

A REVIEW OF “DYNAMICS OF LANGUAGE: PHILOSOPHY OF THE WORLD OF THE WORDS”

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The book under review is the two volume *Dynamics of the Language: Philosophy of The World of the Words*.¹ As the sub-title suggests, the author's claim that he is presenting for the first time a philosophy of the world of the words that is, the world of intelligible beings only and even so independently of intermingling metaphysical beings and our allegiances to them. In fact, this work is the third in the series of the author's engagement with the philosophy of language and grammar. The other two being “*The Central Problems of Bhartṛhari's Philosophy*” (2008) and “*Language, Being and Cognition*” (2012). Here we find the author developing his thoughts further as presented in his earlier writings.

The author now terms his understanding of language philosophy as Cognitive Holism. The whole book is actually a detailed elaboration of this cognitive holism. Cognitive Holism is the theory of language, which believes that language is primarily an indivisible awareness/ cognition. It is a theory of autonomy of language, which resolves the dichotomies of language and reality or of language and meaning/thought by concentrating only on intelligible beings. The author devotes three separate chapters to these issues of Cognitive holism, Autonomy theory of language and Individuality thesis of language. For the author language is primarily awareness by nature, a cognitive being. The outer form of language is not the real language; it is only a ‘garb’. What the outer garbs of language manifest is the real language, which not only expresses itself its own nature but also its meaning non-differently. Thus unlike Western Representatives and essentialists who give primacy to meaning and conceive meaning as transcendental to language, the author here presents the theory which gives primacy to language and understands/conceives meaning as that it expresses non-differently.

Scholars have presented Bhartṛhari's theory of language as metaphysics of language. For the author metaphysics is the last concern of Bhartṛhari and his grammarian tradition. The author here comes with his cognitive approach. For him language is ultimately cognition or awareness. Hence, a philosopher's and specifically a language philosopher's project is cognitive par excellence. Language operates only in the realm of the world of words. This is the only world where a philosopher can

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significantly and determinately express his cognition. Things in themselves remain out of reach to philosopher's objects of reflection. That is why the author repeatedly says "the book analyses and interprets cognition as it is expressed by language. Our cognition, communication, and reflections are not only based on but are confined to the intelligible beings of language and meaning."

Introducing his thesis to the readers Tiwari observes, "Our cognition is confined only to intelligible beings or ideas of the language and the meaning non-differently expressed by language. In very precise, the same awareness/idea or the flashing of consciousness, from the point of view of expresser is language and from the point of view of expressed is the meaning; they are only beings or intelligible existences (*sampratyayātmaka*) that we can know. Language as idea or concept is existence; in contrast to external things as primary existence; it is intelligible existence (vol. I, p.)." Explaining further what this intelligible being is, Tiwari says that the being revealed in the mind is cognitive and communicable by nature. That which figures in mind are ideas; they are existents or being which can only be communicated through garbs. They are intelligible or thought-objects and are called secondary existence or being with small 'b' with contrast to the external things or Beings.

Sphoṭa, and its meaning revealed by it, are intelligible beings to which our cognition, communication and philosophical reflections are not only based on but confined to as well. Now this distinction of intelligible being and primary being reminds one the distinction between 'world of ideas' and 'world of things/facts', or the famous Kantian distinction of 'phenomena' and 'noumena'. However, it is to be noticed it was Mahābhāṣyakāra who, for the first time, made the distinction between the external being (*bāhya Sattā*) and the intelligible being (*Buddistha sattā*). Now what is the ideal or intelligible reality has been called intelligible being or even 'philosophical being' by Tiwari (vol. I. p. 50).

Contrary to external being which is limited only to present, philosophical or intelligible being is the being or 'ideas' or 'concepts' which may be of existence as well as of non-existence, of the past as well as of the future. That is why this *sattā* (intelligible being) has been defined as *bhūtbhaviṣyat sattā*—a being existent as past and as future as well; it is *bhāvābhāvasādhāraṇa*—that is, it flashes positively as being and non-being as well.

Amongst various levels of language, it is the *Madhyamā* which attracts utmost notice from Tiwari. This does not mean that he underestimates the significance of other levels of speech. Tiwari is of the opinion that *vaikharī* is the level of language which forms the subject matter of disciplines like phonetics and linguistics. Similarly, the *Paśyantī* is the level of language which may be very interesting for spiritualists and mystics. However, as far as philosophers are concerned, they are and should be interested to that level of language where it is concept, idea or thought. *Madhyamā* is the language as concept or thought. It is the real language, which is manifested by *Vaikharī* or articulate utterances.

