to practice his religion is protected by the state. His rights are not being violated. His interest in immigrating, in this case, is therefore not fundamental (though he may be quite unhappy). He is free to attempt to immigrate, but no state has an absolute obligation to allow him to immigrate. More interesting is a situation in which adherents of a religious sect believe that they have a religious duty to live in a particular area. To deny members of a sect like this access to that land is to prohibit them from fully expressing their religious convictions. In a case like this, therefore, it seems reasonable to suppose that their fundamental interests are being violated.

Let me briefly consider one last reason for immigration. Many people choose to immigrate to advance their economic opportunities. One slightly absurd example of this is immigration or transference of citizenship for the preservation of wealth. For instance, say that C becomes wealthy as an American citizen, and then seeks to become a citizen of Monaco to take advantage of the extraordinarily low taxes. Clearly, C has no fundamental interest in immigrating. He is able to provide for his own sustenance and has gainful employment in the United States. More commonly, people emigrate from countries routinely subject to flagging

unemployment, depression, and poverty to provide for themselves and their families. There is no clear cut rule for determining when this interest becomes fundamental. Typically, however, immigration is extraordinarily costly (both economically and socially) for those who attempt it, and those who do attempt are therefore highly motivated. People are typically hesitant to permanently leave cultural, linguistic, and social familiarity behind. When they do, it is a strong (though not absolute) indication that the circumstances in their home countries are economically or socially intolerable, and that their fundamental interests are being thwarted. When it comes to economic immigration in particular, it is important that the complex nature of the fundamental interest at stake not be used to deny people who can legitimately claim that their fundamental interest is being violated.

Like people, states also have interests that are involved in the question of immigration. A wide variety of interests and reasons have been cited in favor of immigration restrictions. I am most familiar with immigration discourse in the United States, so I will focus on the particular reasons that Americans tend to cite. Many of these reasons will also apply to other countries. The most common concerns have to do with national security, non-assimilated culture/language, non-liberal political/social attitudes, and the economic impact on the poor and working classes.

Because it is such a heated topic in the United States currently, it can be difficult to discuss national security without invoking or inadvertently legitimatizing fear-mongering rhetoric. However, national security is a legitimate concern and bears directly on the issue of immigration. If large numbers of immigrants are coming into the United States for the purpose of destroying the United States, committing terrorist or violent acts, or in general undermining its political integrity, the United States certainly has an interest in limiting immigration. This interest is supported by right, since immigration which destroys the recipient country is self-defeating. The state's fundamental interest in its own existence and security takes precedence.

However, we must tread carefully on this ground. National

security has been invoked to justify plenty of human rights abuses, and inappropriately targeted immigration policies tend to be a common response to national concerns. Today, many Americans have voiced concerns about Muslim immigration to the United States. Perhaps this growing discourse would be less concerning if it weren't for the fact that anywhere from 2 to 7 million Muslims, a majority of which are American citizens, already live peaceably in the United States. Wellman notes that banning some group of people from a nation when members of that group already live in the country is disrespectful of those people and undermines their status as equal citizens. I believe that applies here. If all Muslims pose such a great threat to the national security of the United States, then it follows that Muslims living legally in the United States pose at least as great a threat to national security. And this justifies acting contrary to their rights as citizens. The same rhetoric which would prohibit Muslims from entering the country based on their religion, when turned against those already in the country, undermines their equal status as citizens or legal long-term residents. A majority of Republicans support Donald Trump's proposal to ban all non-citizen Muslims from entering the United States "Until our leaders can figure out what's going on." Approximately 49% of Republicans also support greater 'scrutiny' of Muslims in the United States (as opposed to members of other religions) (Lipka 2015). Being a member of the stigmatized group is immediate grounds for suspicion. But this is contrary to an environment of mutual respect and democratic dialogue which is necessary in politically open and liberal societies. When democratic states begin to vilify certain sectors of their populations, the results are often jarringly anti-liberal. War with Japan cast suspicion on Japanese-American citizens, and was used to justify the violation of some of their rights. The same justification is at work in the United States today. Banning certain people on religious grounds for the sake of national security casts a suspicious light on those who already live within the United States. A ban of all Muslims from the United States would therefore be unjustified. However, this certainly does not mean that governments cannot

restrict immigration on grounds of national security. Rather, it calls for careful security checks of those who wish to immigrate. Besides likely being ineffective in preventing terrorism, a religious ban from the United States casts its net far too wide. Any immigration restrictions on the sole basis of religion or ethnicity are similarly unjustified.

In his paper "Immigration: the Case for Limits", Miller claims that, "The public culture of their country is something that people have an interest in controlling: they want to be able to shape the way that their nation develops, including the values that are contained in the public culture" (Miller 2005, p. 200). He believes that this interest can justify restrictions on immigration. I want to dispute this claim. Public culture, for Miller, is not the same as the values and practices which make democracy and the rule of law possible. One example of what he means is "A society in which an established religion has formed an important part of national identity" (*Ibid*). In other words, public culture consists of the cultural idiosyncrasies of different nations and states. It is true that some nations have had and continue to have distinct public cultures. However, increasing diversity tends to dilute the effects of a unique public culture. Diversity is very much a component of American society. Hence, a single, unique, public culture is less and less identifiable, and becomes a correspondingly less important factor in immigration.

Furthermore, I do not have a right to live in a non-diverse public culture of my choosing. In other words, I do not have the right to not be exposed to or live amongst different cultures. Imagine that I live in a neighborhood that is predominantly Caucasian and Christian. Over time, the neighborhood is transformed: Thai-American citizens who practice Buddhism begin buying the houses around me. I might not like this turn of events, but it is clear that I do not have a right to prevent them from taking up residence in my area. A single common public culture is not necessary for the success of democracy and liberal institutions. Democracy can be practiced even between jostling and conflicting cultural traditions.

Cultural differences become a more important factor in deciding limitations on immigration when the culture in question conflicts with the basic values that make constitutional democracies possible: respect for human rights, the priority of the rule of law, and political self-determination. Where immigrants with non-liberal values become a considerable social force, their values can begin to shift the public culture in ways that are not consistent with constitutional democratic procedure. In other words, they will begin to erode the necessary foundation for any successful democracy, and can begin to undermine the government itself. This calls for limitations on immigration, so that those who are allowed to immigrate are given time to assimilate to the political values of their recipient country, and those who do not adopt new political values do not have too adverse of an influence on the political process. Like the argument from national security, it is very easy to use this argument in illegitimate ways. This line of argument has been employed by dictators and fear-mongers, and we must be careful to adopt appropriate and reasonable immigration policies based on accurate information which do not undermine the rights of peoples and groups which already exist in the country.

I will consider one final reason which has often been cited in favor of restricting immigration: its economic impact. Immigrants overwhelmingly work in specific low-paying fields. They are often willing to take lower wages than other workers, so they lower wages and offer more competition to citizens already working in those fields. Often, these citizens are already relatively poorly off, so they are made to struggle further. This might seem like a clear-cut case of immigration restriction. However, it's important to notice that restricting immigration for this purpose has essentially the same effect as a tariff. It does protect certain people in specific fields, but it keeps prices above what they could otherwise be. Lower prices benefit those who purchase the goods and services offered in these industries. So this is really a question of which group the government should seek to benefit the most: the workers in the industries in question, or the purchasers of their products

and services. It is beyond the scope of this paper to confront this question, but its answer determines the legitimacy of this reason for restricting immigration. Poor and working-class citizens may have a particular claim to the protection and assistance of the state. If they do, then I believe that a plausible case could be made for the claim that the state's fundamental interests are at stake when immigration will make poor and working-class citizens struggle further. However, even if protecting poorer American workers is a legitimate reason to restrict immigration, it may not be a reason to restrict immigration wholesale. The government could relieve pressure from specific industries by limiting immigration with respect to workers with specific skill sets.

I have considered some of the most popular reasons for restricting immigration. Some are legitimate; others are not. However, I want to be clear about what this entails. Every country has the right to association, so if it wishes, it can prevent all immigration except in cases where the fundamental interests of immigrants are at stake. It can also prevent immigration when its own fundamental interests are at stake. I believe that this conclusion has a mixed application to the existing global geopolitical situation. In many cases, the conclusion of this paper calls for fewer restrictions on immigration than exist at present. Refugees and asylum seekers have particularly strong claims vis-à-vis the interests of states. Thus, more should be done to resettle these groups of people in countries in which they can participate fully as citizens. On the other hand, I have claimed that states have fundamental interests in doing careful background checks on those who wish to immigrate. This may imply more scrutiny than exists in some countries at present. The challenge for those making immigration policies consists in successfully securing the fundamental interests of their states while providing timely and economically viable opportunities to immigrate to those who need it most.

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Issues in Ideology: Althusser's Marxist Theory

Ashley Tarin

Ideology: a structure

Louis Althusser is a structuralist-Marxist. Immediately, one might ask how can that be? How can you combine Marxism, a view that relies on changing social/historical circumstances, with a view that suggests a sense of permanency? Even when we consider the connotation of the word *structure* we think of it as static, frozen, or fixed. Althusser answers these questions initially with his distinction between ideologies (historical/social) and ideology (structural), which we will make clear in the proceeding sections. In addition, Althusser ponders why subjects are obedient, why people follow the laws, and why there isn't a revolt/revolution against capitalism. His view of ideology and ideologies stems from his understanding of the relations between State and subject, between government and citizens.

The State, for Althusser, is the kind of governmental formation that arises with capitalism; a state is determined by the capitalist mode of production and formed to protect its interests. It is historically true, whether you are a Marxist or not, that the idea of nations as discrete units is synchronic with capitalism. It is also possible that democracy, as an ideology and/or a governmental practice is also synchronic with capitalism, as democracy gives the "illusion" that all people are equal and have equal power. We see this in the simple act of voting for national leaders; and, hence it masks relations of economic exploitation.

Why is this significant? Well, for many this "illusion" is non-existent. A vast majority of our population is completely oblivious to the fact that an "illusion" is what they exist as and exist in. Of course, it is very likely the case that many people will

develop, if they have not already, an issue with such a claim. My aim, however, is not to prove that our lives are based off of illusions, but instead to offer an analysis of Louis Althusser's Marxist theory. Specifically, I hope to shed light on the facets of ideology that, according to Althusser, indeed entrap us in illusory manners of living.

First, I will examine Althusser's notion of ideology and how his four main theses on ideology lead to his advancement of the specific relationship between the State and the citizen. Secondly, I will elaborate on his notion of State apparatuses, specifically focusing on his distinction of the two types, namely Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs) and Repressive State Apparatuses (RSAs). Lastly, I will demonstrate how Althusser's claim that these aforementioned apparatuses play an oppressive role within our social order.

ALTHUSSER'S UNDERSTANDING OF IDEOLOGY

Louis Althusser builds on the work of Jacques Lacan to understand the way ideology functions in society. In this process he moves away from the earlier Marxist understanding of ideology in which ideology was believed to create what was referred to as "false consciousness," i.e., a false conception of the way the world functions. For example, he chooses to move away from the suppression of the fact that the products we purchase on the open market are, in fact, the result of the exploitation of laborers. Althusser explains that for Marx, "Ideology is… thought as an imaginary construction whose status is exactly like the theoretical status of the dream among writers before Freud. For those writers, the dream was the purely imaginary, i.e. null, result of the 'day's residues'" (Althusser 1968, p. 108). Althusser, on the other hand, approximates ideology to Lacan's understanding of "reality", the world we construct around us after our entrance into symbolic order. Here, symbolic order simply refers to the social world of linguistic communication. For Althusser, as for Lacan, it is impossible to access the "real conditions of existence" due to our reliance

on language. Through a rigorous "scientific" approach to society, economics, and history, however, we can come close to understanding, if not the "real conditions," at least the ways in which we are engraved in ideology by complex processes of recognition.

Throughout his piece, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," Althusser suggests a series of theses that he explores to clarify his understanding of ideology. Unravelling each thesis will aid us, later on, with our comprehension of his theory of State apparatuses and their ultimate purpose within the much larger picture of ideology.

Thesis I: "Ideology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence" (Althusser 1968, p. 109).

The "traditional" radical way of perceiving ideology led Marxists to show how ideologies are false, as previously mentioned, by pointing to the "real" world that is hidden by ideology. According to Althusser, ideology does not actually reflect the real world but represents the "imaginary relationship of individuals" (*Ibid*, p. 109) to the real world. We can say that ideology, in a strange manner, thus misrepresents itself. Althusser discloses that this notion is largely inspired by Benedict de Spinoza's notion of the imagination. Admittedly, I myself cannot say I am entirely well versed on the notion, and certainly much more can be said regarding the connection to Althusser. Nonetheless, I do find it deserving of a brief explanation here due to the link between the two and the increasing attention given to Spinoza in recent years. For Spinoza, the imagination is a kind of knowledge that includes more than just the capacity to form mental constructs that we would normally deem imaginative. It includes sense perception and memory. So, what was it exactly in Spinoza's thought that inspired Althusser's thinking of the imagination? Spinoza consistently opposes the imagination to intellect and claims that it does nothing more than provide confusion. According to Spinoza, the ideas of the imagination are simply inadequate. Yes, he concedes that these imaginary ideas may be necessary to get around in the

world, but for our purposes the focus, and the point in which the connection to Althusser is made, is that they give us a distorted and incomplete perception of things in the world.

In this way of thinking, Althusser also follows the Lacanian understanding of imaginary order—the narcissistic sense by which human subjects fantasize depictions of themselves and objects of desire—or that which is truly authentic in the sense that there is an unchangeable truth in reference to both the self and the external dimension of experience. The Lacanian Real is in opposition to a reality based on sense perception and material order. In other words, we are always within ideology because of our reliance on language to establish our "reality". Different ideologies are merely different representations of our social/imaginary "reality" and not a representation of the reality itself.

In more Marxist terms, the function of ideology is to present people with representations of their relations to relations of production, rather than with representations of the relations of production themselves. Marxism originally formulated ideology as an illusionary representation of the relations of people to real conditions. Dr. Mary Klages provides a simple example, worth mentioning, of what is meant by illusionary in her essay, "Louis Althusser's 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses.'" She writes:

> My real condition, as a professor, is that of a 'cultural worker,' someone paid to perform intellectual labor in teaching. My salary is not nearly as large as that of a doctor, lawyer, movie star, or athlete (not even in minor league baseball!!). What might be considered my "exploitation," or my "real" economic conditions, are "masked" with an ideology—that teaching and being a college professor is of high moral/social value, if not of high economic value, that the rewards of teaching are immaterial, that I get social status and respect (instead of money) for being the repository of knowledge, etc. That's one notion of ideology: it keeps me happy, thinking that I am really an important

> person, when the real conditions of my economic existence show how relatively unimportant I am. I buy into that ideology (that being a professor is important), and am therefore willing to tolerate my exploitation (and my alienation from the products of my own mental labor, i.e. the surplus intellectual value I create in you) by believing that I get 'other' rewards besides money for doing this job. (Klages 1986)

Althusser says, by contrast, that Dr. Mary Klages' ideology is an illusion, yes. But it's an illusion, or an imaginary understanding, not of the relations of production themselves, but of her relation to them. Thus, people in her position would possibly think they are cool because they are not working in a factory, or they think they're smarter than factory workers because they assume that factory workers are not very bright. The relations of production here are in assuming that factory workers lack education, that relations of production have structured a relationship between job and education. In this example then Dr. Klages relation to that relation of production is to feel superior to it. That is what Althusser says is ideology.

Thesis II: "Ideology has a material existence" (Althusser 1968, p. 112).

Althusser holds the position that ideology has a material existence because "an ideology always exists in an apparatus, and its practice, or practices" (*Ibid*, p. 112). Ideology always manifests itself through actions, simply put, such as rituals, conventional behavior, etc. Indeed, Althusser goes so far as to adopt Pascal's formula for belief, an attempt to justify belief in God not with an appeal to evidence for his existence but rather with an appeal to self-interest. Althusser states, "Pascal says more or less: 'Kneel down, move your lips in prayer, and you will believe'" (*Ibid*, p. 114). It is our performance of our relation to others and to social institutions that continually instantiates us as subjects. Judith Butler's understanding of performativity, in which she refers to

performativity as the capacity of speech and communication not simply to communicate but also to act or consummate an action, or to construct and perform an identity "through language, gesture, and all manner of symbolic social sign," (Butler 1988, p. 519) could be said to be strongly influenced by this way of thinking about ideology.

It is important for Marxists always to be grounding their analysis in material practices or relations. So, if we want to talk about ideas, we need to be able to talk about them as material (so that we don't lapse into idealism, or an argument that ideas are more "real" than material objects). So, what Althusser does, ultimately, to assert that ideology is material is to say that ideology always exists in two places: in an apparatus or practice and in a subject, in a person, who is, by definition, material.

Thesis III: "All ideology hails or interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects" (Althusser 1968, p. 115).

According to Althusser, the main purpose of ideology lies in "constituting concrete individuals as subjects" (*Ibid*, p. 116). In this sense, ideology becomes so omnipresent in its constitution of subjects that it forms our very reality and thus appears to us as "true" or "obvious." Althusser provides his example of a simple "hello" on a street: "the rituals of ideological recognition [...] guarantee for us that we are indeed concrete, individual, distinguishable and naturally irreplaceable subjects" (*Ibid*, p. 117). Through interpellation, individuals are turned into subjects, which are always ideological. The use of the term *subject*, for me, brought much uncertainty. What exactly does Althusser mean by "concrete subjects"? I take him to be utilizing the term as a label that signifies a person's independence and sense of autonomy. It is a label we, as constituents of our society, strive to earn.

With that said and making recourse back to the notion of interpellation, let us look at another example Althusser gives, that of the hail of a police officer. An officer calls out, "Hey, you there!" "Assuming that the theoretical scene I have imagined takes place in the street, the hailed individual will turn round.

By this mere one-hundred-and-eighty-degree physical conversion, he becomes a subject" (*Ibid*, p. 118). We must note, though, that Althusser acknowledges that this notion of interpellation is not always, if ever, recognized by the interpellated. Though we witness people being hailed or called out to, and experience it ourselves day in and day out, it is clearly not the case that every time we are hailed we stop and think, "Oh, just now I was interpellated and am thus an independent subject." Something strange transpires here. The very fact that we do not recognize this interaction as ideological speaks to the power of ideology. What seems to take place outside ideology or "out in the street," in reality, takes place within ideology. That is why those who are *in* ideology believe themselves to be, by definition, outside of ideology. One of the effects of ideology is the practical denial of the ideological character of ideology by ideology; that is, ideology never says, "I am ideological" (*Ibid*, p. 118).

One might ask the question here, "Individuals who are subjects to what?" Well, I think Althusser would answer that individuals are hailed to be subject to the material practices of ideology. Let us look at the advertising industry for an explanation. The ideology of consumption, which can be said to be the most material of all, uses advertising to transform individuals into subjects, into consumers. Advertising, thus, interpellates individuals. The advertisements attract attention, force people to attach meaning to them, and as a result, consumption takes places.

So, when it comes to interpellation I believe Althusser would deem it important to take away that we should not concern ourselves with the instance of becoming a *subject of* society, but rather becoming *subject to* society. The next thesis may help in our understanding of this point.

Thesis IV: "Individuals are always-already subjects" (Althusser 1968, p. 119).

Although he presents his example of interpellation in a temporal form, i.e., I am interpellated and thus I become a subject; I enter ideology; Althusser makes it clear that the process

of becoming a subject happens even before we are born. "This proposition might seem paradoxical" (*Ibid*, p. 119), Althusser admits. Nevertheless, "That an individual is always already a subject, even before he is born, is [...] the plain reality, accessible to everyone and not a paradox at all" (*Ibid*, p. 119). Even before the child is born:

> It is certain in advance that it will bear its Father's Name, and will therefore have an identity and be irreplaceable. Before its birth, the child is therefore always-already a subject, appointed as a subject in and by the specific familial ideological configuration in which it is 'expected' once it has been conceived. (*Ibid*, p. 119)

Most subjects accept their ideological self-constitution as "reality" or "human nature" and rarely run into the conflict of the Repressive State Apparatus, which is designed to punish anyone who rejects the dominant ideology, a notion we will explore in the proceeding section. Domination is therefore less reliant on such Repressive State Apparatuses as the police than it is on those Ideological State Apparatuses by which ideology is instilled in all subjects. As Althusser puts it, "the individual is interpellated as a [free] subject in order that he shall submit freely to the commandments of the Subject, i.e. in order that he shall [freely] accept his subjection, i.e. in order that he shall make the gestures and actions of his subjection 'all by himself'" (*Ibid*, p. 123).

Before moving on, let us reassure our comprehension of ideology as it is understood by Althusser. Ideology is a mirror-like structure consisting of different, yet interrelated parts that reflect one another: interpellation of individuals as subjects, their subjections to the subject, their mutual recognition (subjects recognizing themselves and other subjects), and the requirement that the subject must behave accordingly to the ideology in which it lives. Each of these four parts serves almost as a prerequisite in order to ensure a properly functioning ideology. This is the system according to which society must follow, and are currently doing so, in order for products of the market to be reproduced. It all

depends on one another. Individuals are all connected, although at different levels, and this is necessary to maintain the structure of ideology, to maintain the stratification of social classes.