Madhyamā is the language as thought or intelligible being, the being revealed in the mind of speaker as well as of listeners. It figures in listeners after hearing to verbal-noises and in case of speakers' when they tend to speak (*antaḥ sannivesini śabda*). Tiwari says that one cannot intend to speak if there is no incentive and *Madhyamā śabda* serves as the cause of incentive. It is the flash of the mind of speakers; being manifested by articulate sounds, it reveals itself and its meaning non-differently. Thus, *Madhyamā* is a meaning revealing *śabda* (vol. I. p. 38). Concluding his remarks about *Madhyamā* and *Vaikharī* Tiwari says "what is understood by the word 'idea or thought –object that concerns thinking and reflecting' may be called *Madhyamā Śabda* and what is articulated through human speaking organs is called *Vaikharī* (vol.I.p.38)". According to Tiwari Bhartṛhari conceives *Madhyamā-Śabda* as *Sphoṭa* (vol.I.p.38).

It should be noted, that in Indian tradition four levels of speech have been generally accepted. These are — *Parā*, *Paśyantī*, *Madhyamā* and *Vaikharī*. However, Tiwari is of the opinion, and it is rightly so, that Bhartṛhari accepts only three of them — *Paśyantī*, *Madhyamā* and *Vaikharī*. Tiwari observes that the position of *Madhyamā* as *Madhyamā* (middle) can be justified only when three levels are accepted. He discusses this issue in length and concludes that *Parā*, beyond *Paśyantī*, cannot be distinguished as a separate level of speech (vol. I, p. 39).

According to the holistic philosophy of grammarians, sentences are the real units of language. Language is primarily an awareness, a concept or thought. Therefore, what is actually communicated by language is a complete thought an indivisible whole. Sentences are these indivisible wholes. *Vaiyākaraṇas* are not *Padavādins*. They do not believe that it is the words which are primary units of language. Primary units of language are those by which complete sense is revealed, and since these are revealed by sentences, so they are the primary units.

Tiwari writes "A *śabda* expresses a complete sense satiating further expectancy in the cognition of a complete meaning and for that the term *vākya* (sentence) is used. Manifested by garbs sentences reveal its own nature first from which meaning is revealed non-differently (vol. I. p. 151)." Tiwari has devoted a complete chapter in the book for the analysis of the concept of sentence. Here he discusses all the eight definitions of sentences given by Bhartṛhari and discusses each of them in length in the light of *Puṇyārāja's* commentary. The last two definitions that the sentence is indivisible whole (*ekonavayaḥ śabdaḥ*) and the sentence is a sequenceless, intelligible being (*budhyanusanhṛtivākya*) are accepted to grammarians. The first of these two holds that a sentence is an indivisible whole— a whole without parts. It is a complete unit of language, expressive of a unit of meaning that satiates further expectancy of completion of a sentential meaning.

By illustrating Bhartṛhari's analogy of a picture Tiwari explains the fact why complete meaning is not communicated by words or group of words, and it is one indivisible whole. Similarly *Buddhi*, in the definition '*budhyanusanhṛtivākya*' according to Tiwari, means flash of understanding in mind, and *annusanhṛti* denotes

sequencelessness. Thus according to Tiwari this definition suggests that a sentence is intelligible, sequenceless and meaning revealing unit and in this sense it is the same which is 'vākyasphoṭa'. Tiwari writes that the two definitions of the sentence as "eko'nvayaḥ śabdah" and "budhyanusanhrī" are not different. They emphasize the basic character of sentence as an indivisible whole without parts. While the first one emphasizes the sentence is not a collection of independent words; the second one highlights the sentence as a sequenceless flash of consciousness. Actually, in Bhartṛhari's philosophy Sphoṭa is defined as having both the characters, and hence according to these definitions Sphoṭa, the complete indivisible being, is the sentence, which is awareness by nature. Being flash, it is sequenceless.