State Apparatuses

Louis Althusser complicates Marx's understanding of the relation between base and superstructure by adding his concept of Ideological State Apparatuses, ISAs for short, and Repressive State Apparatuses, RSAs for short. First, let us define what exactly the base and superstructure of a society are as they pertain to Marxist thought, as well as the relations between the two. Marx distinguished among various levels in a society: the infrastructure or economic base and the superstructure, which includes political and legal institutions (law, the police, the government) as well as ideology (religious, moral, legal, political, etc.). The superstructure has a relative autonomy with relation to the base; it relies on the economic base but can sometimes persist for a long period after major changes in the economic base. By insisting on the relative autonomy of these domains, Althusser bans any notion that one may actually ever come into contact with the other. They are autonomous, yet they relate. Knox Peden states in his work, *Spinoza Contra Phenomenology*, "This refusal of dialectical sublimation, a strict instance on the distinction between domains, is crucially Spinozist in that it maintains the fundamental incommensurability between thought and thing…" (Peden 2014, p. 156). Here, thought is the ideal, the superstructure, and thing, or extension to use Spinoza's terminology, is the material, the base. To be clear, Althusser does not reject the Marxist model. He does, though, want to explore the ways in which ideology is more pervasive and more "material" than previously acknowledged. As a result, he proposes to distinguish Ideological State Apparatuses from the Repressive State Apparatus.

The RSA includes "the Government, the Administration, the Army, the Police, the Courts, the Prisons, etc." (Althusser 1968, p. 96). These are the agencies that function through and by violence,

by at some point imposing punishment or privation in order to enforce power. To distinguish ISAs from the RSAs, Althusser offers a number of examples of ISAs:

- the religious (the church, the system of the different public and private 'Schools')
- the family
- the legal (court systems, laws, etc.)
- the political (the political system, including the different political parties),
- the communications (press, radio and television, etc.),
- the cultural (literature, the arts, sports, etc.)

These ISAs, in contrast to the RSAs, are less centralized and more heterogeneous. They are also believed to access the private rather than the public realm of existence, although Althusser's goal here is to question the bourgeois distinction between private and public: "The distinction between the public and the private is a distinction internal to bourgeois law, and valid in the (subordinate) domains in which bourgeois law exercises its 'authority'" (*Ibid*, p. 97). The main thing that distinguishes the ISAs from the RSAs is ideology as mentioned: "the Repressive State Apparatus functions 'by violence,' whereas the Ideological State Apparatuses function 'by ideology'" (*Ibid*, p. 97). To be more precise, Althusser explains that the RSAs function primarily by violence or repression and *only* secondarily by ideology. Similarly, the ISAs function predominantly by ideology but can include punishment or repression secondarily. Althusser states, "Schools and Churches use suitable methods of punishment, expulsion, selection, etc., to 'discipline' not only their shepherds, but also their flocks. The same is true of the Family... The same is true of the cultural Ideological State Apparatus (censorship, among other things), etc." (*Ibid*, p. 98).

Although the ISAs appear to be quite disparate, they are

unified by subscribing to a common ideology in the service of the ruling class. Indeed, the ruling class must maintain a degree of control over the ISAs in order to ensure the stability of the RSAs. Althusser states, "To my knowledge, no class can hold State power over a long period without at the same time exercising its hegemony over and in the State Ideological Apparatuses" (Ibid, p. 98). It is much more difficult for the ruling class to preserve control over the multiple, heterogeneous, and relatively autonomous ISAs, being that alternative perspectives can be voiced in each ISA, which is why there is a continual struggle for supremacy in this realm.

The Reproduction of the Conditions of Production

At this point we might ask ourselves, why is it that we must acknowledge the existence of these state apparatuses at all? Well, the answer for Althusser is simple: these apparatuses serve the ultimate purpose, which is to reproduce the functions of a capitalist society. To put it as Althusser says, the ultimate condition of production is the reproduction of the conditions of production (*Ibid*, p. 85). In order to exist, every social structure must reproduce both the productive forces and the existing relations of production. The former consists of the reproduction of the means of production with respect to a capitalist market. Here, Althusser is referring specifically to the reproduction of labor power, claiming that the reproduction of labor power requires, "a reproduction of submission to the ruling ideology of the workers" (*Ibid*, p. 89). In other words, it requires a reproduction of the ruling class' ability to manipulate through ideology, i.e., maintain the repression and exploitation of the workers. The latter, the reproduction of the relations of production, concerns itself with the goal of a perpetual secured power of the state preserved through the exercises of ISAs and RSAs.

Worth mentioning here is the place of the educational system within the capitalist structure. According to Althusser, "what the

bourgeoisie has installed as its number-one, i.e. as its dominant ideological State apparatus, is the educational apparatus, which has in fact replaced in its functions the previously dominant ideological State apparatus, the Church" (*Ibid*, p. 104). Through education, each mass of individuals that leaves the educational system at various junctures (the laborers who abandon the system early, the trifling bourgeoisie who leave after their Bachelor's Degrees, and the leaders who go on to complete additional specialist training) enter the work force with the ideology necessary for the reproduction of the current system. "Each mass ejected en route is practically provided with the ideology which suits the role it has to fulfill in class society" (*Ibid*, p. 105). We can see here that Althusser's characterization of the educational system is very much like that of a trap, an inescapable cycle through which we all travel at some point for the same purpose, a purpose not even constructed by ourselves, but instead by the ruling class. As a student of the California State University system, I have witnessed this many times. Students invest great amounts of their time and money into higher education and most times cannot even tell you why. All they know for sure is that it is what they are "supposed to do."

Other ISAs contribute to the replication of the dominant ideology but "no other ideological State apparatus has the obligatory and free audience of the totality of the children in the capitalist social formation, eight hours a day for five or six days out of seven" (Ibid, p. 105). The very importance of this function is why schools are invested in hiding their true purpose through an obscuring ideology:

> … an ideology which represents the School as a neutral environment purged of ideology (because it is...lay), where teachers respectful of the 'conscience'and 'freedom' of the children who are entrusted to them (in complete confidence) by their 'parents' (who are free, too, i.e. the owners of their children) open up for them the path to the freedom, morality and responsibility of adults by their own example, by knowledge, literature and their 'liberating' virtues. (*Ibid*,

p. 105)

This ideology is so persistent and almost aggressive, to an extent, according to Althusser, that "…those teachers who, in dreadful conditions, attempt to turn the few weapons they can find in the history and learning they 'teach' against the ideology, the system and the practices in which they are trapped... are a kind of hero" (*Ibid*, p. 106). Isn't this something we all have been a part of witnessing at one point or another in our lives? It is in a way, a classic tale. The teacher who attempts to stray outside of the lines, who attempts to broaden the horizons of their students in a single moment becomes the villain in the system. The state-run educational system, ideology itself, then becomes the protagonist who saves the children from the "dangerous" ways of the school teacher.

Additionally, the ideology of assessment in the educational system says that individuals "freely," as an expression of their "intelligence" or "quality" as a subject, subject themselves to the process of grading when they "submit" pieces of work. If individuals earn good grades then they are entitled to reward themselves with self-defining labels such as "smart," "academic," or "suited for a higher degree." Subjective prowess and personal status implies, in this case, subjection to an impersonal and crudely operationalized grading system. Individual students are thus interpellated. They are allowed to make concrete the abstract categories, or grades, which await them. The entire system here is self-sustaining. The more grades a student wants, the more they have to submit work, the more work that is willingly submitted, the more rational and natural the assessment system becomes to them, and everyone else. The reality that is not so easy to unveil, nonetheless, is that this assessment system serves to reproduce the technical division of the labor force and its docility required by capitalism.

The crucial idea to grasp here is that Althusser, loyal to Marxist thought, is claiming that State apparatuses have a sort of hidden agenda. While we, specifically those of the non-ruling

class, are "conditioned" to live in a society as such and to adopt its given ideologies, those of the ruling class have as their goal to use this process of conditioning as a means to prosper. It is not the case that the ruling class aims to have individuals prosper as independent subjects, but instead it aims to have its system prosper, the system that has been imposed upon us, as we saw earlier within the notion of interpellation.

Conclusion: A New Definition of Philosophy

Althusser's influence is growing more and more among contemporary thinkers. As mentioned in a preceding section, Judith Butler's conception of performativity can be said to have been highly influenced by Althusser's notion of interpellation. His work was also elaborated on by professor of sociology Göran Therborn and philosopher Slavoj ŽiŽek, just to name a few. According to philosopher Etienne Balibar, "Althusser proposed a 'new definition' of philosophy as 'class struggle in theory'… marxism had proper signification only insofar as it was the theory of the tendency towards communism… The criteria of acceptation or rejectal of a 'marxist' proposition was always the same, whether it was presented as 'epistemological' or as 'philosophical': it was in the act of rendering intelligible a *communist policy*, or not" (Balibar 1991, p. 98). It is precisely this type of characterization of Althusser's work that renders it significant in terms of where we stand, ourselves, within our own societies.

At this point, I have examined Althusser's notion of ideology placing focus on how his four main theses lead to his development of the specific relationship between the State and its citizens. I expanded on his notion of State apparatuses, specifically on his distinction between Ideological State Apparatuses and Repressive State Apparatuses. Lastly, I attempted to demonstrate how Althusser's claim that these State apparatuses, ISAs and RSAs, play an oppressive role within the social order in which we exist.

Now that Althusser's conception of ideology has been unraveled, I'd like to leave you with what I find to be important, the

experience of asking ourselves: What else can be done with this particular notion of ideology? How can we apply this conception to better understand our own places in society? What can this idea of ideology do for us? Answers to these questions are what I hope to develop as I continue on in my research. Again, the purpose of this piece was not to construct an argument for or against any specific aspect of Althusser's work, but rather to do two things: shed light on the facets that lead us to living illusory lives, and to bring to the forefront the imperative act of not merely living within ideology, but trusting ourselves to critique it.

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Has Semantic Expressivism Made Progress?

Lavaris McCellion

Introduction

Expressivism in metaethics and its variants has provided, at different times, much optimism for the semantics of moral language. In order to appreciate its longstanding status and its present significance, we should, first, consider some of its origins. As it turns out, these origins also gave rise to several other views in metaethics that are not purely expressivist. It was not long after this point that Expressivism itself began to emerge. After its emergence, there have been many creative attempts to establish its plausibility. There is a recent development that seems to hold new promise. It is called Hybrid Expressivism. It appears to provide intuitive answers to old problems that have engaged pure expressivist for decades. Even in its new form, there is another formidable objection, attributed to Mark Schroder, which has been raised in recent years. At present, this objection is the most significant barrier to the claims that made expressivism so distinctive in metaethics. As such, this paper will trace the development of expressivism so that we can see just what must be given up if they desire to meet this recent objection. Then we will ask whether this is too high a price to pay.

In this paper, we will start by providing a basic understanding of semantic truth. That is, we will see how simple atomic sentences are standardly thought to express true contents. In that same section we will also see how this account of meaning is traditionally associated with a scientific understanding of natural properties. In the second section, we will jump right into Moore's famous Open Question argument. From there, we will explore accounts that emerge from an acceptance of this argument. This

will include a cursory look at some of the objections that followed from these new views. In the fourth section, we will look at a prelude to expressivism; namely, a distinction that they will rely on to separate them from some of their forerunners. That will allow us to introduce expressivism more naturally in the section that follows it. In the sixth section, we will look at the Frege-Geach problem for the expressivist. Section seven will provide a way out of the Frege-Geach problem via hybridism. Finally, we will see how Schroder's concern is a specific and, perhaps, damning objection to hybridism. Let's visit each of these in the order laid out.

Truth and Natural Properties

As you might guess, we use language for many things. In the philosophy of language, much of this is centered on indicative sentences and their sentential components. Such sentences may be as simple as, 'the cat is round', or it may be a bit more complex as in, 'if the cat is round, then it is eating too much food'. Historically, philosophers of language have tried to understand these sentences by stating under what conditions the use of a sentence is correct or incorrect. This intuitive notion of correctness has undergone great scrutiny and, as such, has endured several stages of refinement. But a standardly accepted approach to this notion of sentential correctness (of indicative sentences) is often associated with conditions of *truth*. That is, each correct use of a sentence is the satisfaction of a truth condition.

Here is a rough characterization. A sentence like, 'the cat is round', is true if and only if the cat is round. The simplicity of this theorem beguiles its significance. Although there is no space to rehearse just how significant it is, here is (I hope) an intuitive understanding. We can think of this sentence as expressing our belief about something. In fact, we can think of its component parts as individually being about individual things. Take, first, the role of the predicate. We can think of these things as being demarcated from other things in the sense that the set of round objects

demarcates differences and similarities from (say) the set of square objects. Of course, the singular term, 'the cat', does not refer to the set of cats, but rather to some individual cat. So when we say that (1) whenever the object (namely, a cat) assigned to the subject term is (2) in the demarcation of the set of round things assigned to the predicate, then the sentence is true. Colloquially, we may say that this sentence is true whenever it expresses a belief about a cat having the property of roundness. Sometimes, we may also say that the sentence satisfies a description. In this paper, I will use description and truth condition interchangeably.

This is a truth-conditional analysis of sentential meaning. What is distinctive here is that the content of indicative sentences is its capacity to be about objects that have some natural property that is picked out by the predicate. Intuitively, we can think of a natural property as any phenomenon that obeys scientific laws. The predicate, '…is round', for instance, would be one example of this. That's why the illustration involved cats and round things instead of, say, supernatural things or even certain mental states.[1] In a word, the reference of singular terms and the set of things that are picked out by properties must be restricted to a language whose domain of discourse will be exhausted by phenomena that is associated with natural properties like roundness, height, etc. And the sentence references these things because this referential relation seems to be the only way that our sentences can be about a mind-independent, external world. In fact, the truth conditional analysis claims to be the standard analysis for all indicative sentences.

The Open Question

G. E. Moore does not think this is the case. That is, he does not think that all indicative sentences can be subsumed under a truth conditional analysis of language. That is because there are sentences that have *moral* predicates. By Moore's lights, these moral predicates express properties that are neither natural nor supernatural. Consider the predicate, 'good'. Just as we might take the property

of roundness, or better, circularity, to be that which satisfies some description (i.e., say, 'the points that are equidistant from a single point'), we might likewise conclude that the property of goodness is (say) the property of being what we desire to desire (where, let's assume, desire is a natural property that is associated with some empirical psychological state).

This seems to be a plausible analysis of the property of goodness. But it turns out that we could reasonably ask, 'Is that which we desire to desire good?'. And the answer to that question seems to be *open* in the sense that it is not enough to conclude that an answer is explained by whatever satisfies yet another description. That is, we should not think that this previous sentence can be analyzed as, 'Is that which we desire to desire what we desire to desire?'. This would not be a worthwhile analysis because, insofar as indicative sentences express complete thoughts, the analysis does not show how a thought's component concepts (i.e., each description of 'good') contribute to its entirety. In a word, we might say that the property of goodness is a recalcitrant property that 'pops' out of our analysis. In fact, the sentence that contains 'good' and the sentence that contains its descriptive analysis seem to be two different thoughts. This has led Moore to conclude that goodness cannot be analyzed within a naturalist framework. Rather, he concludes that goodness is a *sui generis* property.

In short, goodness is a new and naturalistically unanalyzable property. This argument is supposed to show that the descriptive (i.e., truth-conditional) account of sentential content is not sufficient for capturing how we understand moral sentences. And that is because descriptions, including psychological descriptions, are not about the properties associated with moral claims.

Replying to the Open Question and Disagreement

There are several ways to respond to the open question. Your answer will essentially turn on how you understand these naturalistically unanalyzable properties. For instance, let's suppose that

the same moral predicate does not represent a unique property, but rather a different property for different speakers. In such cases, the meaning of 'goodness' would be indexed to the speaker of a context. That would force us to conclude that each person who predicates goodness of something or other would mean something entirely different from another person. In a word, moral disagreement would be intractable. That's because in order for two or more speakers to disagree, they must predicate the *same* property of some object.

We can draw out this point with a helpful contrast. Suppose, for instance, that you and I disagree about the weather. That is, when I say, 'It is thundering outside', and you say, 'It is *not* thundering outside', we have asserted incompatible properties. I have said that there is a certain property that the weather has and you have said that the weather does not have that property. But we know that the weather cannot simultaneously have both of these properties. So there is something that we disagree about.

We could say a bit more about this. The sentence in this illustration is an ordinary non-moral sentence. That means that they express a descriptive belief about a natural property. It is standardly accepted that only descriptive content can be manipulated by logical operators such as negation. So, insofar as our sentences encode a description, then we may also conclude that in assenting to both claims we are thereby assenting to a logical incompatibility. This logical incompatibility has a form that can be represented by the conjunction of S and ~S. The structure of this conjunction represents the fact that the weather cannot both have and lack the same property. And this is made clear by the fact that (1) the presence of 'not', in the preceding sentence, is given a logical representation by the negation operator and (2) there is some common phenomena that we are picking out (i.e., thunder). In short, descriptive disagreement can be given a logical representation. A coherent logical representation like this is a virtue of an analysis of disagreement.

This does not work for moral sentences. For starters, on the assumption that we accept Moore's argument, and therefore, forgo

a descriptive translation of moral predicates, we cannot expect there to be a logical representation of disagreement. That much is plausibly made clear by the preceding paragraph. However, there is another straightforward reason why the logical operators associated with descriptions cannot be used to represent disagreement. Recall, we opened this section by supposing that moral predicates do not represent a unique property. But if the predicate, 'good', is used to denote a different property in the mouths of different people, then the content of our statements would never conflict. That is, unlike the case of the weather, we are not predicating something of a common object simply because each speaker is referring to a different psychological state. So, if I say that 'x is good' and you retort with 'x is not good', I have not conveyed something that you have denied.

This is a problem associated with a view called descriptivist relativist subjectivism. They avoid the open question objection by refusing to allow moral predicates to pick out naturalist properties; namely, the ones that are associated with a strict scientific picture of the world. These are psychological properties and, in this sense, they are anti-realist natural properties because they do not propose to predicate something about the external world.

Expression versus Reporting

What's presently important, however, is that they take moral sentences like, 'stealing is wrong', to have the same meaning as the description, 'I disapprove of stealing', where the first sentence is said to *express* an attitude of disapproval, while the second is said to *report* an attitude of disapproval. This is an important distinction because it proposes a way of thinking about moral language that is supposed to have consequences for other subjectivist views.

Here's a clearer explanation of what is meant by the terms, 'express', and, 'report'. For the relativist subjectivist, a psychological state expresses an attitude in a way that is analogous to that the sentence 'trees are tall' expresses a belief. And it reports the

attitude in a way that is analogous to that the sentence 'I believe that trees are tall' reports a belief.[2] In the case of moral language, however, the relativist subjectivist takes things one step further by telling us that the meaning of 'stealing is wrong' should be reduced to the meaning of 'I disapprove of stealing'. That is, moral claims *just are* reports of the speaker.

But now, says the anti-descriptivist and anti-naturalists about moral claims, you can see how the problem of disagreement arose in the first place. Attitudes do not report their contents. That is, insofar as we take moral sentences to (1) be about some phenomena while also (2) allowing the same moral predicates to pick out different properties, then we cannot utilize the attitude reports to understand disagreement. That is likely due to the fact that moral claims that report on attitudes do not, also, receive their logical properties from the objects they are about in the way that non-moral claims do. So, even though the subjectivist relativist tackles the open question by assigning moral predicates to psychological states and, as we have already said, avoids natural properties, it turns out that they will also need to avoid the semantic problems that often come with those properties. In short, we need a semantics whose job is to do something other than report the moral properties we are interested in. That is because there is no way to logically represent attitudinal disagreement.

EXPRESSIVISM

Expressivism has a neat answer to this. A moment ago, I said that the relativist subjectivist wanted to reduce the meaning of the sentence, 'stealing is wrong', to a report that only picks out the speaker's psychological state. But the expressivist tilts things in the opposite direction. Instead of modeling their semantics after a report (i.e., 'I disapprove of stealing'), they instead propose to model it after an expression (i.e., 'stealing is wrong'). And since the sentence, 'stealing is wrong', does not report that 'I disapprove of stealing', but rather, expresses it, we should likewise conclude, contrary to the relativist subjectivist, that the meaning of a moral

claim just is an expression in this same sense. Remember, this is only an analogy. All the expressivist says is that *whatever* the relation is that obtains between the two sentences associated with non-moral beliefs is the same relation that obtains between the two sentences associated with attitudinal accounts of moral claims. Insofar as the relata exist, the expressivist opts for the expression-relata over its reporting correlate; and, that's it. Here is the upshot. It is these relata, if they exist for the expressivist, that allow us to give a coherent (but non-logical) account of disagreement.

Although we are not given an explicit definition of how to define this notion of expression, we can still circumscribe it in another way. First, consider the following way of thinking about disagreement. Originally, the disagreement problem arose for the relativist subjectivist because their reports were about non-identical mental states for different speakers. First, let's focus on the problem of reporting. (We will deal with non-identical attitudes in a later section). Since the expressivist only takes a moral sentence to express (and not report) an attitude, they must show how the expression relation explains disagreement. For the expressivist, it turns out that it is some direct relation between the attitudes themselves that conflicts. So, if there is a sense in which these attitudes can non-reportingly conflict, then it is in virtue of this that the sentences that are governed by them will also conflict. But what account of attitudes can allow us to do this?

A suggested answer is found in the attitudes expressed by terms like 'boo' and 'hurray'. We can use these to explain why the sentences, 'stealing is wrong', and, 'stealing is right', can conflict. If the former sentence has the same meaning as 'boo stealing' while the latter sentence has the same meaning as 'hurray stealing', then the conflict associated with the first set of sentences is just a result of the conflict associated with the attitudes assigned to the second set. That is because 'boo' and 'hurray' seem to inherit the meaning, in a very direct fashion, from the agent's attitude, rather than telling us something about those attitudes. Moreover, the reason they do not yield to a logical representation is for the same reason that we cannot, for instance, use the sentence, 'not hurray',

to logically cancel the expressive content that's governed by the attitude. We will revisit this in a later section.

This is a very intuitive reply to disagreement. However, there is one problem that is commonly associated with this account. How does the expressivist explain disagreement between the sentences 'lying is not right' and 'lying is right'? These are two perfectly meaningful sentences. And they do not seem to be equivalent to the two sentences, 'boo lying', and, 'hurray lying'. If the use of 'not' in this sentence is something distinct from the negation morpheme in logic, then what could it possibly be? In other words, the expressivist must be able to tell a story as to how non-logical negation can be used to cancel the meaning of an attitude. Expressivists go to great lengths to explain how this works and much of it will involve appealing to higher-order attitudes.

In any case, we will not explore these in the present paper. Rather, we will explore a related objection;[3] namely, one that asks how these attitudes can be components of complex sentences and valid inferences. As we will see, there seems to be a way of answering both of these without appealing to higher-order attitudes. So we will, first, lay out the next objection before proceeding to what appears to be a dual resolution to both of them.

Frege-Geach Problem

So far, we have considered how moral claims do not yield to traditional semantic analysis. This challenge was raised by Moore's open question objection. However, the argument was not specifically designed for any particular account of moral claims beyond those that appealed to natural (or supernatural) properties. In that sense, then, it was not an objection to expressivism.[4] But there is an explicit objection for the expressivist. When we discussed a descriptive account of language, we said that a sentence has a value of truth whenever the singular term that references some object is in the extension of the set of things picked by the predicate. However, we must say one additional thing about a truth-conditional semantics.

Assume we are given a stock of words that are already assigned to an object or set of objects. We can use arrangements of these words to compose novel sentences and phrases. Although we have never seen many of these new arrangements, we may, nonetheless, understand them. That is, we may be able to say whether some new sentence is true or false in some context of utterance. Or at the very least, we may be able to understand the sentence regardless of whether we know if something satisfies it or not. This is because there are compositional rules that are associated with a theory of truth. And for the truth conditional (i.e., descriptive) account, these rules are not hard to come by. Essentially these rules tell us that the truth-value of a complex sentence is a function of the truth-values of its constituent sentences. For instance, suppose we have a sentence, A, and another sentence, B. And then further suppose we use these to create a third sentence that simply places a conjunction (i.e., 'and') between them, which results in the sentence, 'A and B'. The compositional rules (associated with conditions of truth) tell us that the value of this third sentence is a function of the individual values of 'A' and 'B'. This is a simple illustration that works for all new sentences that involve logical connectives such as 'or', 'and', 'not', 'if-then,' etc., and atomic sentences whose values we already know.

The expressivist does not have an analogous approach to composition. The reason the truth-conditional account of composition works is because the meaning of the constituent sentences does not change when placed in larger and more complex arrangements. Most often, it is this invariance that our linguistic conventions normally require.[5] However, on an expressivist account, complex sentences do change their meaning from their original atomic sentences.

Take (again) the atomic sentence: 'lying is wrong'. We already know that this sentence expresses (not reports) a negative attitude towards lying and that is a good explanation of the conventional use of the sentence. But what about the sentence, 'if lying is wrong, then protecting the innocent is too'? This sentence does not seem to commit the speaker to some negative attitude.

This is due to the fact that a moral sentence found in an antecedent does not guarantee that the speaker must have the attitude. So, if we assume that the meaning of a complex moral sentence is a function of the meaning of its parts, then we cannot predict the meaning of these sentences from their parts. We can also show how this works in standard argument forms:

1. If lying is wrong, then protecting the innocent is wrong.
2. Lying is wrong
3. Protecting the innocent is wrong

This is a valid argument. But on the expressivist interpretation, the speaker is not committed to the meaning of each premise. The meaning of 'wrong' in the first premise is different from its meaning in both the second premise and the conclusion since the speaker is only committed to the latter two.

Much like the difficulties associated with negation, expressivists have spent a considerable amount of time in answering the Frege-Geach problem. The results have not been entirely convincing.[6] There is a recent approach that offers some hope to answering this problem.

Hybrid Expressivism

Recall, we introduced expressivism by modeling moral language after terms like 'boo' and 'hurray'. In doing so, we were able to explain how (atomic) moral sentences can predicate non-natural properties, while also avoiding problems of disagreement. These problems did not specifically target the expressivist, but obviously played a role (albeit an implicit one) in its development. We might say that these earlier objections are united by the fact that the expressivist did not require any commitment to the properties associated with a descriptive (i.e., truth conditional) analysis of language. That is, it did not require us to appeal to either the natural properties that were prohibited by the open question argument or appeal to attitudinal reporting (and therefore, its conse-

quent problems with logic) to explain how people disagree. Then the expressivist ran into a specific challenge in the form of the Frege-Geach objection. What makes this objection unique from the others is that it *does* seem to pressure the expressivist to come up with a semantic that has something in common with descriptive semantics. In particular, it is concerned with explaining valid inference and composition where these are normally accomplished by sameness of meaning. The descriptive account of composition was due to the fact that the meaning of sentences did not change when placed under complex constructions. It seems as though the expressivist will need to find an attitude that is also invariant to change when placed in these constructions. But can we find such an attitude?

The Hybrid Expressivist thinks we can. In order to do this, we should refrain from modeling moral terms entirely after expressives like 'boo'. Rather, we should model them after slurs. If this is permitted, then a slur patterned moral term will have two semantic values.[7] It will have the familiar descriptive component that we normally associate with non-moral sentences. And it will have the expressive component that we defined earlier. In particular, it will be the expression (not reporting) of an attitude like desire.

This seems to be exactly how slurs are conventionally used. For instance, consider a slur like 'cheesehead'. A competent user of the term will use it if it satisfies two conditions: (1) the target of the utterance satisfies some description such as being a resident of Wisconsin and (2) they have some sort of negative attitude (i.e., contempt) towards people from Wisconsin. If this is the correct model, then it will allow us to handle problems that arise from both the Disagreement objection and the Frege-Geach objection.

It will allow us to answer questions about disagreement by appealing to its descriptive component in the same way that they are appealed to in non-moral contexts. So, the hybrid account is semantically equivalent to the pure descriptive account of disagreement. Here's a quick illustration. When I say, 'Joe is a cheesehead', and you retort with, 'Joe is *not* a cheesehead,' in what

manner would the hybridist claim that our utterances conflict? They would say that you denied the descriptive component of the slur. That is, you denied that Joe is from Wisconsin. As such, it will invoke the standard usage of logical properties that are associated with descriptions. In this case, the attitudinal component plays no role in disagreement.

What about the Frege-Geach objection? In this case, sentences that are part of valid inferences and/or are parts of complex sentences will require a special kind of attitude. In particular, it must be an attitude that retains its meaning in these complex constructions. Recall that other attitudes like disapproval seem to change their values when placed inside of conditionals or valid inferences. And that was because the speaker was not committed to expressing a negative attitude in order to correctly use that sentence(s). But slur-patterned moral terms are different. The speaker does seem to be committed to expressing a negative attitude. This is the case whether it is a simple atomic sentence like 'Joe is a cheesehead', or 'if Joe is a cheesehead, then I hate Joe', or even when found in valid argument forms like modus ponens.

This is because the attitude is said to *project* through the logical environments associated with descriptions. We hinted at the idea of a projection in our section on expressivism. In that section we said that you cannot logically negate expressives like 'boo'. But that original illustration was used to demonstrate how implausible it would be to append a logical connective to a pure expressive term. Although that was an instance of projection, there is a different point that is presently being made. The present point is that it is the *same* attitude that is expressed by the speaker when placed in these complex constructions.

Here's another illustration that might help to make this point. Instead of using 'boo', however, we will use a different expressive that is perhaps closer to our illustration of slurs. Suppose you say, 'if that damn cable guy is late, then I will have him fired', and then, when of a sober mind, you attempt to curb the explicit avowal of your frustration by reminding yourself that you started the sentence with 'if'. Anyone listening to this sentence would

not, on account of the meaning of conditionals, take you to be claiming that the antecedent does not commit you to having a negative attitude toward the cable guy. The point is that no logical connective can be used to inhibit the speaker's commitment to the (invariant) meaning of the term whether it is a complex construction or an atomic sentence. The same point is emphatically true in the case of slurs. This is what is meant when philosophers say that a slur projects through truth conditional environments. It essentially means that it does not interact with logical properties.

SCHROEDER'S OBJECTION

So, slur patterned moral sentences may provide hope after all. They are able to answer questions about disagreement in virtue of encoding a description. And they are able to answer questions about composition and complex sentence construction in virtue of expressing the same attitude that does not interact with logical environments. However, the expressivist (in hybrid guise) may still have a new problem. It is a very recent objection developed by Mark Schroeder.

Schroeder tells us that hybridists should not be too quick to follow the analogy of slurs. That is because there is a *particular* sentence construction for moral terms that does not behave the same when we move from this form of moral sentences to sentences with slurs. He calls this the Big Hypothesis. Consider the sentence, 'Jack believes that lying is wrong'. This sentence should mean that (1) Jack has some descriptive belief that lying is K (i.e., perhaps, that it minimizes happiness) and (2) has some negative attitude toward lying (i.e., boo lying). But it does not seem like slurs obey the Big Hypothesis. That is, in sentences like, 'Ana believes that Joe is a cheesehead', it should mean that Ana believes that (1) Joe is from Wisconsin and (2) has a negative attitude toward people that are from Wisconsin. However, things don't seem to unfold in this manner for slurs.

Consider two Californians visiting Wisconsin. One is a hard-core Raiders fan and the other is an easygoing literary guy.

Suddenly both gentlemen notice a third man wearing a Packers jersey in front of his home. Both Californians have the same descriptive belief about the resident, namely, that he is from Wisconsin. But since Packer fans and Raider fans are natural enemies within football lore, we can expect the Raider fan to have a negative attitude towards the resident while his companion does not.

Now suppose that we ask the easygoing literary guy what state the Raider fan thinks the third gentlemen is from. If the Big Hypothesis is correct, then the easygoing literary guy should reply that 'Raider-fan thinks that the gentleman is a cheesehead'. That's because the Raider fan both believes that the third gentleman is from Wisconsin and the Raider fan has some negative attitude towards Wisconsinites. But it's unlikely that the literary guy would say that. Instead, he would say that 'Raider-fan thinks that the gentleman is from Wisconsin'. That is simply because the literary guy does not have a negative attitude towards Wisconsinites. The same sort of retreat occurs for the Raider fan's report of literary guy's thoughts. If asked of his companion's thoughts about the residence of the gentleman, he would also deviate from the Big Hypothesis and report that 'Literary-guy thinks that the gentleman is a cheesehead'. That would mean the literary guy believes that the gentleman is from Wisconsin and that he has a negative attitude towards Wisconsinites. In either case, we cannot use the meaning of slurs to predict what each speaker would say insofar as we take the Big Hypothesis to be true.

The Upshot of Schroeder's Objection

This objection seeks to show that patterning moral terms after slurs do not obey the Big Hypothesis. If you think that this hypothesis is correct, then you should look for other models instead of slurs. Schroeder offers 'but' as an ideal model. This is because 'but' has dual linguistic properties that are (somewhat) akin to slurs, while not having its drawbacks. For starters, the sentence, 'Shaq is huge but agile', descriptively asserts that Shaq is huge *and* agile. The

use of 'and', here, is the familiar one that is associated with logical conjunction. However, in using it, the speaker also communicates a contrast between being huge and agile. So, it seems like this term has a dual feature espoused by slur-patterned enthusiasts. (However, that does not automatically entail that both features are part of the meaning of the term).

Moreover, much like slurs, 'but' projects through descriptive (i.e., logical) environments such as sentences flanked by 'not' and conditional sentences. For instance, the sentence, 'If Joe is funny, then Joe is funny but smart', still commits the speaker to a contrast despite being placed in a conditional. In this sense, 'but' projects through certain complex sentences. However, 'but' also obeys the Big Hypothesis. That is, it only commits the subject of a sentence to a contrast when it is part of an embedded clause that is ascribed to that subject. For instance, 'Joe believes that Shaq is huge but agile', only commits Joe and not the speaker to a contrast. So in this case, it does not project through certain complex construction. This is unlike the brand of expressivism that is modeled after slurs. As such, this model seems to be like the Big Hypothesis, and unlike slurs, in the sense that it commits the subject of the sentence to a non-descriptive element. And it is like slurs in the sense that it projects through certain logical operators.

It turns out that this a compromise of recent expressivist advances. Expressivism is supposed to be unique in advocating the role of the agent (as speaker) in linguistic meaning. If we are forced to acknowledge the Big Hypothesis, together with the fact that some sentential constructions do not seem to commit the speaker to its *meaning* (as construed by Expressivism), but rather, are invited to model it after 'but', then we could not say that moral beliefs are different from descriptive beliefs. Recall, 'but', unlike moral terms, seems to contribute to descriptive contents. In particular, it interacts with the attitude ascription of belief since its contrast is something that can be believed in. So insofar as beliefs are descriptive, 'but' is also descriptive. These are the same properties that we earlier associated with the natural properties of science. However, the psychology of the agent (whether expressed

or reported) is not part of a strict scientific picture. So, either the expressivist must object to the legitimacy of the Big Hypothesis, or instead, find an unorthodox way to explain why slur patterned moral terms retain their semantic status when embedded in belief clauses. Neither path has yet to be taken.

Conclusion

In this paper we have surveyed the origins of Expressivism all the way up to its most recent objection. We started with Moore's Open Question objection, which did not target the expressivist, but rather targeted all analyses that posited natural (or super-natural) properties for moral predicates like 'good'. We then saw how certain non-natural interpretations of properties emerged from this objection. One of these belonged to the expressivist. Expressivism did not only commit to a non-natural interpretation of moral claims, but also managed to avoid some of the set-backs associated with one of its forerunners; namely, the problem of disagreement. But it was the expressivist, too, who faced a significant challenge. This was the Frege-Geach objection. One apparent way out of this objection, however, was due to a hybrid account of expressivism. It required the expressivist to appeal to slur patterned expressive properties as well as the properties attributed to ordinary descriptive beliefs. This allowed them to simultaneously explain its interaction with logical connectives while also using the invariant attitude associated with slurs to retain the sameness of meaning required for valid inferences. But even the hybrid view has its challenges. Mark Schroeder's argument for the value of the expressive attitude inside of belief ascriptions seems to require the embedded attitude to change its meaning. If his account is right, then the slur-patterned account of moral claims is too strong. And as such, the proposed recent progress of expressivism seems to be compromised.

Notes

1. Particularly those mental states that are not beliefs.

2. They do not explain exactly how the analogy works.
3. The proceeding objection will primarily center on conditional statements. So to the degree that the expressivist can explain moral predicates that are flanked by 'not', is the same degree to which they will understand a material conditional since the latter is equivalent to logical negation and disjunction. This is why I say they are related.
4. Mark Schroeder (2008) thinks that the open question argument also applies to the expressivist. He says that the open question argument is just another instance of cognitive significance (i.e. found in Frege's Puzzle) applied to another domain. And concludes that some 'have not been persuaded that there is anything more exciting about what is revealed by Open Question considerations than goes into instances of Frege's Puzzle in any other domain'.
5. This is, as already suggested, not entirely true. Sentences such as 'Ralph believes that Bruce Wayne is Batman' does not have the same truth value as 'Ralph believes that Batman is Batman'. Many direct referentialist accounts of language simply bite the bullet and appeal to some sort of pragmatic difference in the two sentences.
6. The literature focuses much of its attention on higher order attitudes that are assigned to the attitudes that are embedded in the complex sentences.
7. A two valued semantic is not so uncommon. Frege's notion of sense and reference comprise a two valued semantic.

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Emotivism Revisited

Stephen Sigl

In the early nineties Allan Gibbard propounded a moral theory called Expressivism, which was intended to be an extension, and improvement on the Emotivist theory that had been introduced by A.J. Ayer and C.L. Stevenson fifty years prior. In this essay I will outline the original Emotivist position as espoused by Stevenson and some of the criticisms it engendered. Next, I will outline Gibbard's Expressivism and the objections it has encountered. Finally, I will argue that Gibbard's view succumbs to a weakness that dogged Emotivism, i.e., the inability to accommodate ambiguities in discourse that might obscure speaker intentionality. In light of this conclusion, it seems as if the simplicity of Emotivism offers a better starting point for dealing with this problem. Finally, I will conclude the essay by briefly analyzing approaches the Emotivist might take to navigate this issue.

Part One

As a moral theorist, Stevenson sought an answer to the antiquated question: "what is the good?" Being a 20th century philosopher who was (a) aware of the significance language plays in our lives and (b) a writer who was trying to eschew a Platonic realist conception of "the good", he changed this question, essentially to "what is the meaning of 'good'?" The question is phrased in very particular terms: "Is so and so good?" "Is this alternative better than that?"—by addressing the subject in this way we can tell that, for Stevenson, the original question relates most likely to an action. With these considerations in mind Stevenson set about identifying what he called "interest theories" and, in the process, propounded his own interest theory. The theorists he reacts against in his paper, *The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms*; namely,

Hobbes and Hume, are the ones that his overall message resonates with the most. His initial disagreement is based on the idea that the interest theories put forward by Hobbes and Hume, which hold ethical statements to be merely descriptive, are only partially relevant (Stevenson 1937, p. 18).

Hobbes and Hume view use of the word "good" as a sign of approval, however, their theories are only partially relevant given that they equate this approval with personal desire—as in: "*Good* means what is desired by me." Hence, the word "interest" is shorthand for personal or collective (in the case of Hume) interest. Two individuals who disagree about "the good" based on the premise that "the good" is defined by its accordance with the individuals' desires are not having a substantive argument—they are not disagreeing about the same thing.[1] Stevenson wants to salvage the character of interest theory, holding that praise and condemnation are central aspects of moral statements, but in a way that corresponds to three requirements: **(1) goodness must be a topic for intelligent disagreement; (2) it must be "magnetic"; and (3) it must not be discoverable solely through the scientific method** (*Ibid* p. 18).

The issue addressed by (1) has to do with whether or not there is a matter-of-fact issue at stake in moral debates. For instance, if two people are arguing about what is good and their respective arguments can be effectively reduced to "I desire this" and "That isn't so, because I don't," they are not really contradicting each other.

The topic of whether or not a theory is discoverable solely through the scientific method (3) basically stipulates that moral theories are not reducible to empirical data. This is a claim made by Stevenson's theory that is not extensively qualified in the paper. This might be for disciplinary reasons: Stevenson views philosophy as a discipline that is formally distinct from the natural sciences. Or, the role language plays in forming and advocating moral views makes such a reduction nearly impossible.

I skipped over (2) in the brief summaries above because, of the three requirements, I think "magnetic" is the one that

distinguishes Stevenson's view in the most substantial way from competing moral theories. This is because it corresponds with the necessarily persuasive aspect of speech: ethical statements are intended to sway people. This might come off as cynical, however, what Stevenson is presenting is the way ethical language works, not how it ought to work. This distinction comes into clear view when he describes a scenario in which a munitions manufacturer declares to the public that war is a good thing:

> This example illustrates how "good" may be used for what most of us would call bad purposes. Such cases are as pertinent as any others. I am not indicating the good way of using "good". I am not influencing people, but am describing the way this influence sometimes goes on. (Stevenson 1937, p. 19)

The munitions manufacturer in this instance is not mistakenly conflating his views with those held by the general populace; instead he is trying to corral their views into accordance with his.

This analysis appeals to a modern perspective that can be more fully elaborated from the distinction Stevenson draws between "descriptive" uses of words and "dynamic" uses of words. Essentially, descriptive uses are intended to refer to factual content that is either true or false and dynamic uses that are intended to elicit some behavior from the audience (*Ibid*, p. 21).

For Stevenson, moral propositions especially, blur this line because they work on two levels: the level of belief as to what is considered true (or good, morally speaking) for the speaker and what effect such propositions ought to have on her audience. Everyday linguistic occurrences that operate opaquely within this dualistic picture contradict a more traditional mindset that seeks a clear delineation between statements purporting to report objective truth and speech-acts that reflect the subjective intentions of the speaker. Therefore, one consequence of this view is that even seemingly scientific statements are not strictly descriptive since they can be used, and evaluated, for persuasive ends.