The sentence is not just a set of utterances, they in fact are only instruments in manifesting the intelligible sequenceless sentence. Manifested by them sentence/Sphoṭa reveals itself and its meaning non-differently. Thus by analyzing the nature of sentence Tiwari comes across a beautiful argument for Sphoṭa. He says "Accomplishment of cognition cannot be possible if Sphoṭa as revealing being is not accepted. As verbal noises are destroyed before causing cognition, the question arises, what will be the expresser of meaning? As there is no expressed (vācya) possible without an expresser (vācaka), and as the verbal noises are only instrumental in manifestation the Sphoṭa, how can the expressed be explain without an expresser? Sphoṭa as an expresser of an expressed cannot be denied." (vol. I, p. 161)

If the chapter six of the volume I is devoted to the elaboration of the nature of sentence, the chapter eight is dedicated to the analysis of sentential meaning. The sentence is the signifier (vācaka) which is essentially the nature of flash, the question arises what is the nature of the signified (vācya)? In answer to the above question Tiwari discusses various views presented by rival schools of Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta and finally comes to the conclusion that they fail to explain the holistic cognitive nature of meaning. Tiwari in this context gives a sound analysis of six-fold definitions of sentential meaning and finds the grammarian theory of *pratibhā* as the best. He says "Different from the views mentioned above a sentence for Vaiyākaraṇas, is an inner, indivisible and real unit of awareness in nature i.e.

Sphoṭa and a sentential meaning is that it reveals non-differently that is *pratibhā*, Bhartṛhari uses the word 'pratibhā' for the sentential meaning, the flash of awareness expressed by Sphoṭa. Thus, Sphoṭa is the flash of language and the *pratibhā* is the same flash as meaning a clear and distinct flash. The indivisible flash is analyzed as the Sphoṭa, the expresser and as the *pratibhā*, the expressed and both are the objects of cognition," (vol. I, p. 192). Tiwari's approach to the analysis or *pratibhā* differs from other ancient and contemporary scholars in the respect that he is least interested in the concept of *pratibhā* as religions experience, as poetic-imagination, as element of creative-poetic power, as intuitive faculty, as yogic *prajñā* or as mystical experiences or intuition. Being a philosopher of language, he is interested in it only as meaning directly revealed by Sphoṭa

Tiwari's analysis of the concept of *pratibhā* compliments his cognitive and holistic understanding of language. Meaning revealed by sentence is not alien to it either in existence or in nature. Meaning is not external to language. Sentence and sentential meaning both are non-different and are of the same nature – the flash. *Pratibhā* as meaning of sentence is cognition or awareness and as such non-different from *Sphoṭa*. It is only, from the sense of duality or analysis, that from the point of view of language (expresser), it is called an expresser (*Sphoṭa*), and from the point of view of meaning, it is called the expressed (*Pratibhā*). But, in both cases, it is the intelligible being that we know in a cognition.

The author is very much critical of those who conceive of language and thought as separates. In fact, the whole book is a critique of metaphysical understanding of language, which takes meaning as transcendental to language. Those who share the views include non-grammarians Indians as well as the completely western series of scholars — the representationists and the referentialists. Meaning for the representationist thinkers is transcendental to language. This is one of the major drawbacks of contemporary philosophers of language. With them, the gap between language and thought or language and reality remains unabridged. Contrary to their view for the grammarians signifier and signified or language and thought/meaning are infused and non-different.

Tiwari argues, that if language and thought are different and meaning is transcendental to language the analysis of language will not then be analysis of thought; it would be difficult to accept philosophy as system of analysis of language for clarification of thought, and, hence it will be an aimless game. If thought is taken not only as different but transcendental to language, how can the clarification of former by analysis of the latter be achieved? On the other hand, since *Vaiyākaraṇas* take language as thought/concept, this problem never arises within them.

The author criticizes in detail the views of Frage, Wittgenstein, Ayer, Austin and others and finds their understanding of language is based on the presumption of the duality of reference and referent. Language is taken here as reference and meaning as referent. The drawback with this theory is that here meaning as referent becomes transcendental to language. Hence, language and thought or reference and referent are separate to such extent that the latter becomes such exterior to the former that no link can relate them. Language does not touch the meaning. It can hardly indicate the referent from outside and cannot make it known.