Ostensibly, there are a few problems that arise with

Emotivism, for this paper I will only focus on two. The first is addressed by Gibbard and has to do with the idea that the Emotivist picture of communication demands that the speaker literally be in the grip of the emotion that is informing her moral statements. I will go more in-depth into this objection in the next section. For now, I will turn to the second objection, which has to do with speakers' intentions and the potential for ambiguity.

Imagine a situation where two co-workers, Bill and John, are discussing an event that happened to John. Earlier in the afternoon, John saw a man he thought was homeless and gave him a ride to the bus station. It turns out that the man was not homeless but was actually an entrepreneur looking for prospective employees. This good deed landed John a new, higher paying job. John recounts this story, along with the information that he will be quitting his current job. Bill responds by saying, "That's great!" Let's say that John and Bill don't have any kind of significant relationship, but to a certain extent Bill thinks that John is not the greatest co-worker. Because there is no marked hostility between the two, John has no reason for not believing that Bill is sincerely congratulating him on his new job. However, he is most likely oblivious to the fact that Bill's statement actually entails a proposition like: "That's great, now I won't have to deal with you at work anymore."

I don't see this obfuscated intention as being morally wrong—it is not egregiously duplicitous; neither is it explicitly sarcastic, because there are no inter-subjective precedents between Bill and John that would warrant the appellation of "sarcasm" to Bill's statement. It is merely ambiguous, and it is not an anomaly in everyday discourse. Emotivism, for its part, is not adequate for parsing the total communicative import of Bill's response.

Part Two

For Gibbard, rehabilitating the ethos behind Emotivism begins by fine-tuning the semantic aspect of the theory. He does this by speaking in terms of norms, then bringing this normative component in-line with evolutionary biology. Gibbard concedes that the

Emotivist picture is correct in two respects: there are no particular, realist qualities pertaining to right and wrong actions, e.g., there is no property of "wrongness" that exists outside of the action. Second, he acknowledges that language is not primarily used to report states of affairs; it is more often used to persuade, bargain, and coordinate.

From this starting point follows a delineation between two sets of norms, the first being "norms that we are in the grip of"—these are what we share with animals and cover a broad spectrum, from urges and appetites to instinctive cooperative behavior. The second set of norms is "norms we accept"—only rational agents possess these, insofar as their acceptance implies a facility with language.

In the preface to his book, *Wise Choices, Apt Feelings*, Gibbard states:

> My thoughts for this book began with a straight piece of philosophical problem-solving. The problem was perplexing enough: what the term "rational" means. We can ask what the rational thing to do on one occasion is and, more broadly, we can ask how it is rational to conduct our lives. (Gibbard 1990, p. vii)

Gibbard navigates his analysis of rationality by examining general use of the word "rational," this then leads to his concern that "the term *rational* itself crops up rarely in everyday thinking…" (*Ibid*, p. vii). It is this absence of frequent use that probably pushed Gibbard toward devising a normative structure that operates implicitly. This is a speculative move that would not be as safe (or parsimonious) as inquiring into the very frequent use of the word 'irrational' and then inquiring reductively as to what rationality is in terms of what we don't consider 'irrational.' Instead, Gibbard wants normativity to inform a positive, non-reductive system that is thoroughly in-line with evolutionary science. Gibbard admits to this positivity by stating: "To call a thing 'rational' is to endorse it in some way" (*Ibid*, p. 6). Essentially, "rational" has taken the place of "good" as the preferred moral appellation in

the Expressivist discourse.[2]

On face-value this is problematic because attempts at combining science and ethics are generally thought to lead toward a reductive endpoint in which science dominates the dialogue. It is the temporary friction generated between these two positions (prior to the eventual dominance of science) that Gibbard mines to produce the nuances of his normativity theory. In *Wise Choices, Apt Feelings* he states: "Normative talk is part of nature, but it does not describe nature" (*Ibid*, p. 7). This summation is informed by the idea that an adequate study of psychology will lead toward an understanding of the norms that inform our appraisal of guilt, approval, and resentment.

The point of each is consistent with what I see to be Gibbard's basic schema: evolution (a purely naturalistic foundation) leads to the creation of norms (which operate within the parameters of the nature that engendered them). These norms then impact upon our language, insofar as it is through language that guilt, approval, and resentment are expressed. Feelings of guilt, approval, and resentment then are motivating factors in the creation and maintenance of societal norms. To call an act wrong, for instance, is to express acceptance of a set of norms that recommend that the agent feels guilt and that others should feel resentment towards that agent.

There is some vagueness here as to whether Gibbard believes that people can experience these emotions without the ability to linguistically express them, however, the division he makes between norms you accept and norms you are in the grip of clearly links language with rationality, insofar as animals, being irrational, cannot accept norms. This still fits Gibbard's naturalistic picture:

> In many ways, normative judgments mimic factual judgments, and indeed factual judgments themselves rest on norms –norms for belief. Normative discussion is much like factual discussion, I shall be claiming, and just as indispensable […] The ways we see norms should cohere with our best naturalistic accounts of normative life, and it

> is here that an expressivistic analysis becomes useful. (*Ibid*, p. 8)

Gibbard's theory adheres to a dualistic picture that John McDowell describes as being divided into "the space of reasons" and "the realm of law." On this account, the natural world is precluded from our faculty of understanding:

> Animals are, as such, natural beings, and a familiar modern conception of nature tends to extrude rationality from nature. The effect is that reason is separated from our animal nature, as if being rational placed us partly outside the animal kingdom. (McDowell 1994, p. 108)

McDowell considers theories that attenuate rationality from the biological substrate as the advancement of an ethos he calls "bald naturalism." Bald naturalism informs us that our conceptual apparatus, which operates within the space of reasons, is to be reconstructed in terms that are already "unproblematically naturalistic" (*Ibid*, p. 76).

While I will return to McDowell's position in the third section of this paper, it is worth noting that Gibbard is not far removed from McDowell insofar as he wants to stress the impact that social forces have on us as individuals: "Even tractable evolutionary pictures need not show us as rigid and acultural. We evolved as culture emerged through our evolving" (Gibbard 1990, p. 28). This grants his view some flexibility in the wider discourse of 20th Century philosophy, however, his basic bedrock of natural selection, and its attendant reductionism has to be kept firmly in mind in spite of these concessions.

So far, the picture Gibbard is painting is one in which beneficial norms are carried forward and detrimental ones are weeded out through the process of natural selection. As a tool, natural selection can potentially explain a great deal about the norms societies have come to collectively accept. Difficulties occur when this theory is totalized and becomes implausible, or convoluted theories are posited for activities that seem to have nothing to

do with advancing survival and reproductive fitness. Darwin's theory, generally speaking, does not claim that all traits that get passed along do so because they advance survival and reproductive fitness; the only claim is that traits that are inimical to these constraints will eventually be weeded out. How can we claim that all norms and social constraints fall into the "advancing" category, as opposed to the "neutral" category?

As stated above, natural selection can tell us a great deal about norms a society accepts, the question we need to ask the theorist who puts this theory at the center of his work is: "does it explain everything?" Gibbard is too canny to answer in the affirmative—he claims we can't tell yet. But his recourse to psychology amounts to saying that it ultimately should (*Ibid*, p. 30). Gibbard's reliance on psychology bridges the gulf, in that it brings the drives that are posited by evolutionary theory into a discursive realm in which societal norms can be analyzed in a way that ascertains their cultural value. Psychology, then, gives the relationship between emotions and cultural norms a semblance of causal force.

Part Three

The first point that I would like to consider is the idea that perhaps the caricature of Emotivism (that the speaker must be experiencing the emotion that her utterance conveys) is not so damning. If we do not consider our rational discourse to be a mere extension of evolutionary biological processes, and then in some way reducible to the same kind of explanation, then what is problematic about using the exhibited emotion of the speaker as an indicator of her intention? Obviously this view could fall prey to a duplicity that is more pernicious than the John and Bill example. However, even if such deception occurs there's no guarantee that any competing theory could do a substantially better job of warding it off. It is in Emotivism's favor that emotions are not just expressed verbally—body language can play a substantial role in conversational exchanges as well.

Gibbard's primary disagreement with Stevenson is on the third Emotivist requirement: according to Gibbard, the acceptance of a norm, or set of norms, is a psychological state; therefore moral discourse is reducible to empirical data. This entails the literal interpretation that Emotivism trades exclusively in emotional content. Gibbard replaces this entailment with judgments that are to be explained psychologically. In this way, judgment becomes the primary constituent of morality, not feelings (Gibbard 1990, p. 6).

Gibbard's theory of psychology gives him a basis for positing a causal relation between emotions that result from drives and societal norms. This is a one-way causal relation. Gibbard tries to mitigate the effects of his naturalism by acknowledging that this chain is not always easily discernible. As I have maintained, this does not negate his naturalist ethos; and, therefore only camouflages the one-way direction of causality at work in his theory.

McDowell's theory, in a sense, inverts this model, though it does not make any strong claims regarding causal direction. According to McDowell, if we think of our conceptual understanding as a model of a circle within a circle, the inner circle being "the space of reasons" and the outer circle the boundary of the external world, or "the realm of law." In this scheme, the space between the two circles is a boundary that represents reality unconstrained by demands of reason; we then have a model that conforms to the demands made by a bald naturalism (or expressivism) that would preclude a normative discourse that describes nature. McDowell demands "the plausibility of a minimal empiricism" (McDowell 1994, p. xi). And in order to make the circle model work with this demand, advocates what he calls a "Hegelian image," in which the inner, conceptual circle is unbounded, essentially matching the circumference of the external circle (*Ibid*, p. 82); i.e., there is no discernible boundary between conceptual understanding and reality.

This is an attack on a very strong naturalistic position, one that would preclude rational commentary on nature. If Gibbard's assertion that normative discourse is not about nature can be inter-

preted this way, which I believe it can, it can also be more charitably interpreted: in the sense that laws of nature operate differently (more strictly) than normative laws.

For example, if we speak of water boiling at 212 degrees Fahrenheit we are talking about a natural, law-like occurrence. However, when we discuss codes of conduct and discourse we are not talking about rules that, if violated, would be deemed supernatural; instead we are talking in terms of normativity. Both Gibbard and Stevenson are analyzing what occurs in speech-acts, both have an idea of moral correctness that is fairly conventional. Gibbard, however, uses the idea of normativity to stress the distance rationality can impose between itself and its biological substrate.

Stevenson draws a more plausible causal arrow, in terms of how speech acts influence others. In discourse, propositions that are formulated in empirical (law-like) and normative ways are interchangeable based on the affect their speaker intends to elicit. What needs further investigation is not just how these statements work, but how discourse that is effective utilizes and reverses the traditional roles of descriptive and dynamic language.

Stevenson's idea of magnetism is tied to persuasion or, as he puts it, creating an influence (Stevenson 1937, p. 18). The emphasis is not strictly behavioristic—one that seeks to change the hearer's actions—it is directed at the hearer's ethical code:

> When you tell a man that he oughtn't to steal, your object isn't merely to let him know that people disapprove of stealing. You are attempting, rather to get him to disapprove of it. Your ethical judgment has a quasi-imperative force which, operating through suggestion, and intensified by your tone of voice, readily permits you to begin to influence, to modify, his interests. If in the end you do not succeed in getting him to disapprove of stealing, you will feel that you've failed to convince him that stealing is wrong. (Stevenson 1937, p. 19)

It is most likely this reference to the intensity in the speaker's tone

of voice that led Expressivists, like Gibbard, to assume that the speaker had to have a strong emotional attachment to the content of the imperative, and that this commitment had to be actively entertained while speaking. Stevenson shows that our persuasive use of words is often tactical and not contingent upon our being in the grip of strong emotions. The account he gives of a town meeting, in which a speaker refers to an elderly, unmarried woman as "an old maid" and by doing so, accidently offends her, exemplifies an emphasis on circumspection that is an essential component of Emotivist theory (*Ibid*, p. 23).

These distinctions between law-like (descriptive) and normative (dynamic) occurrence are apt but do they have any impact on the world? When employed by scientists to describe law-like processes, like water boiling at 212 degrees, we can say that descriptive content is relatively free of magnetism. When we say, "littering is wrong," we can ascribe a normative force to the proposition. The former implies a naturally contingent causality, and the latter implies an inter-subjective contingent causality. The fact that both are expressed linguistically gives the impression that we have access to these causal mechanisms. However, it is the discursive medium that creates the impression of access.

Whether a statement is intended as descriptive or dynamic depends on the context in which it is employed. This explains the effectiveness of disguising normative commands in the language of natural necessity. As an example, take a radio station that is holding a contest in which people compete by texting in. Say that this advertisement is broadcast on the station and to discourage the listeners from texting while driving, the announcer says at the end of the instructions: "Do not text while driving." This would not be as effective as the announcer stating at the beginning of the instructions: "if you are not driving, text the word etc." This stipulates that not driving is a condition of eligibility for the contest.

Disguising moral commands in factual language can be detected and/or ignored by an audience, however, it seems more likely to be effective than a command that is explicitly normative because it is stated in a way that mirrors the structure of descrip-

tive statements. The reason for this, as Brandom has discussed extensively in *Making it Explicit*, is that normative commands are commands we adopt attitudes toward. They appeal to our sense of agency, whereas formal instructions appeal to our sense of how the world is empirically outside of our attitudes toward it.

My point is that, in our persuasive use of language we have recourse to both kinds of appeals, and more often than not, people adopt empirical language that is intended to convey a tone of objectivity when discussing matters that are only of normative importance. This is done because speakers, at least intuitively, grasp the distinction between descriptive and dynamic language, and exploit the boundary between the two in order to maximize the effectiveness of their speech. The more that subtleties between the two are analyzed, with the acknowledgment of the significance of emotional content in inter-subjective exchanges, the more we can rationally account for (or accept in an unproblematic way) ambiguities that occur in everyday conversation.

Re-evaluating Emotivism might seem counter-intuitive because we are prone to accepting the most recent theory to be the most informed or comprehensive and rejecting the older. This prejudice is not endemic but it coincides with many of our modern intuitions. Stevenson proposed Emotivism as a newer, improved interest theory, and Gibbard is essentially doing the same thing. Whether or not Stevenson's three requirements for evaluating the meaning of 'good' are inarguably sufficient for our most up-to-date interest theory misses the point of our re-evaluation; the point being that an application of them to everyday discourse should be followed by an extensive pragmatic evaluation that determines their effectiveness. Hopefully I have demonstrated that Gibbard's view has not accommodated enough objections to have adequately surpassed its predecessor.

Notes

1. Granted, the view just stated is more in line with Hobbes than Hume. Hume's view is more nuanced in that it pertains to individuals within communities. I will address Hume's position later in the paper.

2. On page 9, Gibbard states that “calling something rational is not to attribute a property to it; it is to express a state of mind.”

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Tears in the Rain: Empathy and Robotic Suffering

Church Lieu

Introduction

Within the century, futurists predict that robots will become part of everyday life in a variety of roles. They are already being designed with the explicit goal of mimicking human emotional intelligence in order to function as caretakers and research tools, and they continually evolve to fill more and more roles. In order to make them better-suited to these tasks, robots must be designed to cross the uncanny valley so as not to frighten their human users. There is no reason to think that they won't eventually be able to convincingly mimic human emotional states in order to facilitate human-robot interaction.

But a full array of human emotions must include the negative spectrum, including signs of suffering and pain. In this paper, I discuss whether we should be morally concerned with the simulated distress of human-like robots, which I call "androids". First, I give necessary background on social robots, establish some terminology, and outline some basic assumptions. Second, I establish that human empathy does not depend on a subject actually experiencing distress, so empathy can be applied to androids without contradiction. Third, I investigate the concept of empathy as a cognitive process, and its purpose within a society. Fourth, I apply this conception of empathy to the context of androids in near-future society. Fifth and finally, I synthesize my findings and determine that we should indeed care about their simulated suffering.

1. Social Robots

Social robots are intelligent machines designed to interact with humans, and can be classified as either utilitarian or affective (Shaw-Garlock 2009, p. 250). Utilitarian robots are "sophisticated appliances that people use to perform tasks," like ATMs and vending machines (Breazeal and Scassellati 1999, as cited in Shaw-Garlock 2009, p. 250). Affective robots, however, are designed for their capacity for emotional interaction, and present themselves as having mental states in order to facilitate this goal (Turkle et al. 2007, as cited in Shaw-Garlock 2009, p. 250). In this paper, I discuss affective robots. I also put forth four major assumptions, which I present in the following paragraphs.

Due to technological limitations and research goals, most of the affective robots currently available are more similar to animals or children than to adult humans. However, the moral status of animals and children is murkier than that of adult human beings with fully matured emotions and morals, so assuming that my robots are similar to current models may pose some problems. Therefore, my first assumption is that the robots that I discuss are based on adult humans. To clearly mark this distinction, I borrow the term "android" from science fiction to represent robots that simulate emotionally developed persons.

I also assume for the sake of argument that androids do not have mental states, and that they are just non-conscious p-zombies. A p-zombie is a hypothetical being which is indistinguishable from a human in every way, but does not have sentience. I am assuming this is for two reasons. The first is that whether machines can experience mental states is still a passionately debated subject, and I have no convincing argument for my personal opinion, which is that they can. The second is that, if I accepted that androids do have mental states, it would be far easier, almost trivial, to argue that they are indeed morally significant beings. Since the purpose of my argument is to show that, whether or not androids are conscious, they are still morally significant, my argument will be strengthened by testing it against the unfriendly assumption

that they are p-zombies.

Third, throughout the paper, I discuss the concept of empathy. When I use this term, it refers to the combination of cognitive and affective empathy. Empathy, as I use it, is the ability of a person to understand another person's emotional state, and the subsequent emotional impact on the observer.

Finally, I assume that androids will be part of our everyday lives. Following the current trends of robotics research, androids will likely become sophisticated enough to occupy roles on the level of customer service workers, personal assistants, and nurses. These roles require a certain level of emotional intelligence, but these roles are not nearly as meaningful as personal relationships are.

2. Androids as Objects of Empathy

Is there any moral weight to how humans interact with androids? Imagine a situation in which a person is abusing a robotic janitor, deliberately tripping it and laughing when it falls. It acts as if it has been genuinely hurt, adopting body language that demonstrates fear, humility, pain, and begs the human to stop. Is the human doing something wrong? Since arguments for and against considering robots as morally significant tend to "rely on the robot having mental states and being conscious," the natural, intuitive response to the question is to ask whether the android is "really suffering" (Coeckelbergh 2010, p. 232). However, this may actually be a non-issue. Instead, the moral nature of our interactions with other entities is tied to how we *perceive* them.

Human empathy relies on our direct interpretation of a subject's responses. The only way that human beings can get an understanding of another person's emotions is based on our ability to physically perceive their appearance and actions, what they choose to tell us about their emotional states, and so on (Torrance 2013, p. 21). To say otherwise would imply that we can somehow directly sense another person's actual emotions, which we clearly cannot; people often successfully mask their emotions or feign

others by altering their expression and behavior. Again, we see what we believe to be signs of emotion, run them through the filter of empathy, and feel a corresponding emotional response in ourselves. And this is an automatic procedure; when we see someone kick a puppy, we tend not to deliberate over what that means. Why, then, would we react any differently to the simulated emotions of an android? If it is able to convincingly imitate distress, why wouldn't we feel the twinge of pathos in response?

In the study of human-robot interaction scholars are quick to establish a distinction between self-motivated and autonomous operation (Lindemann, Häußling, Knoblach, Schütz and Luckmann, as cited in Pfadenhauer 2014, pp. 137, 140-141). The consensus is that self-motivated actions, like those of humans, are self-initiated performances of consciousness; autonomous actions are merely behavior that occurs without remote control, like those of robots that do not require human input to function. The common argument from this assertion is that humans are aware of the difference between these two actions, and because they are aware that autonomous machines lack consciousness, they respond appropriately.

However, even if we know that a display of emotion is not genuine, we can nevertheless be affected by it. We can liken the actors in a play, reading off a pre-written script, to our androids reacting based on their programming. The performance of an actor, by simulating intense human emotions, can provoke a considerable effect on the audience, despite the fact that the simulated emotions are fictional; the audience is not reacting to the actor, but to the character that the actor portrays. From this we can assert that the appearance of an emotive object often overrules our cognitive understanding of its internal states.

In fact, there are many real-world examples of this happening with robots. In a study of the experiences of AIBO (a socially affective "dog" robot) owners in Germany, researcher Christopher Schultz writes:

> Aibo's movements make a stronger impression than those

> of simple electrical robots… I am sitting on the bed beside Galato (his AIBO)… his tail is wagging the whole time. This produces light vibrations that are transmitted via the mattress and that I can feel. I have a strong feeling that there is a living thing beside me; all cognitive concepts fail in this case; one reacts to something like this directly and without reflection. (Schultz 2008, as cited in Pfadenhauer 2014, p. 138)

Again, even despite the fact that he is perfectly aware that Galato is not alive, its tail-wagging behavior manages to bypass Schultz's rational thought, and produces a viscerally emotional effect.

3. Empathy and Cognition

It is now necessary to further investigate the concept of empathy. As previously stated, the cognitive process of empathy is the ability to judge and be affected by others' internal states. Research into psychology and biology reveals that non-human animals also exhibit empathy, and it is significantly related to their social intelligence.

One well-documented example of empathetic behavior is the practice of consolation; when, after two members of a group engage in an aggressive conflict, a third party comforts the victim of the aggression in an attempt to alleviate their stress. When young human children exhibit this behavior, it is considered a sign of empathy. Interestingly, the practice is also demonstrably present in animals with large social structures, such as apes, large-brained birds, and dogs, while it is not present in animals with less sophisticated societies (Fraser et al. 2008, p. 8557). Consolation is a clear instance of both cognitive and affective empathy, as it requires an animal to perceive the emotions of its peers, and then be emotionally affected in such a way that it feels compelled to offer support. The reason why consolation, alongside many other types of altruistic behavior, is present only in socially intelligent species is because the exercise of empathy is a vital component of social stability.

Post-conflict consolation has real, tangible effects. A 2008 study on the purpose of consolation in chimpanzees reported that post-conflict individual stress levels, which would have remained extremely high without the help of consolation, were significantly reduced after consolation was administered (Fraser et al. 2008, p. 8558). If such stress is left unchecked, then it would have serious, negative consequences to the entire community (Sapolsky 2004, as cited in Fraser et al. 2008, p. 8559).

Japanese Macaques have much less sophisticated social structures and form less meaningful relationships than chimpanzees, and they fail to "display signs of distress when their offspring are targets of aggression nor do they increase post conflict affiliative contacts with their offspring, suggesting that they may be unable to perceive their offspring's need for distress alleviation" (Schino et al. 2004, as cited in Fraser et al. 2008, p. 8559). However, the relatively delicate and nuanced dynamics of chimpanzee social groups require the consistent exercise of empathy in order to progress as smoothly as possible. Chimpanzees' social intelligence evolved accordingly, allowing for deeper emotional connections between members of society; a rudimentary sense of morality formed as a result. Many psycho-biologists agree that enhanced cognitive abilities like empathy likely allow species like "dolphins and great apes… to develop rudimentary levels of morality and altruism," which is vital to the survival of their societies (Hunter 2010, p. 168). So, humans likely owe much of their capacity for social intelligence, which allows them to build and maintain working societies, to the hard-wired instinct of empathy.

4. Androids, Society, and Empathy

Androids, like the abused janitor in section 2, will act as functioning components of society. Even now, robots occupy a growing variety of industrial and commercial roles that were once human-only. Since humans and robots will occupy many shared spaces in society, it seems uneven to specify different societal rules for humans and robots, despite the fact that they will function more

or less identically in these spaces. As discussed in the previous section, empathy appears to have evolved as a mechanism to facilitate interactions between members of a society. Androids, for all intents and purposes, will become members of society in the sense that we will empathize with them, however "misapplied" it may be. So, in the interest of overall social order and well-being, it is useful to apply empathy equally to all members of society, appreciative or not.

Of course, this warrants the objection that androids will not be truly significant social participants. They will not contribute anything, socially, to the environment—they will not deliberately seek out friendships, or connect on a personal level with humans—instead spending all their time performing the tasks that they were designed to do. We will see them only as bartenders, receptionists, and so forth. In short, our interactions with androids will be confined to routine, meaningless exchanges, and we will never develop strong, personal care for their well-being.

However, consolation behavior is not confined to close personal relationships, nor is it just for the benefit of the victim. "[F]riendship and relatedness," although it does hold some sway, actually influence consolation behavior far less than would be expected, suggesting that it is usually done for its own sake (Palagi et al. 2006, p. 110).

Another, stronger objection is that our empathy is predicated on the belief that the subject is accurately expressing (and that we are accurately interpreting) some internal state. Since the androids will not personally care about the harm being done to them and cannot derive any benefit from a human's compassion, any empathy felt towards their distress is wasted.

This second objection requires more attention than the first. It relies on the idea that our empathetic impulses are only justified when the target truly is suffering, since our empathy would otherwise be directionless; it wouldn't "target" anything, so it would be meaningless. But even if a particular instance of empathy is meaningless, that doesn't mean that empathy should not be applied in future, similar situations. We suppose that androids will be rela-

tively commonplace, so that we will regularly encounter them. So, if we go along this line of reasoning, we will have to consciously disregard our impulses of empathy. I say "consciously," because our empathy occurs immediately without conscious input, but we have arrived at the conclusion that empathy in these cases misses the mark through the exercise of our conscious thought. Therefore, in order to take this conclusion to heart, we would have to deliberately negate our instincts towards empathy.

Over time, we would have to intentionally and repeatedly suppress our senses of empathy and ignore emotive responses from affective agents, every time we meet an android. What happens if we succeed? Our senses of empathy would be significantly dampened as a result. Since empathy is an unconscious process, it seems unlikely that we can "turn it back on," when we want to interact with other humans. And since empathy is a decidedly important component of morality and social well-being, deliberately suppressing it in any case is disastrous.

Conclusion

Integrating androids into our existing social structure will not be terribly difficult; all we need to do is to follow our instincts and continue to exercise our sense of empathy. Why force ourselves to stop using this instinct, which is vitally important to the survival of society, just because we are uncertain whether or not the recipient of our empathy can truly appreciate it? Empathy is never "wasted"; rather, it should be applied whenever possible, equally across all social interactions. Since empathy is such an important part of our psyches, it is worth exercising for its own sake.

Even though they themselves may not have social concerns, androids will inevitably become relevant to discussions thereof; "even as a simple tool, robots can have an enormous impact in society and might contribute to the restructuring or even erosion of norms, standards and customs" (Steinert 2014, p. 254). If androids will be perceived as moral patients within our society, with human-appearing emotional responses that evoke strongly

empathetic feelings, it seems incongruous that we should discount these feelings simply because we doubt that androids really do experience consciousness and suffering. Naturally, this entails that we should act on our empathy for such androids the same way as we would for humans.

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Sex and The Simulacrum: Deleuze's Univocity of Being, Performativity, and the Sex/Gender Distinction

Matthew Hart

The Second, Second Sex

In 2004, evolutionary biologist David Haig published an article titled, "The Inexorable Rise of Gender and the Decline of Sex: Social Change in Academic Titles, 1945–2001." Haig's research showed a dramatic increase in academic titles featuring "gender" beginning in the 1980s. The earliest uses of the term gender concerned its grammatical sense. In the 1950s, psychologist John Money developed the notion of a "gender role." Gender began to circulate with the same frequency as "sex" throughout the '60s and into the '70s. However, the '80s and the rise of feminist literature's concern with the distinction between sex and gender showed a decline in the use of "sex". Judith Butler—and her notion of gender as a performative—is arguably the most influential of these writers. Butler took the analytic philosopher of language J.L. Austin's notion of a performative utterance and created a conception of gender as a performative. In the way that Austin demonstrated that language has meaning outside of the truth-value of propositions and is enmeshed with our actions in the world, Butler saw in the notions of sex and gender a meaning that couldn't be expressed in terms of truth or falsity. For Butler, gender isn't propositional; it's performative in the way that it's not a list of attributes, but descriptions of actions, both verbal and non-verbal. For the purposes of this paper, I'll be focusing on Butler's notion of gender parody through performativity. According to Butler, "gender is an identity tenuously constituted in time, insti-

tuted in an exterior space through a *stylized repetition of acts*" (*Gender Trouble*, p. 191). However, Butler's work remains "top-down," insofar as she gives an account of how 'gender' expresses a variety of lived-experiences but doesn't give an account of the body or differences that produce that variety or difference. In order to provide a conception of the body that accounts for this difference, it will be helpful to examine Deleuze's account of the univocity of being as it pertains to a description of bodies. First we have to understand Deleuze's philosophical project of reversing Platonism. The reversal of Platonism involves a radicalization of the simulacrum. This will involve looking closely at the Platonic account of division. According to Deleuze, Platonism is a division between two categories of particulars; (1) the particular representations that allege to participate in an essence/form; and, (2) the particular representations that allege, but fail to represent essences/forms (Phantasms/simulacrum, "the decoy"). Next I'll discuss how Deleuze's radicalization of the simulacrum has parallels to Butler's performativity; in particular, Deleuze's conception of 'naked' and 'clothed' repetition, and Butler's distinction between expressive and performative gender attributes. Where Deleuze differs from Butler is in his account of the composition of bodies and difference in general. Butler sees in repetition its temporal component, but fails to see the immanent nature of difference. Deleuze's univocal being revolving around the different gives us a sense of space or composition in a conversation limited to movements in time. Butler speaks of a body, but for Deleuze, via Spinoza, our bodies are amalgamations of bodies ceaselessly encountering, absorbing, rejecting, digesting, etc., other bodies. Once we've radicalized the signifier and we've radicalized the composition of bodies, where does that leave the status of the sex/gender distinction? The answer requires a new account of what a person is and how we conceive of the "one and the many." A Deleuzian radicalization of bodies pushes us to return to sex, albeit a radically different conception of 'sex': "For us there are, not one or two sexes, but many, as many as there are individuals" (Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*). I will argue

that a Deleuzian multiplicity of sexes more accurately captures the composition of bodies as sites of production and re-petition.

Reversing Platonism

In order to understand the role that Butler's notion of performativity plays in the following discussion, we need to first get clear what Deleuze's Reverse Platonism entails. Deleuze's project (or continuation of Nietzsche's project) of 'reversing Platonism' is at the heart of his metaphysics. Deleuze first developed his concept of the simulacrum in *Difference and Repetition* (1968) and *The Logic of Sense* (1969).

In "The Concept of the Simulacrum: Deleuze and the Overturning of Platonism," Daniel Smith notes, "Nietzsche had defined the task of his philosophy, and indeed the philosophy of the future, as the reversal of Platonism. In an early sketch for his first treatise (1870–1871), he wrote: 'My philosophy is an inverted Platonism: the farther removed from true being, the purer, the finer, the better it is. Living in semblance as goal'" (Smith 2005, p. 90). Nietzsche's call for philosophy to invert Platonism became a primary concern for Deleuze. So, what exactly does it mean to invert or reverse Platonism?

For Deleuze, the answer to any question about the intent of a given philosopher lies in the work of the philosopher himself. What Deleuze saw in Plato is what Aristotle saw: a method of division. Deleuze writes that, "Aristotle indeed saw what is irreplaceable in Platonism, even though he made it precisely the basis of a criticism of Plato: the dialectic of difference has its own method – division – but this operates without mediation, without middle term or reason; it acts in the immediate and is inspired by Ideas rather than by the requirements of a concept in general" (Deleuze 1968, p. 60). However, Aristotle's interpretation of division as between genus and opposing species through a middle term misses the conceptual labor of Plato's division. The aim of "Plato's method of division is completely different," Smith observes, "The method of division is not a dialectic of contradiction or contra-

riety (*antiphasis*), a determination of species, but rather a dialectic of rivals and suitors (*amphisbetesis*), a selection of claimants. It does not consist of dividing genera into species, but of selecting a pure line from an impure and undifferentiated material; it attempts to distinguish the authentic and the inauthentic, the good and the bad, the pure and the impure, from within an indefinite mixture or multiplicity" (Ibid, p. 94). Therefore, it's about "making the difference;" however, this difference isn't between species, but occurs entirely within the depths of the immediate, where the selection is made without mediation (*Ibid*, p. 94). Deleuze writes:

> It is true that division is a capricious, incoherent procedure which jumps from one singularity to another, by contrast with the supposed identity of a concept. Is this not its strength from the point of view of the Idea? Far from being one dialectical procedure among others which must be completed or relayed by others, is not division the one which replaces all the other procedures from the moment it appears, and gathers up all the dialectical power in favour of a genuine philosophy of difference? Is it not simultaneously the measure of both Platonism and the possibility of overturning Platonism? (*Ibid*, p. 59)

Deleuze, riffing on Plato's use of gold in a myriad of examples, offers the analogy of the division between gold and fool's gold. However, even this is "a process which likewise entails several selections: the elimination of impurities, the elimination of other metals 'of the same family,' and so on," writes Smith, "This is why the method of division can appear to be a capricious, incoherent procedure that jumps from one singularity to another, in contrast with the supposed identity of the concept" (*Ibid*, p. 94). Rather than following a neat thread from the Idea to the representation, there is a multiplicity of difference produced by every division and within every division. Only the Idea is pure.

According to Deleuze, the "motive" of the theory of Ideas has to be found in "a will to select and to choose" (Deleuze 1969, p. 253). It is in distinguishing the "thing" itself from its images,

the original from the copy, the model from the simulacrum (*Ibid*, p. 253). Plato's dialogues often take the form of sussing out the correct definition among possible rivals. For Deleuze, the purpose of division then "is not at all to divide a genus into species, but, more profoundly, to select lineages: to distinguish pretenders; to distinguish the pure from the impure… It is to screen the claims (*pretensions*) and to distinguish the true pretender from the false one" (*Ibid*, p. 254). This is why Deleuze calls Platonism the Odyssey of philosophy.

Foucault writes in his dual review of *Difference and Repetition* and *The Logic of Sense*, "With the abrupt appearance of Ulysses, the eternal husband, the false suitors disappear. *Exuent* simulacra." As Smith highlights, "In Deleuze's reading, then, Platonism is defined by this will to track and hunt down phantasms and simulacra in every domain, to identify the sophist himself, the diabolical insinuator (Dionysus)" (*Ibid*, p. 99). The common view of Platonism is the division between particulars and their essences, this world and the world above, the sun of truth and the cave of illusion. However, Deleuze finds in Platonism a process of division between particulars. Foucault characterizes it as a "delicate sorting" that "precedes the discovery of essence precisely because it calls upon it, and tries to separate malign simulacra from the masses of appearance." According to Deleuze then, Platonism is a division between two categories of particulars; (1) the particular representations that allege to participate in an essence/form; and, (2) the particular representations that allege, but fail to represent essences/forms (Phantasms/simulacrum "the decoy"). Foucault's review is wonderful for a variety of reason, but his particular flair for capturing the enthusiastic spirit of Deleuze is worth quoting in long-form:

> To convert Platonism (a serious task) is to increase its compassion for reality, for the world, and for time. To subvert Platonism is to begin at the top (the vertical distance of irony) and to grasp its origin. To pervert Platonism is to search out the smallest details, to descend

> (with the natural gravitation of humor) as far as its crop of hair or the dirt under its fingernails—those things that were never hallowed by an idea; it is to discover the decentering it put into effect in order to recenter itself around the Model, the Identical, and the Same; it is the decentering of oneself with respect to Platonism so as to give rise to the play (as with every perversion) of surfaces at its border. Irony rises and subverts; humor falls and perverts. To pervert Plato is to side with the Sophists' spitefulness, the unmannerly gestures of the Cynics, the arguments of the Stoics, and the fluttering chimeras of Epicurus. It is time to read Diogenes Laertius.

Foucault playfully illuminates the Deleuzian attention to detail and manic desire to produce a cartography of unfathomable fidelity. One can't help but be reminded of the phrase "warts and all" when thinking of Deleuze's affirmation of the simulacra. The reversal of Platonism is an urgent retreat from authenticity, purity, and transcendence. It is a radical affirmation of immanent boundaries, internal difference, and a brutal leveling of order or hierarchy. Platonism, "in subordinating the simulacrum to the copy, and hence to the Idea, defines it in purely negative terms: it is the copy of a copy, an endlessly degraded copy, an infinitely slackened icon," writes Smith, "To truly invert Platonism means that the difference between copies and simulacrum must be seen, not merely as a difference of degree but as a *difference in nature*" (*Ibid*, p. 100).

So, then, what is the difference in nature for the Deleuzian simulacra? Smith outlines three characteristics of the Deleuzian simulacra. First, Deleuze writes that "the copy is an image endowed with resemblance, the simulacrum is an image *without* resemblance" (*Ibid*, p. 257). Deleuze points us in the direction of the early Christian catechisms. Smith writes, "God created man in His own image and to resemble Him (*imago Dei*), but through sin, man has lost the resemblance while retaining the image. We have lost a moral existence and entered into an aesthetic one; we have

become simulacra" (*Ibid*, p. 100). The simulacra have become a "demonic image" in the way that, while it is still an image, its resemblance "has been *externalized*;" and, therefore it's no longer a resemblance, but a "mere 'semblance'" (*Ibid*, p. 100). This is precisely the danger of the simulacra: their sameness.

Smith notes that the simulacrum in Christian thought isn't demonized because it is the opposite of the icon:

> … the demonic is not the opposite of the divine, Satan is not the Other, the pole farthest from God, the absolute antithesis, but something much more bewildering and vertiginous: *the Same*, the perfect double, the exact semblance the *Doppelganger*, the angel of light whose deception is so complete that it is impossible to tell the imposter (Satan, Lucifer) apart from the "reality" (God, Christ), just as Plato reaches the point where Socrates and the Sophist are rendered indiscernible. This is the point where we can no longer speak of deception or even simulation, but rather, as Nietzsche expressed it, the "power of the false." …Foucault suggests that the concern over simulacra continued through the Baroque period, and did not finally fall into silence until Descartes's great simulacrum: the Evil Genius of the first *Meditation*, God's "marvellous twin," who simulates God and can mime all his powers, decreeing eternal truths and acting as if 2 + 2 = 5, but who is expelled from any possible existence because of his malignancy. If Plato maligns the simulacrum, it is not because it elevates the false over the true, the evil over the good; more precisely, the simulacrum is "beyond good and evil" because it renders them *indiscernible* and internalizes the difference between them, thereby scrambling the selection and perverting the judgment. (*Ibid*, p. 102)

Deleuze writes that the simulacra pretend underhandedly, "under cover of an aggression, an insinuation, a subversion, 'against the father,' and without passing through the Idea. Theirs is an unfounded pretension, concealing a dissimilarity which is an

internal unbalance" (*Ibid*, p. 257). For Deleuze, the simulacrum is built upon a disparity/difference and it "internalizes a dissimilarity" (*Ibid*, p. 258). The simulacrum "implies huge dimension, depths, and distances that the observer cannot master" (*Ibid*, p. 258). It is because of this unmasterability that the observer "experiences an impression of resemblance" and "becomes a part of the simulacrum itself, which is transformed and deformed by his point of view" (*Ibid*, p. 258). The simulacra refuse to submit to the Platonist and are seen as a "becoming unlimited," a "becoming subversive of the depths… To impose a limit of this becoming, to order it according to the same, to render it similar—and, for that part which remains rebellious, to repress it as deeply as possible, to shut it up in a cavern at the bottom of the Ocean—such is the aim of Platonism in its will to bring the triumph of icons over simulacra" (*Ibid*, p. 258-259). This internal difference is the second characteristic of the simulacra. It is because of this internal difference (as opposed to external resemblance) that Deleuze distinguishes between the concept of the Identical and the concept of the Same (*Ibid*, p. 103). Deleuze writes that in Platonism, "the model can be defined only by a positing of identity as the essence of the Same (*auto kath'hauto*), as the essence of Ideas, and the copy by an affection of internal resemblance, the quality of the Similar" (*Ibid*, p. 265). However, in an inverted Platonism, Smith writes, "this link between the Same and the Identical is severed. When the Same passes to the side of things rather than Ideas, and indicates the indiscernibility of things and their simulacra (Socrates is indiscernible from the Sophists, God from Satan), it is the identity of things that suffers a corresponding loss" (*Ibid*, p. 103). The third characteristic of the simulacra is the "*mode* under which it is apprehended" (*Ibid*, p. 103). Smith writes, "In the famous passage of the Republic (X, pp. 601d–608b) where he expels the artist from the City, Plato appeals to the user–producer–imitator triad in order to preserve an 'iconic' sense of imitation (imitation as *mimesis* rather than *apate* or 'deception')" (*Ibid*, p. 104). This triad is fundamental in understanding the role of "right opinion" and "true knowledge" in Plato. The user is at the top of the hierarchy

because "he makes use of true knowledge, which is the knowledge of the model of Idea" (*Ibid*, p. 104). The craftsman then produces copies that are iconic insofar as they "reproduce the model internally" and, while not produced by true knowledge, are "guided by a correct judgment or *right opinion* of the user's knowledge, and by the relations and proportions that constitute essence" (*Ibid*, p. 104). In this light, the producer's right opinion "apprehends the external resemblance between the copy and the Idea only to the degree that it is guaranteed by their internal ('noetic') similarity" (*Ibid*, p. 104). For Plato, the imitation the simulacrum engages in neither "reproduces the *eidos*" or is obtained through "true knowledge" or "right opinion". The imitation of the simulacrum is rather a "decoy" or a "ruse". Smith writes, "The simulacrum can only appear under the mode of a *problem*, as a *question*, as that which forces one to think, what Plato calls a 'provocative' ('Is it true or false, good or evil?') (*Ibid*, p. 104). Deleuze writes:

> The artificial is always a copy of a copy, which should be pushed *to the point where it changes its nature and is reversed into the simulacrum* (the moment of Pop Art). Artifice and simulacrum are opposed at the heart of modernity, at the point where modernity settles all of its accounts, as two modes of destruction: two nihilisms. For there is a vast difference between destroying in order to conserve and perpetuate the established order of representations, models, and copies, and destroying the models and copies in order to institute the chaos which creates, making the simulacra function and raising a phantasm—the most innocent of all destructions, the destruction of Platonism. (*Ibid*, p. 265-266).