Tiwari has advanced several arguments against the representationists' theory (vol. I. pgs. 6-8, 89-95), 13th chapter volume I. I will not go in detail here, though they deserve serious study by scholars of language. Problems with reference theory were realized by representationists themselves, and hence we later find Wittgensteinians talking about non-referential functions of language and incorporating use, context, convention, etc. in their discourses. Tiwari, though applauding such approaches, is of the firm view these are just ultra-virus elements and cannot help in arriving towards a proper theory of language. Two of the major objections of Tiwari against

contemporary philosophy of language must deserve our attention. One of these is that the contemporary theorist estimate language from the view of meaning which is transcendental and separate from language.

Language is just a tool or vehicle of meaning for them. They place meaning in the center of their enquiries and give primacy to it. The other objection is even more foundational. It somehow also explains why the above-mentioned attitudes towards language do arise. Tiwari calls this the metaphysical understanding of language. “Language as references, designation, representation and like are examples of metaphysical understanding of language (p. 2).” Language here is a pointer to or an indicator to something ontic in nature.

The whole of Tiwari’s project is based against these two basic understandings of language and meaning. Tiwari’s cognitive holism is a cognitive understanding of language in place of metaphysical rendering of it where primacy has been given to language itself in place of meaning. Meaning in a cognitive holism is what the language expresses; it is never found separate from language. According to this expressive or active theory of language, language is potency, an energy that can function in different forms and many ways as reference, representation, designation and other illocutionary senses as well. In fact, language can express itself and its meaning in infinite ways.

Logic of autonomy of language suggests that the meaning of language should not be something alien to it; rather it should be its own part only. Meaning flashes by language, it is not known independently of language rather language infuses it. It is what the language expresses and is cognized only when the language flashes it. The meaning is eternally infused by language, and that is why the analysis of meaning takes place by the analysis of language. Tiwari argues “to analyze language and to conceive ‘I analyze meaning’ is possible only when language that we analyze is taken to infuse meaning otherwise, no cognitive activity will be possible; doing activities through language and taking language as separate and transcendental to thought is a misconceived, misguided attempt causing unsolvable confusion(vol.I.p.94)”.

Cognitive holism holds that what we know is the flashes of our mind. Moreover, what flashes in our mind is the language and its meaning. Thus, our cognition is confined to the world of words and its meaning. Compared to the world of external things, which are ontic in nature the word of language and its meaning is a world of ideas and thoughts, which Bhartṛhari calls *buddistha-sattā* and Professor Tiwari calls intelligible being. This intelligible being is secondary being which exists only as idea compared to the primary being, which is the being of thing in-themselves. This is the *Mukhya-sattā* or *bāhya-sattā* Tiwari empathetically asserts that as cognition is flash of language and always infused with it, intelligible being of language and meaning are only philosophical objects.

All our knowledge, philosophical analysis and reflection are confined to this world of intelligible beings. As far as the world of primary being is concerned, as it is never in touch of language, it never became an object of our knowledge. This non-

cognitive world may be of interest and a place for day-to-day concern and activities for common people but this world has nothing to do with a philosopher's concern. Referring to the famous line of Helārāja "Vaiyākaraṇānām śabdārtho hyarthahḥ na vastvarthorthahḥ." Tiwari says that for a philosopher of language meaning is what the language expresses and not the thing in-itself. Hence a philosopher's concern is, and should be confined to, word of intelligible beings only: "A philosophical reflection has nothing to do with things or things in-themselves, whether they are eternal or transient." "*Kim na etena idam nityam idam anityam vā iti.*" (vol. I, p. 71)

The term cognitive holism may suggest readers that Tiwari is somehow giving primacy to cognitive aspect of mind as compared to other aspects like emotions and volitions. In fact, this is one of the major objections raised against Indian theories of language and consciousness. Moreover, this becomes more pertinent when we keep in our view that the world of language is the world of intellect (intelligible beings). Therefore, this *prima facie* suggests that the world of language is the world of intellect. If we go deeper, we find that what Tiwari is aiming/doing here is just presenting an epistemology of cognition of meaning of words. Meaning revealed to us is indivisible awareness that may include within it the cognitive, emotive, and volitional as the language expresses. In fact, Tiwari's firm view is that language is primarily injunctive. Action/duty is the primary end for which the whole exercise of language is meant. That is why it should not sound contradictory when he claims that his cognitive holism is based on active theory of language.

In fact, a whole chapter has been devoted to explicate the epistemology of actions and morals. Other contemporary scholars also are of the opinion that Bhartṛhari best explains beauty and Arts, thus, cognition in cognitive holism does not suggest any preference to rational aspect of intellect. It stands for awareness, a flash. Tiwari is conscious of this possible misunderstanding. That is why he in the very beginning makes clear that he is using the term 'cognition' in the sense of awareness or flash of consciousness which includes the flashing of the intelligible beings of emotional, volitional, intuitive and transcendental aspects of consciousness as well.

This book is unique in the sense that it does talk about the spiritual goal of philosophy of language. Philosophy of language is a royal road to liberation. It is freedom from the captivity of some or the other things, theories and their allegiance. The problem lies in the fact that we stick to this or that ideology and our journey to freedom is imprisoned to that. Language expresses cognition without any dependency on things and our allegiance to them. Cognition as such thus, is a pure flash and disinterested. Interested knowledge emerges only when this pure and disinterested cognition is imposed on our passions, emotions, physiological, physiological, culture and religious things and our allegiance to them. We should concentrate on disinterested cognition and practice avoiding knowing by imposing. Philosophy differentiates what is distinctly, and determinedly, cognized by language and its imposition on emotions, passions and other allegiances. A true philosopher is one who knows discriminately what is revealed and what is imposed.

Language according to Vaiyākaraṇas is not confined to garbs or tokens of a system or signs we utter, listen, write or read which stand by proxy for the expresser; they are only tools in the manifestation of the expresser that when manifested by them, flashes forth by its own nature from which its meaning flashes non-differently. *Garbs manifest the concept, then manifested so the concept reveals itself which we call the flashing of consciousness. Thus both the verbal — noises (garbs) and the expresser (Sphoṭa) are involved in the accomplishment of communication and both taken jointly is called śabda.* The former instruments the manifestation of Sphoṭa that reveals itself and its meaning non-differently.

As Bhartṛhari's verse '*Dvā upādāna śabdeṣu śabdo śabda vidoviduḥ. Eko nimittam śabdānām aparārthe prayujyate (vākyapadīya 1/44)*' suggests a *śabda* in fact is a blend of the two – the meaning revealing 'unit that is Sphoṭa' and the verbal noises/ utterances that is *dhvani*. The former is of the nature of awareness and the latter is that of the material tool or instrument (that helps the manifestation of the former) in manifesting the forme,

Sphoṭa from the point of view of speaker is the cause of production of *dhvani* and *dhvani* being produced by Sphoṭa is the cause of manifestation of Sphoṭa in the audience. From the point of view of the hearers, *dhvani* is the cause or Sphoṭa because it causes manifestation of Sphoṭa. Communication is neither a sheer activity of hearing nor that of uttering. It is not confined even to the act of uttering or hearing only, rather it is the accomplishment of cognition in which uttering and hearing serves as tool only. What is heard and uttered are articulate utterance (*dhvani*) which from the cognitive point of view is only the tool that invokes revelation of the intelligible being of language – Sphoṭa. The conceptual/ intelligible level of language (Sphoṭa) is a cognitive unit and hence foundational to communication

There are three factors involved in language according to the grammarians: 1. First there is articulate utterance or verbal — noise (*dhvani*) which manifests; 2. The Sphoṭa, the concept, the idea or thought, the intelligible being of language (the expresser) which expresses itself and 3. Its meaning (*pratibhā*), the expressed.

Thus language involves three factors —*Dhvani*, Sphoṭa, and *pratibhā*. *Dhvani* is articulate sound, which manifests the Sphoṭa, the Sphoṭa is the meaning —revealing unit, the expresser or the signifier, and the *pratibhā* is the meaning, the signified, the expressed, the flash of understanding.

The whole process of linguistic communication is this: first, there is flashing of concept in the mind of the speaker. An idea bursts forth in the mind of speaker. This causes incentive to speak and hence articulate utterances-verbal noises,-sounds (*dhvani*). These utterances are grasped by auditory sense of the hearer, and Sphoṭa is manifested in the mind of the hearer by hearing the utterances. (Manifested by utterances Sphoṭa reveals itself and its meaning non-differently). Revelation of Sphoṭa occurs in the mind of hearers, which reveals meaning non-differently. This causes incentive to do or not to do something or otherwise.