Deleuze's characterization of the inevitable conflict between artifice and simulacrum in modernity is helpful in thinking about the affirmative nature of the simulacrum in his philosophy. Pop Art took mainstream cultural iconography and parodied it through recontextualization. What is the difference between Warhol's soup cans and a Campbell's advertisement? The external resemblance

remains the same, but the "internal difference" through recontextualization and intent forces the resemblance into a semblance. According to Deleuze, the observer "experiences an impression of resemblance" and "becomes a part of the simulacrum itself, which is transformed and deformed by his point of view" (Deleuze 1969, p. 258). Warhol's simulacrum subverted the purity of the icon and forced the viewer to see the "power of the false." Warhol's soup cans weren't "false advertisements;" rather their "falsehood" was precisely their power and their positivity. The "truth" that they presented was an affirmation of their "falseness".

Gender and the Simulacrum: Butler's Performativity

In *Gender Trouble* (1990), Judith Butler took the analytic philosopher of language J.L. Austin's notion of a performative utterance and created a conception of gender as a performative. For Austin, philosophy had argued itself into a corner and elevated the "proposition" to a sacred level. *How to Do Things with Words*, Austin's published lecture series, unpacked how philosophy's myopic devotion to the proposition and its truth-value had limited our understanding of how language operates. Austin's critical project of dethroning the status of the proposition often overshadows his positive project of encouraging philosophers to rethink the relationship between language and the world. In the way that Austin demonstrated that language has meaning outside of the truth-value of propositions and is enmeshed with our actions in the world, Butler saw in the notions of sex and gender a meaning that couldn't be expressed in terms of truth or falsity. For Butler, gender isn't propositional; it's performative in the way that it's not a list of attributes, but descriptions of actions, both verbal and non-verbal.

For the purposes of this paper, I'll be focusing on Butler's notion of gender parody through performativity. Butler states, "The replication of heterosexual constructs in non-heterosexual frames brings into relief the utterly constructed status of the

so-called heterosexual original" (Butler 1990, p. 43). "The notion of gender parody defended here does not assume that there is an original which such parodic identities imitate," writes Butler, "Indeed, the parody is of the very notion of an original… it is a production which, in effect—that is, in its effect—postures as an imitation" (*Ibid*, p. 188). It would be easy to stop here and identify Butler as seeing the simulacrum affirmed as a simulacrum, using an external resemblance to highlight an internal difference.

However, as we'll see below, Butler's conception of external/internal will differ from Deleuze. Butler writes, "Although the gender meanings taken up in these parodic styles are clearly part of hegemonic, misogynist culture, they are nevertheless denaturalized and mobilized through their parodic recontextualization. As imitations which effectively displace the meaning of the original, they imitate the myth of originality itself" (*Ibid*, p. 188). The affirmation of the simulacrum degrades the icon and subverts the "myth of originality" or the very notion of representation. "If the body is not a 'being,' but a variable boundary, a surface whose permeability is politically regulated, a signifying practice within a cultural field of gender hierarchy and compulsory heterosexuality," writes Butler, "then what language is left for understanding this corporeal enactment, gender, that constitutes its 'interior' signification on its surface?" (Ibid, p. 189). The answer to this question is perhaps where Butler leaves Deleuze and begins to both fill and widen the cracks in the similarity between them that I've constructed. For Butler, language is the boundary between the "corporeal enactment" and its "'interior' signification." We'll return to this point in the next section.

According to Butler, "gender is an identity tenuously constituted in time, instituted in an exterior space through a *stylized repetition of acts*" (*Ibid*, p. 191). In the above section of this essay I've emphasized only one part of Deleuze's thought; namely, difference. However, Deleuze's book is titled *Difference and Repetition*. It wasn't until I started working through Deleuze's reverse Platonism that I noticed the similarity between both Butler's notion of parody and the "repetition of acts" and Deleuze's emphasis on

"difference" and "repetition". Smith writes, "Platonism relies on what Deleuze calls a 'naked' model of repetition (representation): the copy repeats the identity of the ideal model as the first term in a hierarchical series (just as in archaic religion, ritual is said to repeat myth)" (Smith 2005, p. 111). In other words, there is a temporal and hierarchical component to the Platonic notion of repetition.

For Plato, learning is a "remembering" of an originary moment when we had access to the forms and "this originary identity, now lost or forgotten… conditions the entire process of repetition, and in this sense remains independent of it" (*Ibid*, p. 112). However, as Smith notes, "the question Deleuze poses is the following: are the disguises and variations, the masks and costumes, something added secondarily 'over and above' the original term, or are they on the contrary 'the internal genetic elements of repetition itself, its integral and constituent parts'? (Deleuze 1968, p. 17). In this case, we would no longer have a naked repetition of the Same but a 'clothed' repetition of the Different (*Ibid*, p. 112). Clothed repetition doesn't repeat this temporally prior identity, but repeats a "virtual object or event." Smith writes, "There is not an originary 'thing' (model) which could eventually be uncovered behind the disguises, displacements, and illusions of repetition (copies); rather, disguise and displacement are the essence of repetition itself, which is in itself an original and positive principle" (*Ibid*, p. 112). "Re-petition opposes re-presentation: the prefix changes it meaning, since in the latter case difference is said only in relation to the identical, while in the former it is the univocal which is said of the different," Deleuze writes, "When the identity of things dissolves, being escapes to attain univocity, and begins to revolve around the different" (*Ibid*, p. 67). Therefore, clothed repetition "does not refer to something underneath the masks, but rather is formed from one mask to the other, in a movement of perpetual differentiation" (*Ibid*, p. 113). This distinction between "naked" and "clothed" repetition is similar to Butler's distinction between expressive and performative gender attributes. "Gender is also a norm that can never fully be internal-

ized; 'the internal' is a surface signification, and gender norms are finally phantasmatic, impossible to embody" writes Butler, "The possibilities of gender transformations are to be found precisely in the arbitrary relation between such acts, in the possibility of a failure to repeat, a de-formity, or parodic repetition that exposes the phantasmatic effect of abiding identity as a politically tenuous construction" (*Ibid*, p. 192).

Butler concludes her book by stating, "If gender attributes and acts, the various ways in which a body shows or produces its cultural signification, are performative, then there is no preexisting identity by which an act or attribute might be measured; there would be no true or false, real or distorted acts of gender, and the postulation of a true gender identity would be revealed as a regulatory fiction" (*Ibid*, p. 192). For Butler, gender doesn't express an "originary thing," but performs or repeats the disguises or masks of gender itself. Therefore, gender is a re-petition and not a re-presentation. However, Butler stops there and only radicalizes the signifier, 'gender', and falls into a classic philosophical paralysis over whether or not the "physical" body exists prior to the perpetually perceived body, "an impossible question to decide" (*Ibid*, p. 155). It is here that Deleuze's conception of the simulacra will be helpful in conceiving of the body such that it produces this repetition.

Deleuze's Univocity of Being and the Sex/Gender Distinction: Thinking of Difference as Substance and the Poweer and Composition of the Body

For Deleuze, meta-philosophy is inextricably linked to metaphysics. The question of "What is philosophy?" is nearly identical to the question "What is a being?" Similar to Spinoza, Deleuze wants to remind us that philosophy is a part of the world. Jay Conway, in *Affirmation in Philosophy*, writes, "A being is the actualization of a problem or differential. Or, a being is the actualization of an incorporeal in a corporeal mixture" (Conway 2010,

pp. 57-58). A philosophy is a body in the world—composed of bodies—that encounters other bodies. According to Deleuze, if we separate metaphilosophy from metaphysics we perpetuate the idea of metaphysical transcendence. It creates an image of philosophy and representation, science and representation, language and representation. "The image is one of two distinct objects in space," writes Conway, "On one side we have philosophy, science, and language; and on the other side we have the world. Does philosophy or language mirror the world? Does science construct or represent the world? One side says yes, the other side says no…. Both sides obscure the obvious: philosophy, science, art, historiography, logic, and linguistic acts exist within the world" (*Ibid*, p. 58).

Deleuze sees in Spinoza's univocity of being a way of conceiving immanence through difference. For Spinoza, God/Nature is the only substance and we have access to two of his attributes; namely, thought and extension. A person is a mode of this substance. Mind and body are two expressions of the same thing. Thought is an attribute of nature; and, therefore, not only is thought an activity within nature, but of nature (i.e., the idea of the totality of nature is one of its infinite modes). Thought and extension on this view are immanent boundaries within a single being that express a qualitative distinction. Deleuze's gesture is to say that difference is the only 'substance' and its two attributes are difference as a difference and repetition. Therefore, the 'univocity' is difference itself. Let's now get a clear idea of how Deleuze conceives of difference. Conway identifies four ways in which this genuine or primary difference is formulated:

1. Difference as the subject, a system of habits: difference is the production of a relation where every relation is a habitual association formed between two heterogeneous terms.

2. Difference as the institution: the irreducibility of each organization of our bodies to a simple principle of human nature.

3. Difference as a real, but non-numerical distinction within

every being: difference as the difference between an immanent principle of power (the power of affection, the will-to-power) and how it is fulfilled, difference as radically different tendencies (duration and space, qualitative multiplicity and quantitative multiplicity, memory and matter, active and reactive forces).

4. Difference as one side of this distinction within every being: difference as the immanent cause (the power of affectivity, the will-to-power), difference as one of the tendencies (duration or the continuous production of heterogeneity, the active force that produces difference). (*Ibid*, p. 204)

On this account, the body's mercurial composition is what allows for repetition. Deleuze refers to this way of conceiving of the body's composition as "assemblages". Univocal being "is at once both production of repetition on the basis of difference and selection of difference on the basis of repetition" (Deleuze 1968, p. 42). So, unlike Butler who identifies the body as a surface that displays the signification of language, Deleuze provides an account of the body as the site of the production of difference. The question for Deleuze is "What is this body *doing*? In what situation is a body actualized?" Conway draws our attention to the way that Deleuze and Guattari apply the metaphysic found in the *Logic of Sense* to political uprisings in Europe in 1968 in the short piece, "May '68 Did Not Take Place." Conway writes, "The emergence of radically different, nondocile bodies, along with a variety of new lived experiences, has as its meaning the belief in and demand for a different world" (*Ibid*, p. 60). Similarly, if we apply the Deleuzian metaphysic to the advent of concern over the sex/gender distinction in feminist philosophy, we will be in a better position to affirm the differences rather than theorize their lack of cohesion. Deleuze and Guattari write, "The possible does not pre-exist, it is created by the event. It is a matter of life. The event creates a new existence, it produces a new subjectivity (new relations with the body, with time, sexuality, the immediate surroundings, with culture, work)." The dawn of radical 'gender' within feminist philosophy isn't

an uncovering of preexisting, authentic notions of gender buried under "false" notions perpetuated by patriarchy. Rather, the event of distinguishing/dismantling the sex/gender distinction is itself the creation of new genders/sexes in battle with dominant conceptions that limit the movement/existence of adversarial bodies. "May 68 was neither the result of, nor a reaction to a crisis," write Deleuze and Guattari, "It is rather the opposite. It is the current crisis in France, the impasse that stems directly from the inability of the French society to assimilate May 68." The "current crisis" is of bodies immobilized and destroyed by patriarchal notions of gender (e.g., the suicide rate of trans* peoples, the lived reality of "The Myth of the Eternal Feminine", and the secondary status of feminist philosophy itself). It is the failure to assimilate "radically different, non-docile bodies" that also produces them; their repression is at the same time their production.

A Deleuzian radicalization of bodies pushes us to return to 'sex', albeit a radically different conception of 'sex': "For us there are, not one or two sexes, but many, as many as there are individuals" (Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*). Butler quotes this passage and states that the, "limitless proliferation of sexes, however, logically entails the negation of sex as such. If the number of sexes corresponds to the number of existing individuals, sex would no longer have any general application as a term: one's sex would be a radically singular property and would no longer be able to operate as a useful or descriptive generalization" (Butler 1990, p. 161). With a conception of the simulacrum, it is now easy to respond to this charge. Butler is still distinguishing between a particular that represents the Idea and a particular that fails to represent it (the simulacra). The aim of her radicalization of 'gender' was, in part, to dismantle descriptive generalizations. In her words, to render "identity" itself as "permanently problematic" (*Ibid*, p. 174). For Butler, the identity of a body is made problematic by radicalizing the signifier 'gender'. However, on Deleuze's account the masks and costumes are not something over and above the body, but are rather "the internal genetic elements of repetition itself, its integral and

constituent parts" (Deleuze 1968, p. 17). Butler's problematizing of identity relies on showing that the "internal" is a phantasm, and that gender norms are "impossible to embody". Again, this notion holds only if we are still conceiving of particulars that represent the idea and those that fail to. When we begin to see difference not as a relation to the identical, but as the univocal revolving around the different, the internal/external relation itself falls apart: every 'one' is a 'many'. Every body is an assemblage; all boundaries are immanent. Gender norms involve the production of bodies that reproduce them. In this light, a multiplicity of sexes more accurately captures the composition of bodies as sites of production and re-petition. This isn't a return to 'sex' as a biological signifier, but a radicalization of sex more closely related to Beauvoir: a conception that encompasses the inseparability of the body and the myths they produce and perpetuate. When we conceive of sex as simulacrum, we can both dissolve identity and affirm the same. Our bodies and our being are seen as a "becoming unlimited." The body doesn't undergo processes; it is the process itself. The production of bodies becomes a revolutionary event. Sex as simulacra affirms difference and levels all order or hierarchy. It is impossible in the space provided to give a detailed account of how conceiving of sex as simulacra functions in the variety of philosophies concerning the sex/gender distinction. However, I hope that showing how it functions to give Butler a more robust account of repetition has been a helpful case study.

Conclusion

In philosophy, we often have to create new concepts in order to reactualize "old" ones. The work done in distinguishing sex from gender (and radicalizing it) has been of tremendous philosophical importance. Butler's notion of gender as a performative has helped to produce a generation of exciting and useful work, both politically and philosophically—if one sees a distinction between those two. I have attempted to show how Deleuze's Reverse Platonism and his conception of the simulacrum aids in both understanding

Butler's work and providing a metaphysical sense of composition in a discussion relegated to time and language. Deleuze's "innocent destruction" of Platonism encourages us to reevaluate our metaphysical commitments. When we leave the world of Ideas and find ourselves involved in the "delicate sorting" of particulars and affirming immanent boundaries, we are forced to create new concepts to handle the level of fidelity that this entails. The sex/gender distinction is a concept that seems to have been pushed to its limits. I hope to have shown that the crisis is not the inability to theorize the bodies or the lived-experiences of those participating in radical gender; instead, it is the failure of our concepts and the bodies and institutions that produce them to assimilate these "radically different, non-docile bodies." The philosophical work on the sex/gender distinction is not a reaction to oppression: it is the necessary production of unlimited bodies emerging in the cracks of artifice and power. Sex as simulacra is an expression of hope and a demand for change.

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The Ethics of Nietzsche's "Immoralism"

Avedis Bekhloian

Introduction

Nietzsche has been consistently thought of as an "immoralist" based on his critique of morality. To claim that Nietzsche does not accept contemporary morality is fair to a certain extent; however, claiming he is an immoralist is misleading and inaccurate. The claim lies in how one would define an immoralist. For the purposes of this paper, I believe a definition that is fair and captures the essence of the term is: one who does not accept any moral principles. Traditionally, throughout the history of western philosophy, moral theories have appeared in three main branches: Consequentialism, Deontology and Virtue Ethics. This paper will discuss how Nietzsche's moral views are (non-classical) virtue ethics.

The reason why I state they are *non-classical* virtue ethics is because this branch of moral theory is most commonly associated with Aristotle and his list of various virtues; this list will not apply for Nietzsche. The essence of virtue ethics, or the aspect which differentiates it from the other branches of ethics, lies in the emphasis on an individual's character as opposed to analyzing specific cases or assessing specific moral rules. For example, deontological ethics places a greater focus on one's duty and makes moral judgments based on rules of what is "right and wrong" (e.g. the ten commandments provided by the Judeo-Christian God). Virtues are not obvious and appear subjective; however, it is clear that Aristotle believed that the *purpose* of embracing and acting on certain virtues would lead to eudaimonia (Greek for human flourishing/well-being). Virtue then must be treated as a means to an end (i.e., eudaimonia). This paper will argue that Nietzsche's

philosophy is primarily focused on providing individuals with values and dispositions that lead to human flourishing and well-being. Unlike Aristotle, Nietzsche doesn't provide a concrete list of dispositions, but I will argue that he provides dispositions that he believes would remove humanity from a state of pusillanimity, towards magnanimity. The Judeo-Christian moral paradigm is the present-day moral code that Nietzsche heavily criticizes for advocating nihilism amongst mankind. In essence, this leads man to embrace non-life-affirming values, which I will label as a state of pusillanimity. Nietzsche's goal is embodied by his concept of the Ubermensch, which he believes to be something man can *ascend* towards. This ideal of Nietzsche's will embrace life-affirming values and serve as a model for man to become what I label as magnanimous. Once again, the ethical aspect of Nietzsche's philosophy that I will argue for does not mimic the format used by Aristotle; there is no explicit list of virtues familiar to Aristotelians. Nietzsche's ethics are difficult to categorize as ethics itself, because they do not follow the current moral paradigm. However, there is an emphasis on one's character and the values embraced, which determine one's ability to become magnanimous. In proving that Nietzsche provides virtue ethics, I will simultaneously be proving that he is not an immoralist—based off of the definition provided in this paper.

This paper will be presented in three sections. Section I (Pusillanimity in Slave Morality) will discuss the psychological impact that the Judeo-Christian moral paradigm has on an individual. It will describe the birth of what Nietzsche refers to as "slave morality" through ressentiment and how man has welcomed nihilism as a result of it. The purpose of this section will be to prove how Nietzsche believes man has embraced a timid and cowardly spirit (pusillanimity). Section II (The Overman) will discuss how the self will be able to progress from the stunting effects of slave morality. Nietzsche doesn't propose specific attributes or specific actions but rather promotes a certain spirit an individual should adopt; and, that spirit is expressed through his concept of the Ubermensch. The Ubermensch is an anti-nihilist

and possesses life-affirming values—although these values are not definite. The purpose of this section will be to prove how Nietzsche advocates certain types of values that are magnanimous and provide an individual the opportunity to flourish in a meaningful and genuinely happy state. Section III (Pity vs. Mercy) will compare how Nietzsche views these two specific feelings/acts from a psychological standpoint. Nietzsche is famously known to despise pity and it appears as though he is in favor of mercy. I find that the contrast between these two values is at the heart of the contrast between pusillanimity and magnanimity, respectively. The purpose of this section, much like the second section, will demonstrate how Nietzsche promotes a specific value because he believes it helps man progress and how he denies another because it stunts the growth of an individual.

Pusillanimity in Slave Morality

Pusillanimity is a quality that consists of characteristics such as weakness, timidity, and cowardice. Nietzsche's description of slave morality places values upon an individual that are perfectly encompassed by this quality. In *On the Genealogy of Morality*, he presents the shift in paradigm from "good and bad" into "good and evil." The first paradigm is referred to as master morality because the individuals in power (noble class/aristocracy) took it upon themselves to determine their habits and values as good and the values of the commoners as bad. The values of master morality are simply self-affirming: the individuals in power look at themselves and their customs first and deem them "good." The introduction of the successor moral paradigm (good vs. evil) occurs through a process of acquired ressentiment, where "slave morality says no to an outside, to a different, to a not-self: and this 'no' is its creative deed… in order to come into being, slave morality always needs an opposite and external world; it needs, psychologically speaking, external stimuli in order to be able to act at all" (Nietzsche 1998, p. 19). Ressentiment is a French word for resentment and it's significant to emphasize that a shift in values

begins psychologically, with the masses of commoners attempting to find a form of revolt against the nobles. It then becomes the case that the habits and values of the nobles, which are based on earthly pleasures, become to be known as evil. In essence, the commoners "lie themselves into" adopting non-life-affirming values (e.g., abstinence from sex and certain foods); a psychological trick one commits upon himself so that he can find contempt in his life through his present conditions. Nietzsche claims the Jews to be the commoners who "revolted" and adopted the new values that would eventually be adopted by Christianity. The non-life-affirming values become exasperated when a deity (God) is presented. This introduces the concept of the afterlife, which is held to be of greater importance than this life (human life on earth). This completely skews the values of individuals towards nihilism because the "good" qualities that were adopted in slave morality become necessary to embrace if one is to ensure eternal happiness. Nietzsche's criticism of slave morality is vivid. The psychological impact resulted in individuals who don't embrace certain pleasures that life can offer; instead they embrace non-life-affirming values because they are under the belief that genuine and eternal happiness is attained that way. Slave morality is an apparent advocate for pusillanimity, which is why Nietzsche finds it to be "poisonous" and seeks a path to overcome it.

The Overman

The overman (*Übermensch*) is Nietzsche's ideal to overcome the pusillanimous state man has placed himself in. He states that, "man is a rope, tied between beast and overman—a rope over an abyss. A dangerous across, a dangerous on-the-way, a dangerous looking back, a dangerous shuddering and stopping" (Nietzsche 1995, p. 14). The overman is a fairly vague concept to depict, at least in detail, because Nietzsche doesn't attribute specific characteristics to it. Rather, he uses metaphors and imagery to capture his essence—this is perhaps done intentionally so that restrictions are not placed in one's path towards flourishing. In the descrip-

tion stated above, it is clear he believes there is a form of linear progression where man can overcome the dangers of the present path. The essence of the overman appears to be described well in a section that is dedicated to the maturation of his spirit. There are three stages: the camel, the lion, and the child. The spirit begins as a camel because it must bear weight on its quest for truth. This quest is difficult because it requires abandoning comfort and enduring internal suffering. The lion represents independence from external influences because it has the courage to deny it. This is especially characterized when the lion battles his final "master," the dragon named "Thou Shalt," which is described as having ancient values on its scales. The final stage embraces the spirit of a child because a child-like innocence is required in order to seek a new perspective and create new values. Although he is not as explicit and detailed as Aristotle was in defining his virtues, Nietzsche provides a more abstract direction to an individual's transformation. There is clearly a focus placed on the characteristics of an individual with the intent of his prosperity. By denying the values handed down from generations past, the overman develops new values established, more so, on his own influence. Based off the imagery Nietzsche presents in the three stages of the metamorphoses, it's evident that the values adopted in becoming the overman are a progression from inferior qualities into higher-minded, noble, and magnanimous ones.

Pity vs. Mercy

The core of Nietzsche's values can be understood when one places focus on his criticism of the feeling of pity. Judeo-Christian morality views pity in a positive light because it is associated with ideas of altruism by helping others who are less fortunate. Nietzsche, on the other hand, says, "be warned of pity: from there a heavy cloud will yet come to man" (Nietzsche 1995, p. 90). This spite for pity stems from Nietzsche's association of meek and cowardly individuals with weakness. His interest lies in the psychology of the feeling, as he believes individuals who seek pity

acknowledge their weakness. This acknowledgement of insufficiency is what Nietzsche despises in man. He instead advocates the feeling and act of mercy. It may appear that pity and mercy are heavily intertwined, but Nietzsche draws psychological distinctions between the two that mold one (mercy) to be a virtue. He says, "mercy; as goes without saying remains the privilege of the most powerful" (Nietzsche 1998, pp. 47-48). Immediately, one can notice the distinction of power that is associated with mercy, an aspect pity lacks. Nussbaum writes that, "implicit in the structure of literary appeals for pity… is that one will not respond with the pain of pity, when looking at the suffering of another, unless one judges that the possibilities displayed there are also possibilities for oneself" (Schacht 1994, p. 142). This is an important detail in the act of feeling pity. The altruistic aspect is somewhat, if not completely, diminished because the concern lies in the individual's potential for impotency. Mercy on the other hand does not entertain such unfortunate thoughts. Mercy reaffirms that the individual is in a position of power; and, despite relieving someone from a more extreme punishment he will remain unharmed from any potential vengeance. *On the Genealogy of Morality* presents a subsection of how a community changes its psychological stance on punishment as it grows. The stronger a society becomes, the more it can tolerate transgressions from individuals, essentially saying, "what concern are my parasites to me…let them live and prosper: I am strong enough for that" (*Ibid*, p. 47). Mercy does not associate itself with individuals of ressentiment; it captures the element of magnanimity by generosity. The pitied acknowledge their insufficiency and their inability to overcome it, leaving an individual in a state of pusillanimity.

Nietzsche's contempt for pity can easily be misconstrued to paint him as an immoralist since pity is welcomed as a favorable quality. However, in rejecting the present moral paradigm, he has also rejected one of its values in place of another—mercy—as he believes it to be a preferable disposition for an individual to embrace.

Conclusion

In an era where morality is centered on Judeo-Christian values, Nietzsche's expressive critique of it may serve as encouragement for abandoning morality itself. However, this is precisely why Nietzsche wrote *On the Genealogy of Morality*: because he wanted man to question the origin of their values from a perspective outside of one who accepts it as truth. According to Nietzsche, the origins of what he refers to as slave morality and the results it has produced are abhorrent, based off of pusillanimous attributes. I have only presented content from two of Nietzsche's works in this paper, but in each of them, his primary concern is the meaninglessness of man's existence (or the illusion of meaning provided from religion) and his goal to reinvent life in a meaningful way. The way he goes about this is by providing dispositions (more so psychological dispositions) where not only does one recognize the hollow contemporary values but also develops new ones (life affirming ones), which will in theory harvest a more meaningful life. The Übermensch manifests Nietzsche's ideal characteristics in an individual. Without providing specific restrictions, he creates a presence of an individual by expounding his spirit. This spirit represents the virtues that allow the overman to prosper and live a meaningful life in a way that the average man embracing old values can't. Nietzsche's disgust for pity is a perfect example of how he has developed the misconstrued reputation as an immoralist. Seen as a righteous trait in the current moral paradigm, his weariness of it can strike up questions in regard to his ethics. His psychological dissection of it clarifies why he finds it to support and spread impotency. His admiration for mercy, by contrast, depicts his aspirations to help an individual by bolstering magnanimity through generosity. If one were to associate virtues by Aristotelian standards (i.e., listing specific temperaments) then it would be difficult to recognize the virtues that Nietzsche supports. However, if one acknowledges the ambiguous nature of "virtue" and sees it as a means to an end (i.e., eudaimonia), it becomes quite clear that a sizeable amount of Nietzsche's philosophy is virtue ethics.

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Centering Non-Normative, Queer Embodiments: Exploring the Intersections of Trans Studies, Disability Studies, and Fat Studies

Bree Lacey

In the last thirty years, many interdisciplinary developments have occurred that have led to the emergence of new fields of identity-politics based analyses. These emerging fields, particularly the emergence of trans studies, disability studies, and fat studies within the academy, have brought about new insight in regards to making sense of the very real, material conditions that arise as a consequence of the bodies we inhabit. Additionally, they analyze, identify, and combat various forms of identity-based oppression. In this paper, I will explore what can be gained by looking at each discipline in relation to one another. I posit that there is a complementary relationship between these fields and the identity-based politics that comprise them. I will begin by providing a brief history of the emergence of these respective fields. Then, I will analyze the social-model of disability and how this model is useful when applied to both trans studies and fat studies. Lastly, I will look at the analyses put forth by Eli Clare in his piece, "Body Shame, Body Pride: Lessons from the Disability Rights Movement," and Anna Mollow's essay, "Disability Studies Gets Fat." By looking at these two pieces, I hope to make clear the beneficial outcome that results from viewing these disciplines in a complementary relationship with each other.

Susan Stryker draws the distinction between trans phenomenon and trans studies proper. Trans phenomenon has been studied as far back as the 1950s and follows a particular formula where

trans people possess a bizarre condition that is then positioned as the object of study.[1] In this formula, trans people are to be studied by non-trans researchers who possess academic accolades and who are then positioned as experts in the study of trans people. Trans phenomenon privileges the voices of so-called non-trans experts. Trans studies posits that those with the lived experience as trans people should be regarded as the experts of what it is to be trans. Trans studies was the emergence of trans people theorizing on their own experiences as trans people. It arose from the resistance trans people had to this medicalized, academic model where trans people are positioned as mere objects of study. Trans people encouraged a shift in our perception of this kind of model by positing that trans people with the lived experience of being trans are experts of their own lives. Trans studies has, at its core, the belief that trans people are experts of their own experiences and that these experiences should be privileged over the objectifying gaze found in the study of trans phenomenon.

Disability studies arose from the resistance of medicalized discourses surrounding disability. It has at its core the salience of self-determination. Disabled folks have often been the study of medicalized inquiry, positioned as mere objects of study. In this sense, all facets of the disabled person are reducible to their disability. In allegiance with the commitment to self-determination, disability studies invert the perceived "problem" of disability onto society, namely that it is society that makes living with a disability difficult, not the particular disability itself.[2]

The rise in rhetoric surrounding the "(gl)obesity epidemic" and the cultural belief that we are constantly getting fatter and, as a result, will be detrimental to society has been challenged by fat people. Fat studies is the youngest of the three disciplines with its inception beginning in the early 2000s. In relation to both trans studies and disability studies, fat studies focus in on two areas: the various ways fat people are oppressed and discriminated against medically, socially, and culturally and how fat people resist these forms of oppression.

I want to address the preliminary case in favor of a theoretical

framework that looks intersectionally at trans studies, disability studies, and fat studies. The term intersectionality, coined by legal scholar Kimberle Crenshaw, is focused on black feminism and the understanding that to be a black woman living in a society governed by both racism and sexism cannot be understood by looking exclusively at sexism or racism alone. Various forms of oppression must be looked at as interlocking with one another. Audre Lorde provides the imagery of baking a cake where when one ingredient of the cake is added to the mixture, you no longer have flour, sugar, baking soda, individually but you have something new altogether, something that cannot be separated into its composite parts. In the same way facets of identities intersect so too do power and oppression. Breaking down axis of oppression implicitly presupposes a kind of privilege. Patricia Hill Collins analyzes the objectification of white women and animalization of black women in pornography and posits that if you are able to look at the animalization of black women in pornography and view it as simply sexist, you are probably not getting hit at the intersection of racism. Susan Stryker states, "[T]ransgender studies is following its own trajectory and has the potential to address emerging problems in the critical study of gender and sexuality, identity, embodiment, and desire in ways that gay, lesbian, and queer studies have not always successfully managed" (Stryker 2004, p. 214). She notes this is especially the case for fields of study such as disability studies and other fields of study that focus in on embodiment and subjectivity that cannot merely be reduced to sexuality and heteronormativity.

An example of the dissonance that arises in queer theory, when taking into consideration queer embodiments, can be found in Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner's piece "Sex in Public." Warner and Berlant analyze the consequences of New York City's "Zoning Text Amendment," which would outlaw adult book and video stores, restaurants and bars, theatres and other establishments to relocate to non-residential neighborhoods. Given the geography of New York City and its high population of residents, this would relegate queer-catering businesses to the waterfront on

the outskirts of the city. As a result, queer people, and in particular gay men, would either have to resort to "privatized virtual public" consisting of phone sex and the internet or have to travel to the outskirts of town which are inaccessible, poorly-lit, and where queer people are subject to potentially violent interactions with heterosexual porn users who would frequent these locations as well. Warner and Berlant detail how queer intimacies are often relegated to the private. In my view, their analysis presumes a monolithic view of embodiment and fails to acknowledge how corporally non-normative, i.e., differently abled, disabled, trans and fat queer bodies, on a micro-level such as our bodies, experience privatization in ways that cannot be adequately explained in terms of heteronormativity alone.[3]

Historically, those with disabilities have been relegated to the private for both reasons of access and reasons of stigmatization. Furthermore, those who were able to enter public spaces still had to negotiate a lack of access and stigmatization within the public. These negotiations still occur contemporarily for disabled people both in queer and non-queer spaces. Within trans studies, there has been significant research conducted, analyzing the relationship between the private, concealed body versus the public, discursive body. Talia Bettcher, in "Evil Deceivers and Make-Believers," analyzes a specific form of transphobic violence that she coins "reality enforcement." Reality enforcement can be characterized by its appeal to appearance, reality, exposure, and deception, and as that which eventually leads to the invalidation of the trans person's identity. This can surface as both implicit genital verification (questions like "Have you had the surgery?") and explicit genital verification (the sexually abusive practice of exposing a person's genitals thus "revealing" their true sex.) With the rise in the phenomenon of the "globesity epidemic," fatness and fat bodies are positioned as an imminent threat to public health.[4] When the media provides representations of fat bodies, news outlets will often blur the faces of the fat person being filmed or photographed in order to grant them anonymity. The fat body is without identity, faceless, a mere body, with no opposing perspec-

tive or voice. Outside of images, when fat people interact with the everyday world bodies are to be covered as much as possible for as long as possible. Anyone who diverges from this implicit agreement is subject to fat-shaming in the form of gawking, explicit remarks, and other forms of violence.[5]

In my view, it is salient to incorporate into the analysis the varying degrees in which queer embodiments are privatized and publicized in ways that are very much so rooted in our material bodies. That is not to say that Berlant and Warner's account is without value, but highlights one particular instance of the lack of consideration of queer embodiment within queer theory.[6]

By looking at the disciplines of trans studies, disability studies, and fat studies through a queer theoretical lens of embodiment and analyzing not only the qualitative differences of those categories in relation to one another, I argue that there is intersectional value in exploring where these intersections converge and diverge from one another.

The social model of disability is a framework for understanding the way disabled people interact with the world. The starting point for this model is the distinction between impairment and disability. Impairment has to do with one's physical limitations from a disability. Impairment is positioned as a private medical matter. Disability has to do with the ways one is excluded in mainstream society. The social model of disability moves away from the medicalized perception that impairments need to be at its worst alleviated and at it's best cured. Instead of seeking to alleviate or cure impairments, disability scholars and activists posit that it is societal oppression, stigmatization, and inequity that need to be addressed (Shakespeare p. 216). Disability is thus regarded as a cultural and historical phenomenon and it is not to be understood as particular ailments one individual has. The social model is distinguished against the medical or *individual* model of disability. The medical model of disability centers disability around identifying how many people have disabilities then finding means of preventing, curing, or rehabilitating those people. The social model of disability mandates an alleviation

or removal of structural barriers, anti-discrimination legislation, and other responses to ableism. Furthermore, the social model of disability recognizes people with disabilities as an oppressed group with a specific, unique experience as disabled people in an ableist society. In this model, the "problem" of disability is solved by civil rights and equal societal treatment and access.

What then can be learned by thinking about trans studies, disability studies, and fat studies within a social model of disability framework? Eli Clare in his piece, "Body Shame, Body Pride: Lessons from the Disability Rights Movement," outlines what he feels the trans movement can learn from the field of disability studies from three different avenues: naming, disclosure and coming out, and living in our familiar, ordinary bodies (Clare 2013, p. 262). For many fat and disabled folks, the first experience of queerness can result from bodily difference. Furthermore, for fat and disabled folks often times our bodies are positioned as not just different but in need of repair, as broken. Clare challenges the cited ableist claim that to be transgender is equitable to being born with a "birth defect" and therefore trans people should have access to good, respectful healthcare just like disabled people. Furthermore, this line of reasoning presumes that people with disabilities do in fact receive adequate, respectful healthcare, which for many people with disabilities is not the case. For the disabled, potentially fat, transgender person this can be an extremely misleading and potentially violent way of viewing transness; it assumes that there is something defective about trans embodiment while simultaneously distorting the real violence that pervades the medical community faced by those with queer embodiments.

First, many disabled people face violence in the forms of dismissiveness about ailments, infantilization based on ability, and sheer invalidation. Furthermore, positioning one's body as defective takes for granted the critical engagements with bodily acceptance trans people and disabled people have been fighting to achieve for a long time. This coupling of disability with cure contributes to the oppression of differently-abled and fat folks alike as well as normalizing an imposed medicalized under-

standing of trans bodies, disabled bodies, and fat bodies. Clare posits that trans folks, therefore, have to be mindful and conscious of the language employed when naming bodily difference, and encourages trans folks to use language that does not encourage shame.[7]

Disclosure and coming out is a rather divisive topic within queer circles particularly because it often puts the person coming out into a double-bind. When the phenomenon of coming out is focused in on trans folks, it can be particularly binding: the trans person who chooses not to come out is framed as ashamed and the trans person who does come out is framed as making a mistake and possibly regretting the decision they made. Clare wants to challenge the assumption that being trans is a private, corporeal, medical matter (Clare 2013, p. 263). Clare argues that for many trans people, disabled people, and fat people, to choose to keep bodily difference private is a privilege not everyone has. Clare states, "bodily privacy is a privilege regulated by systems of power and control" (Clare 2013, p. 265). In this way, bodily difference then results in unwanted public attention and could be a potential source of violence.

Disability activists and disability studies scholars have adopted the phrase "nothing about us without us" to resist the paternalistic, imposed features of ableism that pervade society. In this way, disability studies have developed a "politics of self-determination," that place value on the act of choosing when and how to explain the status of particular bodies. For Clare, choosing when and how to explain the bodies we inhabit is indicative of trans people, disabled people, and fat people having authority over our own bodies. It is us determining what works for us, what doesn't, who we are, and what we want.

Lastly, Clare touches on the salience of living in our familiar bodies. What he means by this is that there is a tendency for marginalized people to want to fit within the parameters of normality. The idea of the "normal" is the external, largely mythical standard against which we contrast ourselves against and evaluate ourselves according to how well we conform to what is perceived

as normal. He analyzes the commonly circulated question as to whether or not transness should be regarded as a psychiatric issue and posits that this is the wrong question.[8] Rather he wants to question this fundamental relationship between transness and the very idea of diagnosis. Within the disability rights movement and the fat justice movement, activists, and scholars have resisted this kind of medicalization of bodies.[9]

Anna Mollow in "Disability Studies Gets Fat" outlines how disability scholarship can be benefitted by incorporating a fat justice agenda into the disability studies framework. Her call for disability scholarship to "get fat" doesn't necessarily mean to increase one's body size, rather it demands that there is an end to dieting and diet talk and a recognition of how these patterns intensify fatphobia and fat oppression. Another feature of "getting fat" is to get it: learn the facts, know the politics, and actively support fat justice. Mollow posits that fatness is inseparable from disability because the rhetoric of fatness is positioned as a road to disability (Mollow 2015, p. 199). By making this connection, Mollow seeks to propose a new framework for thinking about fatness, coined, "set-point epistemology." Set-point epistemology brings together Rosemarie Garland-Thomson's set-point theory—a crisp repurposing of the feminist standpoint theory—and traditional set-point theory (a concept from the physical sciences that each person's body has a biologically determined set-point at which it "wants" to be). This theory contends that our embodied understanding of set-point theory has epistemological consequences for those of us living in a body-normative society. The starting point for set-point epistemology is the salience of positioning fatness within a social model of disability framework that posits fatness as political oppression rather than physical defect (Mollow 2015, p. 201). While situating fat politics in this framework, Mollow takes it a step further and argues that fat and disability studies have to move beyond the social model and address how the effects of fatphobia influence our *individual* lives.

A feature of set-point epistemology is the necessity to analyze discourses surrounding fatness. Mollow outlines two discourses

that shape our societal perception of fat people: personal-blame model and the pity model of fat. The personal blame model follows the rationale that fat people are fat because of their poor choices. In this model, the lack of will power is the catalyst for fatness being as pervasive as it is.[10] In this view the "obesity epidemic" is a social problem requiring political intervention by eliminating fat people's access to "unhealthy" foods by increased sales taxes or bans on large soft drinks. The pity model of fat is seemingly kinder to fat people than the personal blame model, because, in this model, instead of being the catalyst for fatness, fat people are mere victims in the "war on obesity." Set-point epistemology has the potential to alleviate some features of fatphobia found in these models by framing fatness as mere corporeal difference that is propagated and stigmatized through the normalization of staring, "cures," and overcoming narratives.

In "Feminist Solidarity After Queer Theory: The Case of Transgender," Cressida Heyes critiques the work of transgender theorist and novelist Leslie Feinberg. In *Transliberation: Beyond Pink and Blue*, Feinberg describes her book as literature for "masculine females and feminine males, cross-dressers, transsexual men and women, intersexuals born on the anatomical sweep between female and male, gender-blenders, many other sex and gender-variant people, and our significant others." Feinberg uses these varying anecdotes to serve as an embodiment of the varying identities and struggles one can face as a result of one's gender. Later, Feinberg states each person's expression of their gender or genders is their own and equally beautiful. To refer to anyone's gender expression as exaggerated is insulting and restricts gender freedom" (Feinberg 1998, p. 24). Furthermore, she states, "Since I don't accept negative judgments about my own gender articulation, I avoid judgments about others. People of all sexes have the right to explore femininity, masculinity—and the infinite variations between—without criticism or ridicule" (Feinberg 1998, p. 24). Heyes finds Feinberg's account of gender freedom to be politically problematic due to the lack of acknowledgement of the violence that can be embedded within those gender categories.

For Heyes, gender is relational which means that it is not exempt from scrutiny and critique. For example, there are highly problematic elements of both masculinity and femininity that should not be critiqued just because they have been adopted as a part of someone's gender expression. Heyes argues for an "ethics of self transformation" which endorses the analysis of helpful and harmful forms of gender expression that do not result in the further marginalization of one's self or others (Heyes 2003, p. 113). I find Heyes' analysis to be particularly helpful when looking at the intersections of trans studies, disability studies, and fat studies. For any of us who fall under any of these identity categories, it is of supreme importance that we do not reinforce someone else's oppression while we resist our own.

In H.N. Lukes' analysis of queerness in relation to the phenomenon of phantom limb syndrome, he states, "Recent queer scholars' return to the primacy of the body and affect nevertheless tend to occlude the literal figure of the disabled body. I join disabilities scholars in positing that any intersectional analysis would benefit from centering the figure and figuration of the disabled subject" (Lukes 2009, pp. 227-246). Lukes is pointing to the often made move when thinking of disability, and I would argue, non-normative embodiment more broadly and queerness as mere metaphor. Rather it would be advantageous for any discipline engaged in exploring the conditions of queer subjects to position queer, non-normative embodiment as central to queer analyses.