The book "Dynamics Of Language" is a set of two volumes each divided into systemically arranged twelve and sixteen chapters respectively. These volumes discuss at length the various dynamics of language in perspective of Indian grammarian philosophy. Against metaphysical understanding of language, the book provides a cognitive approach to language. The relation of language with meaning, thought and reality have been discussed in the book keeping "language" at the center. Basic philosophy presented in the book is that language is power and expressive. Based on this expressive theory of language, the book discusses philosophy of the cognition of the world of words.

The author is of the firm view that our cognition, communication and reflections are not only based on but also confined to the intelligible beings of language and meaning. Throughout the book, the author aims towards working out a philosophy of language that is free from metaphysical, psychological, religious and other entities and our allegiance to them. After going through the book, one realizes that the author has been successful in his project.

The book analyzes very minutely and discusses at length almost all popular theories of language and meaning. The meanings of words, prefixes, suffixes and different theories of the word, the sentence, the word-meaning, the sentential meaning and the theories of verbal cognition have been discussed as according to the Indian grammarians taking serious account of the views and counter-arguments of the rival theories. The success of the book lies in the fact it discusses minutely some of the key problems of philosophy of language, specially Holistic understanding of language, Cognitive holism, Autonomy of language, Indivisibility thesis of language, Ontic non-being verses intelligible being, Language and possibility of disinterested knowledge, Language and logic of Translation and Analysis, Language and communication, Language and culture, meaning of moral expression, Problem of negation and Indescribable. The book explores these problems from contemporary perspective and in comparison with the Western counterparts as well. The exposition is full of arguments and counter arguments; the views and arguments of rival theories have been presented very honestly, and all this reminds one of argumentative style of ancient Indians.

Volume first of the book provides a critique of almost all popular theories of language, meaning, relation between them and the controversy on verbal-cognition examined well in light of advancement of knowledge. The volume follows author's reflection on the classical grammarian philosophy of India. It concludes in a way that culminates into a holistic philosophy of language.

Volume second discusses and analyzes the dynamics of language from this holistic prospective of cognition. The author claims "attempt is made here for the first time to investigate into dynamics of language; the concepts that are concerned directly with flashes or knowledge and that too in a way the analysis of those concepts is the same analysis of knowledge. It facilitates us to understand indivisible knowledge through its different perspectives." (vol. II. p. 5) The book successfully

keeps the promise of analyzing and interpreting the cognition by language afresh without any amalgamation of metaphysical, psychological, religious entities and our allegiance to them.

The last three chapters of the vol. II of the book are devoted to the philosophies of Jainism, Buddhism and Cārvāka. Here special mention should be made on studies of language in the last chapter, which discusses Cārvāka theory of *śabda*. In fact, Tiwari provides an entirely different story of Cārvāka based on Jayarāṣī's *Tattvopaplavasinhāḥ*. Tiwari complains that school of Cārvāka is interpreted by modern scholars in the light of Mādhavācārya' *Sarvadarśanasamgrahaḥ*. Though Jayarāṣī is much earlier to Mādhavācārya, the latter according to Tiwari had not gone through his *Tattvopaplavasinhāḥ*. Had he gone through it the story of Cārvāka would have been quite another. Tiwari here discusses in length the 14th Chapter of *Tattvopaplavasinhāḥ- śabdapramāṇasya nirāsaḥ*, which is centered at the refutation of theories of verbal cognition. He presents the arguments of Jayarāṣī one by one and evaluates it honestly.

In fact, Tiwari's exposition here may be viewed as a commentary of the referred chapter. Tiwari's analysis of Jain philosophy of language is also very significant one for this is one of the most neglected area of Jainism. Barring a few scholars like Sagarmal Jain, none has taken serious note of Jain Philosophy of language. The book under review not only discusses ancient classical scholars in this regard but also takes in consideration of Sargarmal Jain's book. His view on Jain position examines the position of Jains regarding 'indescribable'. Tiwari finds himself in total disagreement with it. He writes "Philosophically, the position of Jainas leads to a dichotomous situation. If indescribable (*avācya*) remains indescribable, how can it be described by the term indescribable (*avācya*)? Jainas may say that *avācya* is *avācya* only because it is the object of knowledge partially by experience and absolutely by Sadhanā" (vol. II. p. 239). In the chapter on the Meaning of Religious Ideas of Buddhism, the author starts his discussion with a brilliant account of the Buddhist notion of construction and verbal meaning. I fail to understand why he instead of delivering on those unnecessarily engages himself with the Buddhist notion of *pāramitas* and *Daśabhūmis*

The language and arguments furnished in the defense of his thesis are quite simple and can be understood by any reader interested in the philosophy of language and grammar. The only drawback, which I find with the book, is that it is full of proof-mistakes. It appears as if no editorial effort has been made in this regard. The title of the chapter nine in the content of the second volume is missing. The font of these volumes is too small to be read. I hope all these would be taken in notice in future editions of the book. I congratulate the author for his thought-provoking discussion and reasoned arguments in the defense of his views that scales the contribution of the book to a philosophical height.

A major strange point of cognitive holism of Prof. Tiwari is that it limits language to the world of intelligible beings. Philosophical reflections are confined to

the world of words that is intelligible beings. Knowledge is expressed by and infused by language and the language does not touch the reality independently from intelligible beings. Things in - themselves remain beyond the grasp hence unknown. This situation may not be unwelcome to grammarians but for some philosophers it would be an embarrassing situation. It is true that a grammarian is and should be interested only to the world of words but as far as a philosopher and particularly a philosopher of language is concerned one of his major tasks is to explain the relation between language and the reality, language and things lying outside it. Tiwari has discussed the issue of intelligible being and primary being in such a way that what has been called otherwise a secondary being in Bhartṛhari's philosophy becomes primary to Tiwari's analysis when he says that a philosopher's concern is and should be confined to only intelligible beings

The reason why reality in Tiwari's Cognitive holism remains philosophically interesting is that he overestimates the Western notion of 'concept', 'thought' and 'logos'. Throughout the book in the most of the places, he has identified the nature of language as 'concept' or 'thought'. However, it would be injustice to Tiwari if we say that he is not aware of the consequences of Logocentricism. *In fact, we find him repeatedly making a distinction between a 'concept' and a 'flash of concept', and identifying the Sphoṭa often with the second one, similarly he repeatedly tries to make a distinction between 'proposition' and 'vākya-Sphoṭa'.* It is clear to him that Sphoṭa is not an abstraction and ultimately it is a flash of awareness.

The pit-falls of logocentric and representative theory of meaning have been discussed very scholarly by him in the book so many places. Likewise, efforts have been made brilliantly to overcome the duality of language and meaning or language and thought. We find him arguing the indivisible theory of language where meaning does not remain a transcendental signified; it is infused with language. Meaning and thought become integral to language, they no longer are separate or exterior to it. But nevertheless, we find him so many places equating language with 'concept', 'idea', or 'logos' and unnecessarily paying undue emphasis on intelligible being and excluding the primary being from his cognitive world. Had Tiwari advanced his argument of identifying language and meaning a little further, he would have found that ultimately reality is not transcendental to language. Language and reality are in tuned and infused with. They are not two, but one

The value of language lies in expressing knowledge and that of knowledge in causing incentive to action. Cognitive holism is an action-oriented theory of language. The whole enterprise of language is here meant for action. Tiwari rejects out rightly the contemporary theories of moral language, which, hold moral language as meaningless. In the chapter eleven entitled 'The Meaning of Moral Language: Indian Perspective' of the Volume II of the book Tiwari examines the contemporary meta-ethical theories of the West and finds them unsound. In this context, he specially criticizes the theories provided in Language, Truth and Logic, Ethics and Language and the language of Morals. Against the non-cognitivists Tiwari holds that moral

judgment is cognitive and against logical positivists, he holds the theory that moral language is not only meaningful but also in some sense Verifiable.

Tiwari remarks “a moral sentence, unlike the factual sentences that expresses facts, is expressive of duty, and is basically an object of evaluation and is verified by the duty performed on its basis.” (Vol. II, p. 200). This does not mean that Tiwari advocates the verification theory. In fact, he is too critical of representative theory of language. For him language is expressive and all sentences are expressive by nature. Factual, non-factual, descriptive, emotive, perspective, all expressions express- their respective meaning because of which we know them so distinctly by the respective sentences. A J. Ayer type meaningful—meaningless criteria of type Boolean true-false criteria may be valuable for factual propositions, but as far as moral sentences are concerned, they are neither befitting nor applicable.