Trans studies, disability studies, and fat studies began at the starting point that these identity-based groups face a very specific form of oppression, unique to them exclusively in the forms of transphobia, ableism, and fatphobia. My motivation for situating these theoretical disciplines in relation to one another is the qualitative similarities found in the lived experience and oppression of trans people, disabled people, and fat people. What then do they have in common? All these formalized disciplines are resisting systems of violence that are targeted at the body and the body's seeming unwillingness to not conform to what is deemed "normal." Trans people, disabled people, and fat people,

in varying ways, are encouraged to seek medical or other forms of intervention to normalize bodies and move them closer to the normative "ideal" body, which can be characterized as a body that no one thinks twice about. This compulsion to seek medical or other forms of intervention and alteration is informed by the history of medicalization and pathologization.[11] This positioning of one's body as a problem, a mistake, a defect, in the first place has to be communicative of the call to be ashamed of our bodies. This cannot be aided solely through medical institutions and interventions, so we have to start addressing the social inequity. By situating these disciplines within a social model of disability framework, it becomes not about disability or dysphoria but about just societal treatment. Many trans people, disabled people, and fat people are not looking for a cure, we are seeking civil rights, access to safe medical care, and just social treatment and looking intersectionally at how our struggles converge and diverge might be a start.[12]

Notes

1. See Harry Benjamin.
2. I am referring to the social model of disability. There are other models.
3. I find it useful to discuss Berlant and Warner specifically because of the close relationship between intimacy and embodiment.
4. The globesity epidemic refers to the positioning of obesity as a public health crisis domestically (in America) and internationally (as a byproduct of globalization and increased business with American companies as is the case with Mexico). See Berlant.
5. These forms of violence have intensified on the internet especially.
6. I recognize when this piece was written and must note that queer theory has made a turn toward an incorporation of various queer embodiments.
7. Fat people and disabled people should be mindful in the same way.
8. See http://letsqueerthingsup.com/2015/12/12/why-arent-more-trans-people-denouncing-truscum.
9. This, of course, happens in trans subcultures as well. I think the author is referring to commonly found arguments for *some* trans folks and in no way is represented as any sort of homogenous view.
10. With two-thirds of the population being considered overweight or obese.

11. I want to just note the qualitative differences of pathologization of trans and disabled folks. We do not have to look back very far in history to see instances of this pathologization and I do not want to equate this with the experiences of fat folks because they are qualitatively divergent.

12. This entails recognizing the problems with a "more rights" framework.

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Victims of Heterosexuality: Compulsory Binaries, Queerness, and Lesbian Identity

Iliana Cuellar

I was in middle school when I realized my dating trajectory would be loaded with awkwardness and misunderstandings beyond the "typical" teen experience. I told Gloria about my crush on her and she thought I was sweet staring at me through a hetero gaze. I'd fallen for straight girls. In her 1979 paper, "Paradigm," Monique Wittig states, "And it is not 'women' (victims of heterosexuality) that lesbians love and desire but lesbians (individuals who are not the females of men)" (Wittig 1979, pp. 121). What does my falling for straight women or dating bisexual women have to do with Wittig's assertion of lesbians loving and desiring other lesbians? There seems to be something beyond a reading of Wittig as defining "lesbian" simply as lesbian on lesbian desire obscuring an array of sexual orientations beyond a hetero/homo binary. In fact, Wittig challenged the very notion of gender markers in "lesbian" in which she attempts to abolish a binary gender relation and render it obsolete.

The claim, however, follows its main argument, assuming the connection between gender identity and compulsory heterosexuality, the idea of assumed heterosexual orientation as obligatory and the "natural" orientation, as coined by prolific lesbian scholar and poet, Adrienne Rich. I believe it is politically detrimental to assert that the category woman can only refer to women in relationships with men; it undermines years, although not without its problems, of women's resistance against a patriarchal chokehold in which "women" is defined in relation to men. In this paper, I will attempt to uncover the shortcomings of such a definition of lesbian through Jacob Hale's critique of Monique Wittig, while

formulating my own conception of sexual identity categories as sites of oppression as well as resistance, where gender identity is irrelevant to the definition of lesbian. I would like to clarify that I am writing from my experience as a cisgender woman identified as lesbian; residing in the United States; involved in queer radical grassroots organizations and spaces; and will thus restrict my analysis to U.S. definitions of LGBTQ+ categories, while recognizing that these identities are products of colonialism, imperialism, and not universal to all cultures (Lugones 2007).

Why is Wittig's assertion that lesbians are not women a shocking or puzzling statement? Jacob Hale mentions his student's remark, "I would have thought that that [*woman*] is the one thing a lesbian *had* to be" (Hale 1996, pp. 94-95). Dominant culture conflates sex, gender, and sexual orientation. You are born a certain sex (of which there exists only two: male, female) established by the state's medical apparatus according to your genitals. Genitals then refer to a certain gender marked either girl/boy, man/woman. Finally, opposite sexes/genders (sex and gender are interchangeable according to this gender assigning system) belong together in romantic, intimate partnerships. The latter part of this interconnectedness, specifically heterosexual orientation, is justifiable in many ways (e.g., for the purposes of procreation, inherent biological attraction, God said so, or patriarchal dominance of women in the domestic sphere—a popular feminist definition). Homosexuality is held in opposition to heterosexuality (as its moral antithetical) in order to justify the "the natural order" of things in which an inherent power dynamic of men dominating women exists within marriage and heterosexual relationships. In his 1996 paper, "Are Lesbians Women?", Jacob Hale states: "One reason for negative reactions is that it [the assertion "lesbians are not women"] flies in the face of both gender and sexuality, which do not differ relevantly from those used by lesbian and gay activists" (Hale 1996, p. 94). He highlights the way in which lesbian and gay liberation movements subscribe to the "natural attitude" toward gender as defined by dominant culture. The "natural attitude" on gender, or the naturalization of sex coined by ethnog-

rapher Harold Garfinkel is as follows: (1) "normals" (non-trans and non-intersexed people) define gender as only two genders corresponding to sex, (2) sex is reduced to genitals, (3) anything outside of this is abnormal or an anomaly, (4) there is no escaping gender, everyone is gendered (Garfinkel 1967). Not only is relegating sexual attraction to a heterosexual framework oppressive, but relegating sexual attraction to a homosexual framework may be mimicking a similarly oppressive structure. It is the case that when explaining homosexual attraction that phrases such as "same-sex" are used (e.g., same sex marriage); thus, this framework operates on the same strict interconnectedness of sex and gender as established by the "natural attitude."

Hale believes the main shortcoming of Wittig's argument is the simplistic nature of analysis, "Since Wittig's view is that the concepts man, woman, and lesbian each rest on a single defining characteristic, her view, does not have conceptual room for the multiplicity of gendering present even only among contemporary U.S. lesbians." (Hale 1996, p. 49). Thus, Wittig's general argument that lesbians are not women because they do not conform to dominant culture's definition of "women" as belonging to men—specifically in heterosexual intimate partnerships—falls short because, Hale argues, it does not so much state that lesbians are not women but that they are not "real women." It is not then their reality that is in question, but "real woman" is equated to signify "good woman" and thus the statement "not a real woman" states "bad woman" where "bad woman" is that woman who falls short of her gender role. It then questions other representations of womanhood (e.g., sex workers, body builders, mothers with substance abuse problems) and if it is the case that "bad women" are not women, then many women would fail to be women and the "natural attitude" is challenged. "Given the pull of the 'natural attitude' toward gender, it cannot be the case that many bad girls are, thereby, in some gender category of categories other than man or woman. This 'natural attitude' according to which there are exactly two genders and one's gender is invariant and determined by one's genitals, would be severely undermined if many bad girls

ceased being women simply by being bad" (Hale 1996, p. 52). If it is the case that lesbians are not women in virtue of being bad women, and bad women then lie in a separate gender category, then many clusters of women would be genderless and that is of severe worry to the natural attitude and dominant culture. It is not possible for anyone to exist outside of the gender categories man and woman; everyone is gendered. Is it Wittig's project to define genderless lesbians within a dominant framework or does she simply seek to transcend and undermine this framework?

It seems that when referring to "women" we tend to really refer to the feminized gender expression. Masculine and feminine expressions are present in lesbian relationships and are also influenced by dominant culture. A masculine woman likely learns her masculinity from dominant culture's ways of acting masculine, sometimes mimicking patriarchal defining characteristics of men. Unfortunately, I've learned this not only from gender studies but from experiencing masculine-presenting lesbians treating me like a "girl," as I'm a feminine-presenting person, as they role play their macho, chauvinist fantasies infantilizing me by steering me to walk on the inside of the sidewalk. Another example would be friends, family, or strangers asking who's the "girl" in the relationship. This question isn't so much saying that one of the lesbians is not a woman and one is, because if asked the person would probably identify both of them as following the "natural attitude," but asking who exhibits the traits or characteristics of the feminine.

My overall interpretation of Hale's answer is that gender is not reducible to certain characteristics and that there is no person that exhibits all of the thirteen characteristics of woman, outlined in his paper. Overall, gender mostly refers to a heterosexual enterprise, unfortunately, even in its abolitionist or radical reformulations. I don't believe his primary goal is to critique Wittig, in particular, but to analyze how gender can be reformulated. If anyone were seen as transgressing gender boundaries as posed by the "natural attitude," it would be transgender and gender nonconforming people, since they do not neatly fit into these sex and gender dichotomies.

I believe there exist worlds that are post-gender in radical queer circles. By post-gender, I do not mean gender no longer exists or is irrelevant in these circles (gender identity is crucial in these circles) but that they are often reformulated and recoded. In these circles, people usually identify as "queer" and that term is used to envelop multiple identities. There is disdain towards the LGBTQ+ acronym, gay rights, and monogamy. Queer is usually described as a reclamation of the pejorative used against gay men and lesbians throughout history, but I would also argue that queer is an intentional, important political response against the homogeneity and mainstream attention of what falls under "gay and lesbian liberation movements." The movements monopolize the conversation on queer liberation, specifically detracting from some of the most vulnerable groups, including trans women, low-income, disabled, undocumented, queer people of color, and those whose identities intersect with many other marginalized identities. Mainstream gay and lesbian politics' focus and preoccupation with marriage equality and inclusivity demonstrates its assimilative and exclusive character. Another recent example of a trans-exclusive mainstream gay and lesbian politics would be a Change.org petition by cisgender gay men and lesbians to drop the "T" in "LGBT" (as if it was ever really acknowledged). How, then, in a post-gender world in opposition with a world preoccupied with binaries and identity, can lesbian and gay identities function and exist; furthermore, are they even worth saving?

In *Bodies That Matter*, Judith Butler, utilizes the Althusserian concept of interpellation to display the way in which gender is institutionally constituted. "In Althusser's notion of interpellation, it is the police who initiate the call or address by which a subject becomes socially constituted. There is the policeman, the one who not only represents the law but whose address "Hey you!" has the effect of binding the law to the one who is hailed. This "one" who appears not to be in a condition of trespass prior to the call (for whom the call established a given practice as a trespass) is not fully a social subject, is not fully subjectivated, for he or she is not yet reprimanded. The reprimand does not merely

repress or control the subject, but forms a crucial part of the juridical and social formation of the subject. The call is formative, if not performative, precisely because it initiates the individual into the subjected status of the subject."

The interpellating not only imposes but also allows room for resistance. It imposes while simultaneously triggering a response. In this case, sexual orientation is posed (e.g., "hey dyke!" or "that is a total dyke"). The hailing of compulsory heterosexuality then allows for a broad spectrum of queerness to claim certain identities. Although in radical queer circles we are critical and suspicious of these normative identities, which reinforce gender and sexuality binaries and oppression, we are gazed, gendered, and labeled in particular ways adhering to the "natural attitude." We then have to react in order to resist and survive. This can mean a variety of different things and can range anywhere from immediate self-preservation to institutional violence (e.g., "passing" as a gender or heterosexual to lessen risk of self-harm or being killed). We create post-gender worlds in which we present and identify in certain gendered ways, often similar to those of cishetero instantiations, but simultaneously deconstruct and dismantle the ridiculousness of reducing sexual attraction to other queer people as an attraction to distinct genitals. The question then becomes one of agency. If we are to be labeled, then why not mess around with their presumed identities and the way they typically function? Within both dominant culture and mainstream lesbian and gay politics, gender and sexuality are conflated (lesbian and gay = same-sex, same-gender relations). Since these distinctions become murky in post-gender worlds they can take on a different meaning. Telling a cisheterosexist world, more specifically cis men, that I am a lesbian doesn't so much refer to my body or that I like specific bodies, genitals, or gender presentation, but is more like answering "stay the fuck away from me" when hailed by heterosexual culture.

Taking Wittig's argument, and the tension between queer and mainstream lesbian and gay politics, we can interrogate how lesbian may function. In a cisheterosexist world, the word

"lesbian" is defined as "homosexual woman" and can roughly be broken down to "woman who has romantic and intimate relationships with women." I want to argue that simultaneously, "lesbian" communicates "woman who does not have romantic and intimate partnerships with men." In both of these utterances, "man" and "woman" refer to the natural attitude's definitions of each (i.e., cisgender man and cisgender woman). This is similar to Wittig's definition in that uttering lesbian or self-identifying as a lesbian, you are disassociating yourself from a heterosexual male orbit and opting out of compulsory heterosexuality (i.e., you are a woman that does not have relationships with men).

A social constructionist view of gender critiques the dominant culture's codependent definitions of assigned sex, gender identity, gender expression, gender presentation, and sexual orientation. For example, a person assigned female at birth is expected to self-identify as a female/girl/woman, express herself as feminine, present feminine, and to be heterosexual or be in romantic and intimate relationships with men. In disrupting this framework concerning gender, we are in a way saying that sexual identities don't really refer to anything. If assigned sex at birth no longer dictates gender identity, which no longer dictates gender expression or gender presentation, then what can sexual identity/orientation possibly refer to? It is open to interpretation. The labels "straight," "gay," "lesbian," "bisexual," just doesn't have a referent because the coordinates are already misaligned. Think of the genderbread person, a popular infographic used in intro to women and gender studies classes. It's a cute gingerbread figure that has spectrums according to their gender identity, gender expression, biological sex, and sexual orientation. The spectrum is supposed to illustrate fluidity, interconnectedness, and separation. In the case of the naturalized category "women," if you stack all of these spectrums and coordinate them to the "natural attitude" on sex and gender (and I argue that it also implies sexual orientation) then you get a straight line across the different spectrums. If you coordinate them to divergent identities from the "natural attitude," it's all scrambled and incomprehensible. It disregards

the "natural attitude." Therefore, sexual orientation has nothing to correspond to because everything is already defying the natural attitude anyway.

Similar to Hale's assertion that lesbians are not "real women" really says lesbians, while women, are not good women, Talia Mae Bettcher further interrogates this moral gender system in her paper, "Full Frontal Morality: The Naked Truth About Morality." She appeals to Garfinkel's claim that penises and vaginas are legitimate possessions. There is a sex one ought to possess; the keyword is *ought*. One is intended to have a particular sex and the only transgression is purely "ceremonial." This view is important when trying to understand transphobia. If a trans person is discovered to possess a different sex from the one they ought to have, they are subject to various forms of violence. In this framework, there exist moral boundaries and encounters that must never be transgressed.

The idea of proper and intimate appearance is important in Bettcher's framework because of what she terms interpersonal spatiality (IS) as a system in which we determine closeness, intimacy, and distance. Paired together, closeness and intimacy may be compromised and hard to navigate due to what she terms the "sex representational system" (SRS) and its moral implications. If you are viewed as incoherent according to this system (i.e., your proper appearance and your intimate appearance do not align), you may be subject to privacy violations and charges of decency offence (Bettcher 2015).

Bettcher argues that in trans resistant theories and subcultures, proper appearance does not refer to intimate appearance. When observing someone's proper appearance there is no question of what is or is not in between their legs. It has no referent because the coordinates are everywhere. This allows for what she terms "intimate vulnerability" because you interact with other people without assumptions. In a SRS, everything is disclosed because of the way in which gender presentation is assumed to communicate sexed body. This leads to "intimate deadening." In not allowing the "natural attitude" to navigate our worldly inter-

actions, we open ourselves to variety of new intimate experiences (Bettcher 2015).

I would like to parallel this moral framework to a theory about lesbianism and queer identity. In queer resistance and lesbian resistant frameworks, we should allow for recoding of these identities. Lesbianism doesn't need to coincide with the "natural attitude." While white mainstream lesbians align themselves with HRC and GLAAD and are celebrating their victories in WeHo on "Ladies Night," there are lesbians that do not benefit from this privilege. If we are to say that lesbian identity no longer has meaning in these resistant circles because of its mainstream appearance and its historically exclusive character, we are lumping all kinds of lesbian identities into a single meaning. But I cannot bear to leave behind Audre Lorde, Gloria Anzaldúa, Cherrie Moraga among many other important, resistant lesbians whose identities as lesbians were central to their organizing and artistic efforts. Lesbians of color have been struggling against a single-issue; namely, to borrow Audre Lorde's language, the representation of lesbianism. Similar to the reclamation of "queer," lesbians should strive to reformulate their sexual identity to stray from a history of gender exclusivity. I think Wittig was onto something. She argues that lesbians are not women, and Hale states that some are while others aren't; I argue that some lesbians are women and some are not, furthermore lesbians are not *inherently*, *unchangeably* women but the lesbian may say whether she is or is not a woman. Although this is not really her point but in making the assertion "Lesbians are not women" she opened up a question that, thanks to queer theory and transgender studies, can take on a new set of inquiries. Lesbian identity should not refer to gender or sex, either for the person identifying as a lesbian or their partners. Proper appearance does not entail intimate appearance. Proper sexual identity does not entail intimate body, sexual partners, or sexed bodies at all. There is no referent.

Reclaiming the rhetoric of choice means that we are no longer relegating queerness, gayness, lesbianism, or Sapphic desire to "born this way"—accounts of sexual orientation as being

determined at early age or birth. This account not only invalidates people who identify as queer and do not identify with the "born this way" narrative, it also limits gay and lesbians who are told by family members, friends, others that they [others] always knew and are then expected to live fully "homosexual" lives, limiting their choice of romantic and intimate partnerships similarly oppressive as compulsory heterosexuality. It is also rooted in homophobia by implicitly making the claim that, given the choice, queer people would have chosen or would choose to be straight or heterosexual. The moral claim behind this statement continues to portray queerness as inherently bad.

Lesbian identity has no intimate referent. It grants meaning from a social sphere reliant on the "natural attitude" and in one world lesbian means "women who has intimate and romantic relationships with women" where woman means someone who (1) self identifies as a woman and (2) someone assigned female at birth. I make the second distinction because as Talia Bettcher points out in "Interpretative Intimacy," the lesbian fears invalidation of her lesbian identity and, consequently, being led to conform to the dominant culture and subscribe to the "natural attitude," in which she then identifies her trans woman partner as "really a man."

A goal of this paper is for these labels to move beyond a dependence on the gender binary and a history of transphobic exclusion trying to theorize a place for them in post-gender spaces in which people identify through a broad spectrum of gender identities. It is trying to make sense of my own impulse to identify as a lesbian. My suggestion is to embrace choice, recoding, and reclamation. We have a history of resistance and reclamation and I believe lesbian and gay identities contain room for reformulation. In constant struggle against cisheteropatriarchy, lesbians can both reject heterosexism while not subscribing to cissexist ideals of bodies and gender.

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Contributors

Avedis Bekhloian. B.A. Philosophy, California State University, Northridge. Existentialism, Ethics. Avedis intends to apply to Ph.D. programs.

Iliana Cuellar. Currently pursuing a B.A. in Philosophy and a Minor in Women, Gender, and Sexuality Studies at California State University, Los Angeles. Social Political Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy, Queer Theory.

Matthew Hart. B.A. Philosophy. Modern Philosophy (Spinoza), Contemporary Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy, Philosophy of Science. Matthew plans to apply to Ph.D. programs in the future.

Bree Lacey. B.A. Philosophy, B.A. Communication, California State University, Los Angeles. Feminist philosophy, Queer Theory, Transgender Studies, Disability Studies, Fat Studies, History of Philosophy.

Church Lieu. Currently pursuing a B.A. in Philosophy, California State University, Los Angeles. Ethics, Existentialism, and Philosophy of Mind. Church intends to write literature with a philosophical bent, particularly science fiction.

Lavaris McCellion. B.S. Accounting, Florida State University. Meta-ethics, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Science. Lavaris will be applying for Ph.D. programs in the fall of 2016.

Austin Mitzel. B.A. Music, Thomas Edison State College. Political Philosophy, Social Theory, Metaphysics, and the History of Philosophy. Austin intends to pursue a Ph.D. in Philosophy soon after his M.A.

Nefeli Ralli. B.A. Philosophy, Psychology and Pedagogy, M.A. Ethics, University of Athens. Interested in Metaphysics, Philosophy of Mathematics, Logic, Philosophy of Language, Meta-ethics. Nefeli plans to apply to Ph.D. programs in the fall of 2016.

Stephen Sigl. B.A. Philosophy, California State University Los Angeles. Continental Philosophy. Linguistics. Stephen plans on applying to Ph.D. programs in the fall of 2016.

Ashley Tarin. B.A. Philosophy, California State University, Los Angeles. Social Political Philosophy, Existentialism, Philosophy of Liberation, Feminist Philosophy, Philosophy in Literature. Ashley plans to apply to Ph.D. programs in the fall of 2016.

Master of Arts in Philosophy
California State University, Los Angeles

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