The testability thesis totally fails. “Moral sentences are based on human conduct the performance of which is evidential for their value; their meaning is expressed by the sentences themselves and thus need not require verification based on the corresponding fact in the empirical world (Vol.II.p.206)”. As moral sentences are sentences related with duty and not with facts, Tiwari rejects the correspondence criterion in any of its forms. Hence, the theory of utilitarianism, or rather all sorts of consequentialists theories are also rejected because somehow or other they are based on the fact or correspondence. In way the author makes ‘duty’ in the center and the way he vehemently attacks the consequentialists he appears to be advocating the deontologist’s position. However, in some other place he openly favors for the virtue ethics

Tiwari tries his best to provide a complete analysis of moral language as according to Indian theorists. In this regard, his attempt is commendable and unique. He advances a number of arguments to prove why language is primarily an action oriented. His arguments are justifiably agreeable. Being a Grammarian, he is able to show that action is the central meaning of the sentences. As we know according to Grammarians ‘verb’ is called *ākhyāta* that expresses an action without which communication cannot be accomplished by language. Use of mere nominal words cannot satiate the expectancy for a complete sense, whereas ‘verb’ conveys the complete sense. Hence, there is no sentence isolated from ‘verbs’ (*eka tiñ vākyaṃ*). It is not only that a ‘verb’ is sentence because the complete sense is expressed by it but also the use of nominal word alone, if verb is implied with it, is a sentence. Analyzing in length the nature of words, sentences, sentential division, stems, *lakāras*, suffixes Tiwari shows that Indian theorists as framed and formed keeping primacy or action or duty interpret words and sentences in view. Language as well as the world here is totally action oriented. Tiwari remarks, “...for the thesis presented herein, life is the constant process of action and the theorists give importance to duty to the extent that they provide subordinate importance to the sentences lacking some or the other duty.” They accept that all sorts of verbs are derived from verbs/ roots; recognize verbs as the central word and action as the central meaning of sentences. (Vol. II, p. 208)

Advancing his argument further for the meaningfulness of moral sentences Tiwari says that language expresses emotive, prescriptive and different meanings and its uses as reference, representation, designation and other ways on that basis, it performs several functions. With these differences, it is not philosophical to concentrate on any one out of its different sorts of functions, as the only meaningful function of the language, and this will be the overlooking of the cognition that is expressed. All expressions express their meanings and this is so with moral language too. Moral sentences are well distinguished by the 'should/ought' applications; it expresses its meaning non-differently.

The knowledge expresses by them causes incentive to a duty and a conduct following them is evidential in valuation of their meaningfulness. If the conduct follows the incentive it is good, and if it deviates it is bad. The incentive contains three parts (i) the duty to be performed (*Sādhyā*), (ii) means to that duty (*Sādhanā*) and, (iii) application of the duty (*Itikartavyatā*), which collectively are called (*bhāvanā*) expression of duty. This *bhāvanā* is always for a duty of welfare and not for otherwise, and that is why it is called *Dharma*. Concluding his remarks Tiwari asks- "How can a sentence expressing an action comprising all the three parts of an action be meaningless?" (Vol. II, p. 208)

Cognitive holism emerged in Tiwari's discussions in the volumes under review is a trend of philosophy potential enough to be learnt for an updated and fresh insight into the problems of philosophy. I observe Tiwari's interpretation on active theory of knowing, the infusion of language and cognition, concept of intelligible being, the problem of identical cognition, arguments against proposition as abstraction, autonomy of language, determinate versus indeterminate cognition, dichotomies of interested and disinterested, analytic and indivisible, verity and validity of cognition, difference between Being and being, between objects of cognition and cognition itself and controversy over language between the word-theorist's and the sententialist's, his argument of language oriented against meaning oriented philosophies are philosophically precise and consistent, attractive and outstanding.

Arguments, discussions and evaluation of concepts undertaken in the book and his style of differing or agreeing with rival theories are commendable. The author's perception of cognitive holistic interpretation and his claim that cognitive holistic approach to philosophical problems, I am sure will attract the philosophers in time to come. I hope the book is a great help to the intellectuals who are sick of the same taste of the scholarly books on history of Indian Philosophy describing the same issues in similar way without caring novelty and to those seeking some challenge in the field of philosophical reflection. I am sure scholars and students of philosophy, in general, and Philosophy of language will welcome the book globally, in particular.